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Preface
Economic integration in Europe is proceeding on two fronts. The European
Community is taking further steps towards the deepening of integration after
having completed the Internal Market. At the same time, the widening of inte-
gration through an enlargement of EC membership is likely to result in a com-
mon market encompassing most of Europe. The EC's trading partners are wor-
ried about their access to European markets, and about possible shifts in com-
parative advantages that may be induced by economic integration in Europe.
Such concerns are most pronounced in developing countries that have followed
outward-oriented development strategies and for which the EC is an important
export market.
Against this background, this study evaluates the effects of European inte-
gration on trade and economic growth in EC member countries and on the com-
petitive position of non-European suppliers. The Internal Market programme is
shown to encourage structural adjustment within the EC, which, in turn, domi-
nates the effects on third countries. The magnitude of these effects depends on
the degree of association with the EC, the extent of mutual trade relations and
the structure of production in member and non-member countries. It turns out
that EFTA countries are most affected by the integration process. By contrast,
marginal overall effects are revealed for the United States and Japan.
As concerns developing countries, the study argues against the likelihood of
substantial trade diversion at the expense of these countries arising from the
Internal Market programme. Adverse effects are shown to be largely restricted
to exporters of specific agricultural products and skill-intensive manufactures.
On the whole, developing countries are expected to maintain their comparative
advantages in sectors in which they have successfully penetrated EC markets in
the past. Taking income-induced demand effects into account, net welfare ef-
fects of European integration on developing countries will be small, but posi-
tive rather than negative.
The study is part of a joint research project entitled Regional Integration and
Its Impact on Developing Countries, which was initiated and funded by the In-
stitute of Developing Economies (IDE) in Tokyo and encompassed studies of
regional integration schemes in North America, Asia and Europe. A prelimi-
nary version of the study was presented at a workshop held in Tokyo on 3-4
February 1993. The authors are particularly grateful to Dr. Koichi Ohno and his
colleagues at IDE who bore the main burden of coordinating the project and
provided intellectual and organizational support. Thanks are also due to the dis-
cussants who provided valuable comments at the Tokyo meeting.IX
The authors wish to thank their colleagues at the Kiel Institute for their help
in completing the analysis presented in this study. The collection and the pro-
cessing of data were efficiently handled by Angela Husfeld and Michaela Rank.
The burden of typing the manuscript rested with Ingrid Gleibs, Gretel Gliss-
mann, Ingrid Lawaetz, Birgit Wolfrath and Christiane Yildiz. Use Biixenstein-
Gaspar and Korinna Werner provided the editing expertise. These acknowl-
edgements notwithstanding, the authors accept responsibility for all remaining
errors and omissions.
Kiel, February 1994 Horst SiebertA. Introduction
The European Community (EC) has evolved considerably since the Treaty of
Rome (EEC) was implemented in 1958. The deepening and widening of inte-
gration have transformed the EC from a mere customs union with six members
into a fully fledged single market with twelve members and a wide range of
association and preferential trading arrangements. During the remainder of this
decade, this process is to continue, with enlargements of EC membership
(EFTA countries), further association agreements (Central and Eastern Europe)
and the eventual establishment of an economic and monetary union. The EC is
well on the way to a regional trading bloc encompassing most of Europe.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that non-Europeans, and de-
veloping countries (DCs) in particular, worry about their access to the large
European Single Market, about shifts in comparative advantages generated by
economic integration and about a possible reversal of international capital
flows that a Europe "without borders" may entail. The EC member countries
have traditionally been important trading partners of DCs. Changes in demand,
market accessibility and investment flows will have an immediate effect on the
welfare of these countries, especially when they have followed an outward-
oriented development strategy, such as many Asian DCs have.
The purpose of this study is to assess the effects of the Internal Market pro-
gramme and of related changes currently under way in Europe on the trade and
growth prospects of EC member countries and the competitive position of sup-
pliers from third countries, especially DCs, on EC markets. Towards this end,
the rationale and the scope of institutional change in the EC is evaluated in
Chapters B and C. The completion of the internal market for goods, services,
capital and labour goes hand in hand with an enlarged network of policy coor-
dination agreements with the EFTA countries and countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. The emergence of the European Economic Space (EES) and
the association of formerly centrally planned economies has increased trade
policy discrimination among trading partners and has rendered the trade policy
regime of the EC even more complex and non-transparent than it already was
prior to 1993 [Hiemenz et al., 1990]. Chapter D highlights the degree of policy
coordination achieved so far, as well as the expected effects on economic
growth and the structure of production and trade in EC member countries.
Chapter E deals with the economic implications of European integration for the
main beneficiaries, the EFTA and Central and Eastern European countries, and
for non-European industrialized countries.
Chapter D and E provide the parameters for an analysis of the external reper-
cussions of European integration on DCs that is undertaken in the remainingpart of the study. Chapter F focuses on the trade prospects for DCs on EC mar-
kets in a more general fashion, while sensitive product categories are scruti-
nized in greater detail in Chapter G. The study concludes (Chapter H) that de-
veloping countries do not need to fear an erosion of their trading opportunities
in an integrating Europe if they respond in a flexible manner to the institutional
changes that are being implemented in the 1990s.B. EC 1993
I. Background of EC Common Market
The foundation of European economic integration was internal trade liberaliza-
tion. Intra-EC trade was successively liberalized in three major stages. The
first, starting in 1958, was the elimination of customs duties and quantitative
restrictions. It was completed on 1 July 1968 with the introduction of a com-
mon external tariff, i.e. when the customs union became fully operative. The
second, between 1973 and 1986, witnessed the stepwise enlargement of the EC
from six to twelve member countries and the conclusion of various free trade
and preferential trading agreements with neighbouring industrialized countries
(mainly EFTA countries) as well as DCs around the Mediterranean Sea (Synop-
tical Table 1). During the 1970s and early 1980s, however, global economic
setbacks, rising inflation, surging oil prices and problems of structural adjust-
ment worked against a further deepening of economic integration among EC
members [GATT, 1991, p. 55]. In 1985, a comprehensive and ambitious ap-
proach was launched to revitalize the integration process: the completion of the
Single Market by the end of 1992, which marks the third and last stage of inter-
nal trade liberalization.
The strategy toward achieving a common market in the EC was first laid out
in the White Paper on Completing the Internal Market presented by the Com-
mission on 15 July 1985 [EC Commission, 1985]. The legal basis for the Inter-
nal Market programme was brought about by the Single European Act, which
came into effect on 1 July 1987 and established the required institutional re-
forms. The White Paper enumerated close to 300 proposals for adoption by the
Council of EC Ministers and implementation by the member states. By the end
of 1992, about 90 per cent of these proposals had been dealt with at the Com-
munity level, while implementation was lagging behind in general and in some
member states (e.g. Italy) even more so than in others. The proposals concerned
the following major issues (Synoptical Table 2).
After the EC member countries had accomplished a free trade area and a
customs union, the Internal Market programme meant the establishment of a
common market without internal borders and border controls. To achieve this,
EC member countries primarily had to liberalize factor movements and trade in
services within the EC. Concerning manufactures, trade had already beenSynoptical Table 1 — EC Regional Agreements
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liberalized earlier except for a relatively small number of products (including
those covered by the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA)) for which national quotas
still existed. Such quotas had to be removed. Furthermore, market access is to
be based on the country-of-origin principle, but certain technical standards,
public procurement, the provision of subsidies and VAT were harmonized
within the EC. For years it was not clear, though, how and when these policy
changes would be fully implemented and how suppliers from third countries
might fit into the new framework [for details, see Dicke, Langhammer, 1991].
As concerns restrictions of manufactured imports, the trade policies of indi-
vidual member countries differed widely with respect to product and country
coverage. In addition to MFA quotas, the GATT [1991, p. 12] listed some 50bilateral restraint agreements involving the EC, individual member states or
even their industries. These measures took many different forms (e.g. official
quotas or "voluntary" export restraint agreements) and were implemented in a
wide range of sectors, including traditional as well as technologically advanced
manufactures. According to EC data on the number of eight-digit product cate-
gories subject to quantitative restrictions [Amtsblatt der Europaischen Gemein-
schaften, 1991] most bilateral measures originated in France, Italy, Portugal
and Spain, and were directed towards exports from Japan and Asian newly in-
dustrializing economies (NIEs) [Mobius, 1991, pp. 19 ff.].
Suppliers from these countries were also among the prime targets of anti-
dumping measures. The EC ranks among the most intense users of such meas-
ures world-wide, and a total of 279 measures were implemented in 1980-1989,
mostly in the form of price undertakings [GATT, 1991, pp. 17 ff.]. Messerlin
[1989] has shown for 1980-1985 that the anti-dumping procedures of the EC
had a strong protectionist drift: imported quantities were reduced by as much as
40 per cent, and anti-dumping duties were rather severe when they were im-
posed.
As concerns trade policy, most of the often redundant national import quotas
were dismantled. Until recently, however, there was a core of national quotas,
for example, for cars, iron and steel, textiles and clothing, and agricultural
products, that were effective under the safeguard provision of Art. 115 EEC
Treaty. The number of new Art. 115 restrictions authorized fell from 119 in
1989 to 8 in 1992 [GATT, 1993, Vol. A, p. 20]. Although "the Single European
Act provides no scope, as from 1 January 1993, for any internal trade measures
against imports from external sources" [ibid, p. vii], the legal provisions of Art.
115 remain in force as they were included in the Maastricht Treaty. The future
destiny of trade in agricultural and MFA products has been decided upon in the
Uruguay Round. The EC yielded to international pressure and agreed to a re-
duction of support granted to agriculture and the gradual liberalization of trade
in textiles and clothing. Apart from the recent accord (July 1991) between the
EC Commission and Japan concerning EC imports of Japanese cars (see Sec-
tion E.III), no new export restraint arrangements have been concluded by the
EC in the past two years. Moreover, many former arrangements have expired.
Hence, the widespread fears of a "Fortress Europe" appear to have been exag-
gerated, even though the tightened application of anti-dumping measures and
safeguard provisions, as well as the French pressure for higher import protec-
tion, will continue to create uncertainty among exporters from non-member
countries.II. Rationale of Integration
From the early 1970s, trade liberalization did not progress very much within
the EC. Rather, benefits from integration were derived from the enlargement of
community membership. However, these benefits could hardly offset the detri-
mental effects of an increasingly difficult external economic environment char-
acterized by world-wide recession, high rates of inflation and substantial
changes in relative prices as the result of successive oil price hikes. The eco-
nomic slow-down experienced in the EC is well reflected by the key indicators
presented in Table 1. In 1973-1980, real growth of the gross domestic product
(GDP) declined to less than half of its 1960-1973 size and by another 30 per
cent in the first half of the 1980s when investment and employment were even
shrinking in absolute terms. Inflation rates reached unprecedented levels, there
were sustained current account deficits and public debt augmented consider-
ably. A similar picture emerges from the trade data given in Table 2. Intra-EC
export shares confirm the stages of integration identified in Section B.I. These
shares increased steadily following the Treaty of Rome, jumping from less than
40 per cent in 1958 to nearly 55 per cent in 1970. Thereafter, they remained
roughly constant at this level until 1985, but increased again in the second half
of the 1980s to reach over 60 per cent in 1990.
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Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities [d].Economic stagflation, structural rigidities and intensified competition from
external, i.e. in particular Japanese, suppliers had nourished a strong Euro-pes-
simism in the early 1980s when the term "Eurosclerosis" [Giersch, 1987] was
coined to describe the lack of dynamism in the European economies [see also
Buigues, Goybet, 1985]. This is the background against which the Commission
decided to take a bold step to revitalize the integration process by completing
the Single Market. It was expected that the removal of all internal barriers to
trade and factor movements would trigger a supply-side shock to the EC econo-
mies and that larger markets would offer opportunities to increase production,
to improve the allocation of resources and to reap economies of scale. It was
also expected that the resulting productivity gains would improve the internal
and external competitiveness of European firms and bring prices down, thus
stimulating domestic demand. Furthermore, output growth and higher competi-
tiveness were supposed to create new employment opportunities, to reduce in-
flation rates and to ease the budget constraint of government.
The expected welfare gains from the completion of the Single Market were
estimated in two ex ante studies commissioned by the EC Commission, the fa-
mous Emerson and Cecchini Reports [Emerson et al., 1988; Cecchini, 1988].
According to these studies, the removal of technical barriers to trade, the aboli-
tion of border controls, more competition in public procurement and the open-
ing of major services markets would boost the EC's GDP by between 2.5 and
6.4 per cent over a period of roughly 5 years. These results ignited a heated de-
bate both in the general public and in academic quarters within the EC as well
as in third countries. Critical comments focused on the true size of gains from
integration, in particular the neglect of effects from structural adjustment, and
the at most parenthetical reference to the effect on the rest of the world. The
latter led to the perception shared by many DCs that the EC may try to restrict
the access of outsiders to the benefit of integration, i.e. by erecting a Fortress
Europe. These aspects will be elaborated in Sections D.III and E below.
III. The GATT, the Uruguay Round and the EC
The relationship between the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the EC has always been somewhat strained for several reasons. First, only
EC member countries are contracting parties to the GATT, not the EC as such.
The Commission has nonetheless the mandate to negotiate at the GATT rounds
on behalf of its members. The mandate results from consensus-building among
the members. Therefore, the preparation and modification of proposals takes10
time, and more often than once proposals merely represent a careful balancing
of benefits and costs among member countries rather than true support of a
multilateral trading system. This tendency was reinforced by the institutional
shortcoming that there is no special EC council of ministers for trade policy (as
is the case for, e.g. agriculture or finance). The Commission now reports to the
General Affairs Council of EC Foreign Ministers and to informal trade councils
[Pelkmans, Murphy, 1991, p. 17].
J This means that the Uruguay Round vies for
attention with issues such as the political relations between the EC and EFTA,
Central and Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Agri-
cultural Council claims responsibility for determining the direction of EC agri-
culture policy as concerns the GATT.
Second, multilateralism has never taken precedence over regionalism in ex-
ternal EC trade policies. To use the EC's words [GATT, 1991, Vol. II, p. 32]:
"... the basic attitude in favour of the multilateral trade system has ..., since the
inception of the GATT, existed hand-in-hand with its enthusiastic support for
and active involvement in free trade arrangements of a regional character". Fol-
lowing this policy guideline, the EC has adopted a rather broad interpretation
of GATT Article XXIV, which provides a waiver for deviations from the most-
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment of regional trade agreements. The main
reason for the trade policy stance of the EC is, of course, the very nature of the
EC itself. While it can be argued whether the EC has actually met the pro-
visions of Article XXIV [see the discussion in Arndt, Willet, 1991], it seems
safe to state that the completion of the Single Market has brought the EC closer
to the requirements for GATT-legal customs unions, which stipulate the elimi-
nation of internal barriers on the bulk of trade among member countries with-
out raising external barriers. However, the persistent restrictions on external
trade in agricultural products remain a weakness.
In pursuit of its own interpretation of Article XXIV, the EC has adopted
trade policies that are extremely discriminatory among regions and countries
(see also Synoptical Table 1 and Hiemenz et al. [1990]). It maintains a multi-
layer system of trade preferences vis-a-vis third countries on a reciprocal or
unilateral basis. Preferences are granted in the context of free trade agreements
(FTAs) (EFTA countries, Israel), through a wide range of association and coop-
eration agreements (including the Lome Convention) and the Community's
generalized system of preferences (GSP) scheme. A major distinction between
these arrangements is that the FTAs and association agreements result from ne-
Responsibility for applying anti-dumping procedures and other short-term meas-
ures still rests with the Council. A group of member states have vetoed french
initiatives to shift more jurisdiction from the Council to the Commission. This veto
has been the main reason why the harmonization of national quotas is still pending.11
gotiations and, therefore, have a contractual character whereas the GSP scheme
is a unilateral trade preference in favour of DCs that can be revoked annually.
In principle, the FTAs and the association and cooperation agreements pro-
vide for unrestricted and duty-free access for industrial products. In many
cases, trade in coal and steel (European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
products) and textiles is treated in a separate context. Agricultural products are
either completely excluded or subject to specific constraints as regards product
coverage, quantitative ceilings, minimum price requirements, seasonal calen-
dars, etc. This applies especially to those products that are under common
market organizations.
Special benefits are granted among DCs to Mediterranean and ACP coun-
tries. More generous treatment is provided in terms of access opportunities —
including rules of origin and regional cumulation possibilities — and policy
regimes (e.g. for sugar and bananas). In addition, the legal status and the re-
spective time-frames differ. While GSP preferences are not legally binding and
are subject to an annual review, the recent Lome-Convention with the ACP
countries has been enacted for a ten-year period. The agreements with the
Mediterranean countries are for an indeterminate time period.
Third, the differential treatment of DCs is a further reason for the GATT-EC
relationship that has always been somewhat strained. A stated objective of the
Community's external trade regime is to provide support to the development
and industrialization efforts of DCs. Trade privileges and the active support of
regional integration schemes among DCs are, thus, considered as development
aid policies of the EC. For these reasons trade preferences are not only differ-
entiated by regions or membership in an integration scheme but also by indi-
vidual countries according to income levels. The intention is to interfere with
the income distribution among DCs by granting substantial preferences to poor
countries while NIEs often face restricted access to the EC as in the case of
textiles. This mixture of aid and trade policies represented an impediment for
the negotiations on the phasing out of the MFA and is an important reason why
it is unlikely that the EC will abandon its discriminatory trade practices and
return to a wider application of the MFN principle in the near future.
EC trade policy objectives and the weakness in decision making on trade
policy matters have also overshadowed the negotiating stance of the EC in the
Uruguay Round. The opening of the GATT round in 1986 coincided with be-
ginning efforts to set up the Internal Market, and for quite some time the multi-
lateral negotiations took second place behind the Internal Market programme
[Page, 1991, p. 1554]. The Uruguay Round was considered as mostly technical
in nature, and there is ground to assume [Pelkmans, Murphy, 1991] that the EC
did not have a strategy for the negotiations but reacted defensively to US
attacks on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). An additional impediment12
for a more active participation of the EC in the Uruguay Round was the above
mentioned lack of an internal arbitration mechanism that could balance agricul-
tural and other interests. And finally, the mandate of the EC was not only re-
stricted by diverging interests among member countries but also by the attempt
to protect the privileged position of associated countries, particularly the for-
mer colonies in the ACP group. This has led the EC to clearly breach GATT
rules in such cases as the Sugar and the Banana Protocol.
Given these constraints, it is hardly surprising that the EC mainly adhered to
a defensive attitude in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Any change towards
becoming a more constructive GATT partner seems to have been contingent on
the progress made in internal liberalization for achieving the Internal Market.
Internal liberalization gave the EC greater negotiating leverage and expertize in
areas such as services, standards and public procurement. It facilitated a pre-
liminary accord between the EC, the US and major DCs such as Brazil and In-
dia with respect to the much disputed rules for trade in services and helped to
find a possible compromise for a gradual liberalization of trade in MFA prod-
ucts. Likewise, the EC had to find internal consensus in favour of a CAP re-
form before the Commission could attempt to break the deadlock of negotia-
tions with the US. Hopes for progress in GATT negotiations on agriculture
were frustrated, however, as France threatened to veto the so-called Blair
House Agreement of November 1992, in which the US administration and the
EC Commission had agreed on a substantial (21 per cent) reduction of subsi-
dized EC exports for certain agricultural products. The finally successful con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round reflects changing political priorities. The Uru-
guay Round was no longer considered as a technical matter. Since November
1991, when President Bush put the issue on the agenda of the EC/US Summit,
the importance of resolving the remaining conflicts had gained considerable
political weight. Thus, it became possible to overrule the powerful farm lobby
and other protectionist interest groups and reach an agreement on multilateral
trade liberalization.13
C. Beyond EC 1993
The economic landscape of Europe will continue to change considerably after
the completion of the Single Market. The Maastricht Treaty has done the
groundwork for the further integration deepening by establishing the timetable
and the conditions for the European Monetary Union (EMU) to be implemented
until the end of the decade. Negotiations on the formation of the EES with the
EFTA countries and association agreements with formerly socialist countries in
Central and Eastern Europe pave the way towards the widening of integration.
The final objective of closer economic cooperation between the EC and other
European countries is enlargement of EC membership, although neither the
countries desiring full membership nor the respective time frame for their ac-
cession have been identified. As concerns future integration, resentment was
expressed both in member (Denmark, Great Britain) and non-member (Switzer-
land) countries. This may indicate that economic integration in Europe may not
follow a smooth course, although intra-EC disputes on the Maastricht Treaty
have been largely resolved recently.
I. The European Monetary Union
The EMU represents the last step of European economic integration, i.e. the
transformation of the common market into an economic union. This step is
considered to be a precondition for a political union, the ultimate objective of
European integration. The EMU essentially means the introduction of a single
European currency issued by a common, independent central bank. The elimi-
nation of exchange rate risks among EC member countries is expected to re-
duce transaction costs in intra-EC trade and — together with stability-oriented
and disciplined budgetary policies — to improve the allocative efficiency of
the European economy. The plan dates back to 1988, when the heads of state
commissioned a report on ways and means to achieve economic and monetary
union. The report, drafted by a committee of central bankers under the chair-
manship of Jacques Delors, proposed a three-stage plan towards monetary un-
ion, with the last stage entailing a common currency and assignment of full
monetary and economic competences to EC institutions. Agreement on this
proposal was reached in the Maastricht Treaty of December 1991, which pro-14
vided for the introduction of a common currency sometime in 1997-1999, de-
pending on progress in economic convergence in the interim.
The EMU builds on the accomplishments of the Internal Market and the
European Monetary System (EMS). In preparing for the Internal Market, all
restrictions on capital flows among EC member countries were abandoned, a
necessary precondition for shock absorption in a common currency area. Until
recently, the EMS had narrowed exchange rate fluctuations among the curren-
cies of member countries to a small band. The eight core countries adhering to
this mechanism were joined by Spain and the United Kingdom on 20 June 1989
and 8 October 1990. Greece and Portugal remained outside the EMS. Events
since the last months of 1992 have, however, clearly indicated the fragility of
an exchange rate mechanism in the absence of consistent monetary and fiscal
policies as a response to external shocks such as the German unification and the
economic transformation of Eastern Europe. Relatively high rates of inflation
and fiscal deficits in Italy and the United Kingdom, for example, caused sub-
stantial pressure on the former countries' currencies requiring a major realign-
ment of exchange rates. Both countries suspended their participation in the
EMS and had not rejoined the mechanism by mid-1993. The entire system be-
came subject to major revisions in August 1993 when the margin for exchange
rate flexibility was extended to 15 per cent in each direction of the bilateral
parity and provisions for more rapid realignments were agreed upon.
The realization of EMU is supposed to follow the three-stage approach out-
lined in the Delors Report (Synoptical Table 3). The major decisions to be
taken in Stage I are already effective since in the economic field the Internal
Market programme is on track, the reform of the Structural Funds is in opera-
tion, and the mechanism governing coordination and surveillance was finalized
in early 1990. In the monetary field capital market liberalization is effective in
most member states, and monetary coordination is being strengthened within
the framework of the Committee of Central Bank Governors. The remaining as-
pects mainly relate to country-specific adjustments, i.e. participation in the
EMS, further convergence towards low inflation and budgetary adjustments.
In contrast to Stage I, which is basically defined in economic terms, Stage II
is mainly institutional in nature. It is meant to be a transitional stage only. The
Delors Report placed emphasis on the gradual transfer in Stage II of responsi-
bility for monetary policy. After intensive discussion among member states, the
emphasis has been placed more on the technical preparation of the Euro-Fed
institution in Stage II, on the grounds that policy responsibility must be clear-
cut. For this reason it is now widely considered that Stage II should be quite
short.15





Completion of the Internal Market
Strengthened competition policy
Full implementation of the reform of the
Structural Fund
Enhanced coordination and surveillance
Budgetary adjustments in high debt/deficit
countries
Evaluation and adaptation of Stage I poli-
cies
Review of national macroeconomic ad-
justments
Definitive budgetary coordination system




Enhanced monetary and exchange rate co-
ordination
Realignments possible, but infrequent
All EC currencies in the narrow-band ERM
Extended use of the ECU
Establishment of Euro-Fed
Possible narrowing of EMS bands
Euro-Fed in charge of monetary policy
Irrevocably fixed exchange rates or ECU
as single currency
Source: Emerson et al. [1992, p. 40].
The main aim of Stage III is then to introduce the common currency. The
timing of transition and membership in EMU will ultimately depend on the
speed of convergence in inflation rates, budget deficits and public debt. The
Maastricht Treaty has stipulated the following convergence criteria as a pre-
requisite for participation in EMU:
— a budget deficit not exceeding 3 per cent of GDP;
— a public debt stock not exceeding 60 per cent of GDP;
— a rate of consumer price inflation exceeding the inflation rate of the
three most stable member countries by no more than 1.5 percentage
points;
— a long-term nominal interest rate exceeding the rate in the three most
stable countries by no more than 2 percentage points.
By the end of 1996, the heads of the EC governments are to decide by a
(qualified) majority vote whether the majority of member countries are ready
for a currency union. In the case of a positive verdict, the currency union could
be introduced for these countries as of the beginning of 1997. In the case of a
negative verdict, countries that are then deemed to be ready for the union will
have to replace their currencies by a common one at the beginning of 1999.
The criteria are non-binding, however; they merely provide the basis for a rec-
ommendation of the EC Commission to the Council of the heads of EC gov-
ernments, which is free in its final decision. Hence, the criteria need not con-
strain the macroeconomic policy of member countries very much.16
II. The European Economic Space
The completion of the Single Market was to coincide with integrating the
EFTA countries pursuant to an EC-EFTA agreement on the formation of the
EES. EC and EFTA markets have been connected by special economic agree-
ments since Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland concluded parallel bilateral FT As with the EC in 1972/73 (Synop-
tical Table 1). In these FTAs, the EC and each EFTA member individually
agreed on a timetable to abolish tariffs on most industrial goods by the end of
1977. For some sensitive products, for example, paper and steel, temporary
quotas remained and tariff removal was delayed until 1984 [Abrams et al.,
1990, p. 6]. To help solving problems caused by differing trade policies regard-
ing third countries, a system of rules of origin was developed. The initial FTAs
treated the EC as one country, but not the EFTA. Thus, FTAs did not allow for
cumulation of processing by EFTA countries. The main features of the EC-
EFTA FTAs have also been preserved in the agreement on the EES: exclusion
of agriculture, special provisions for some sensitive products, differential treat-
ment of third countries and rules of origin.
The formation of the EES dates back to April 1984, when the ministers of
the EC and EFTA agreed on a second generation of EC-EFTA initiatives in the
so-called Luxembourg Declaration. The FTAs had succeeded in integrating the
Western European market for industrial goods, but EFTA countries were still
facing numerous technical barriers to trade in areas such as standards, rules of
origin and border formalities. The desire of EFTA countries to eliminate barri-
ers to trade and to integrate more closely with the EC increased when the
White Paper envisaged the completion of the Single Market. Following the
Oslo Declaration of March 1989, an EC-EFTA ministerial meeting began for-
mal negotiations on the development of the EES in June 1990. The intentions
were (i) to achieve a free movement of goods, services, capital and persons —
the four freedoms —, (ii) to strengthen cooperation in other areas such as R&D
(research and development), environmental protection, etc., and (iii) to reduce
economic and social disparities between the regions.
In May 1992, EC and EFTA countries finally concluded an agreement on the
establishment of the EES on 1 January 1993, concurrently with the completion
of the Single Market. In compliance with the original objectives, the agreement
covers the implementation of the four freedoms, the EC competition policy,
special measures concerning, for example, social policy, R&D, consumer as
well as environmental protection, and institutional adjustments [Senti, 1992].
Appendices to the agreement concern the transfer of all EC regulations ("acquis
communautaire") to EFTA countries. Furthermore, EC institutions will be sup-17
plemented by respective EFTA institutions such as an EES standing committee
(similar to the EC Ministerial Council) for political decisions regarding the
EES, an EFTA surveillance authority guiding the implementation of the EES
agreement in EFTA countries, and an EFTA court resembling the European
Court in Luxembourg. Arbitration of disputes will be the responsibility of new
joint EC-EFTA institutions.
Despite its far-reaching institutional and legal implications, the EES is, in
the final analysis, no more than a free trade arrangement with extensions con-
cerning the free mobility of capital and labour. EC and EFTA countries main-
tain their respective trade regimes towards third countries. Therefore, rules of
origin and border controls are inevitable and will continue to impede EFTA-EC
trade in contrast to intra-EC trade. The agreement also includes exemptions
from the free trade/free mobility principle in sectors considered particularly
sensitive for individual EFTA countries, such as fishery (Iceland, Norway),
transport (Austria, Switzerland), labour mobility and financial markets (Swit-
zerland). These exemptions automatically apply to all EFTA countries. The
special provisions and the exclusion of agriculture maintain a degree of market
segmentation and reduce integration benefits. For this reason, it is hardly
surprising that three EFTA countries, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, have ap-
plied for full EC membership, and Norway is likely to do so soon. The EC has
decided, however, to start formal negotiations about an enlargement of its
membership only after the completion of the Single Market.
The implementation of the EES agreement depends upon ratification in all
countries that are party to the agreement and the European Parliament. By the
end of 1992, ratification was accomplished in (i) only two EC countries,
Ireland and Portugal, (ii) the European Parliament and (iii) the EFTA members
Austria, Finland, Liechtenstein, and Sweden. In Switzerland, a national referen-
dum was held in December 1992 that rejected EES membership by a small
margin. This negative vote dealt a severe blow to the timetable of the EES. It
delayed the process of ratification, since the agreement had to be amended and
partly even renegotiated. Switzerland will remain in the bilaterally agreed FTA
with the EC, but will not become a member of the EES.
Summarizing from the point of view of third countries, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the formation of the EES is not really a decisive event. Condi-
tions of market access will hardly change in any significant way and, in the
medium term, the EES will vanish when major EFTA countries (Austria, Fin-
land, Sweden) become full members of the EC in 1996.18
HI. Integration of Central and Eastern Europe
The former member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) in Central and Eastern Europe can be considered as "natural" trading
partners of Western Europe. Historical trade patterns from the inter-war period
as well as the simulation of "normal" trade patterns using gravity models (with
economic size and distance as the major determinants of the direction of trade)
suggest that Central and Eastern European countries would direct the largest
share of their exports to Western Europe. Havrylyshyn and Pritchett [1991] es-
timate that about 75 per cent of Central and Eastern European exports would
normally be directed to Western Europe. Actually, however, trade flows be-
tween the two groups of countries were much smaller and even declined in the
1980s (Table 2). The two main reasons for the dismal trade relations were the
limited and deteriorating supply capacity of CMEA countries and high barriers
to trade in Western Europe. In terms of market access to Western Europe,
CMEA countries ranged at the bottom of the pyramid of trade preferences
granted by the EC and faced tariffs and a wide range of quantitative restrictions
(QRs) (Figure 1).
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Source: Adapted from Mobius [1991].19
A liberalization of East-West trade began in mid-1988 — even prior to the
ultimate demise of socialism that took place in 1990-1991 — when the EC
signed trade and cooperation agreements with Hungary (September 1988), Po-
land (September 1989), the Soviet Union (December 1989), the Czech and Slo-
vak Federal Republic (May 1990), Bulgaria (June 1990) and Romania (October
1990). The agreements focus on trade in industrial products, excluding coal and
steel (ECSC products) and textiles. To facilitate the transition to a market
economy, the EC abolished all quantitative restrictions specifically applied
against these countries (except for the Soviet Union, where a stepwise proce-
dure was adopted) and temporarily lifted all other quantitative restrictions until
1992. In addition, the EC granted GSP treatment to the smaller countries of
Central and Eastern Europe — to Poland and Hungary since 1990 and to Bul-
garia and the CSFR since 1991.
Economic cooperation between the EC and CMEA countries gained momen-
tum after the collapse of central planning. Within the unprecedentedly short pe-
riod of one year, the EC negotiated association agreements with the former
CSFR, Poland and Hungary. These so-called "Europe Agreements" were signed
on 16 December 1991, effectively dividing the CMEA countries into two
groups, the Central European countries (Poland, Hungary, the former CSFR)
and the Eastern European countries including Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and
the former USSR republics (now: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)).
The Europe Agreements were intended to actively support the transformation
process, and their ultimate objective is to lead to full membership of the Cen-
tral European countries [Langhammer, 1992a]. The agreements do not only
include preferential trade policies but also measures of economic cooperation
and institutional changes such as a partial adjustment of the legal framework in
the Central European countries to accommodate EC rules and regulations.
The trade policy part of the agreements became effective prior to formal
ratification by so-called "interim agreements" on 1 March 1992. They envisage
a unilateral removal of EC trade barriers against most manufactured imports
from the contracting parties in a five-year period. The Central European coun-
tries are granted a ten year period starting in 1995 to eliminate their trade re-
strictions against imports from the EC. The most remarkable feature about the
agreements are the concessions the EC has granted for trade in agricultural
products, textiles and clothing, as well as in iron, steel and coal (for details, see
Section D.III below). For the first time, the EC has facilitated access to markets
of highly sensitive products in which the associated countries are likely to be or
become competitive. In the hierarchy of trade preferences this relatively sweep-
ing trade liberalization puts the former CSFR, Poland and Hungary on a level
roughly comparable to EFTA countries and certainly ahead of all DCs (Figure
1).20
The EC offer of economic cooperation is equally far-reaching. It includes
scientific and industrial cooperation, investment promotion, monetary coopera-
tion, technical assistance, financial assistance through the PHARE programme
and balance of payments support. All in all, the three countries will receive
more external support than any non-member country (including the ACP coun-
tries) has ever received from the EC [Langhammer, 1992a, pp. 4-5].
As compared with the former CSFR, Hungary and Poland, the process of
economic transformation is less advanced and surrounded by political uncer-
tainties in the other Eastern European countries. They are, on average, less de-
veloped, and economic fragility is reflected in high rates of inflation and rap-
idly declining output (Table 3). The EC assumed a more cautious approach to-
wards these countries. Initially, it offered only some of the financial and trade
privileges granted in the Europe Agreements [Langhammer, 1992b, p. 11].
Concerning trade policies, the EC lifted quotas and improved the GSP cover-
age. To support the transformation process, the economic reconstruction pro-
gramme PHARE was extended to Bulgaria and Romania. Only recently, the EC
has concluded negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania on a similar type of
institutionalized relations as the Europe Agreements. However, the EC denied
the explicit reference to future full membership made in the preamble of the
earlier Europe Agreements. It is very likely that future agreements, for exam-
ple, with the Baltic states and Albania, will be rather comparable to those nego-
tiated with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 1).
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Source: Gabrisch [1993]; KOPINT-DATORG [1993]; World Bank [1993].21
Among the Eastern European countries, the 15 successor states to the former
USSR represent a special case. In the cold-war period, bilateral trade with the
EC was not only very much restricted through EC import quotas, both Com-
munity-wide and on the national level, but perhaps even more so on the EC
export side for security reasons (Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
(COCOM)). Since 1989 many quotas against goods originating in the USSR
were lifted under a ten-year trade and commercial cooperation agreement with
the former USSR (December 1989). All specific EC quantitative restrictions
were to be eliminated by the end of 1995 at the latest, except for a limited
number of products rated as sensitive [GATT, 1991, p. 73]. After December
1991, the EC had found it difficult to formulate new policies for trade relations
with the CIS. By January 1993, the GSP status has finally been granted to CIS
products, thus putting the CIS on the same footing as other DCs in the pyramid
of trade preferences (Figure 1). Yet, greater trade concessions will be without
much substance because the CIS states predominantly export non-dutiable
items such as primary commodities.22
D. Current Features of EC Integration
Chapter C has shown that the economic integration of the EC is proceeding on
several fronts. Besides completing the Internal Market, this refers to macroeco-
nomic policy coordination within the envisaged EMU in the first place. The
Treaty of Maastricht also entails elements of policy coordination in the field of
social and industrial policies. Moreover, the CAP is under review and some
initial policy adjustments have already taken place.
I. Policy Coordination
1. Trade and Factor Movement
The free movement of goods, services, capital and labour provides a powerful
means to foster economic integration among EC members. In designing the In-
ternal Market programme, the policy-makers in Brussels and their external ad-
visers were aware of the welfare costs resulting from policy-induced distortions
of intra-EC flows of goods and factors of production [Emerson et al., 1988;
Commission of the EC, 1988].
2 While tariffs and quantitative restrictions on
intra-EC trade had been largely eliminated before, the remaining internal mar-
ket barriers added up "to a considerable degree of non-competitive segmenta-
tion of the market" [Emerson et al., 1988, p. 17]. The following barriers were
considered most important: (i) border controls for customs purposes and related
administrative costs; (ii) differences in technical regulations between EC coun-
tries; (iii) restricted competition in public procurement; and (iv) restrictions on
the freedom to engage in the trade of services or to establish a business in the
service sector of other EC countries (e.g. financial, insurance and transport
services).
What has been achieved to date in removing internal market barriers? This
question must be addressed in two respects. First, it has to be assessed to which
extent the EC's agenda for completing the Internal Market has been fulfilled.
The expected welfare effects of the Internal Market programme, reported in
Section D.II, are based on the assumption of full compliance with the earlier
For an assessment of the welfare effects of removing internal market barriers, see
Section D.II.23
intentions. If major deviations in terms of policy implementation are to be
observed, the estimates have to be adjusted downwards. Second, it has to be
answered whether the preferred approach to policy coordination was well
suited to maximize the dynamic welfare gains of market integration.
A recent progress report on the implementation of the Internal Market pro-
gramme portrayed the situation in mid-August 1992 [Commission of the EC,
1992]. A number of 251 out of the 282 proposals made in the White Paper of
1985 had been adopted by the Council of Ministers. All in all, the report of the
Commission provided an optimistic assessment of the progress achieved in
completing the Internal Market. This judgement was mainly based on the
observed acceleration of the Council's decision process, whereby the ratio of
adopted to proposed measures was raised from 60 to 90 per cent within two
years. For various reasons, however, this "inventory approach" provides only
limited insights into the market integration effectively achieved through the
removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, services and factors of
production.
First, the high compliance ratio may obscure the fact that important deci-
sions were still pending. The Commission considered remaining ambiguities
with regard to intra-EC border controls to be the most delicate question. More-
over, progress had proven to be difficult to achieve as concerns the critical is-
sue of Community-wide business activities in banking and insurance. Only re-
cently it was agreed to apply the country-of-origin principle to the approval and
supervision of banking activities, after common solvency and accounting rules
had been established. The same principles were basically agreed on for the es-
tablishment and trading activities of insurance companies, including life insur-
ance [Commission of the EC, 1992, p. 32]. However, national regulatory pecu-
liarities remain in place for some time in the financial service sector.
3 Transi-
tory provisions characterize the liberalization of capital flows (for Greece and
Portugal) and transport services as well. Finally, economic integration was still
hampered by remaining restrictions with regard to the free movement and set-
tlement of workers, as well as ambiguities concerning company laws and regu-
lations to avoid double taxation.
Second, free trade and factor movement depends critically on the behaviour
of national governments. Out of the 216 measures that had become effective by
mid-1992, 174 measures had to be incorporated into national legislations. The
process of national implementation was most advanced in Denmark, which
Moreover, the Commission has announced that additional regulatory measures will
be introduced to control financial conglomerates. These measures shall ensure that
the liberalization of financial markets does not infringe upon the interests of enter-
prises and financial institutions [Commission of the EC, 1992, p. 33], which is a
somewhat confusing argument.24
applied 86 per cent of the effective measures. Belgium ranked at the other ex-
treme with a ratio of 62 per cent. The incorporation of agreed liberalization
measures into national legislations was delayed in several important respects. A
case in point was the resistance of France and Germany to further liberalize the
freight-transport systems, by insisting on a prior harmonization of taxes [Blick
durch die Wirtschaft, 4 September 1992]. Concerns about the slow national re-
sponse to liberalization measures agreed at the EC level were raised by the
Commission also with respect to border controls for goods and people, the mu-
tual recognition of professional diplomas, some technical trade barriers and
public procurement in sectors such as energy, transport and telecommunica-
tions, which had traditionally been highly protected [Commission of the EC,
1992]. Furthermore, scepticism is justified whether the liberalized rules in pub-
lic procurement will be applied effectively by the purchasing agencies. Similar
discrepancies have been observed with regard to financial services. In practice,
decisions were biased in favour of national financial instruments and institu-
tions.
Third, earlier assessments of the advances made towards completing the In-
ternal Market have shown that the majority of the measures taken are con-
cerned with administrative harmonization [Dicke, Langhammer, 1991]. Admin-
istrative harmonization was considered necessary for a long list of rather trivial
issues, ranging from the composition of jam to the safety of toys. This indicates
that the integration approach was biased in favour of ex ante coordination to
overcome national peculiarities. Alternatively, harmonization could have been
left to the market once transparency was established and institutional competi-
tion allowed.
The third point refers to the debate on the optimal approach to economic
integration and dynamic welfare maximization [Giersch, 1988; Siebert, 1990].
From an economic viewpoint, the need for administrative ex ante harmoniza-
tion is limited. In the case of non-existent property rights, harmonization may
help to internalize externalities such as transborder pollution. Furthermore,
basic principles defining the framework under which private initiative takes
place have to be agreed upon ex ante. The fundamental rules of economic inte-
gration concern the country-of-origin principle and the mutual recognition of
national standards, regulations and institutional settings. Once these principles
are firmly established, ex post harmonization can be relied upon, which will de-
velop spontaneously through the competition between national standards, quali-
ties and policy frameworks. The preferences of consumers will then decide on
the superior, i.e. welfare maximizing institutional setting, which may differ
from what would be decided ex ante. Furthermore, institutional competition
stimulates a permanent search for better solutions [Siebert, Koop, 1990]. Fa-25
vourable growth effects are likely, whereas competition is suppressed by the
cartelization that characterizes ex ante harmonization.
The case for institutional competition as a means for European economic in-
tegration was strengthened by the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice
[Dicke, Langhammer, 1991; Siebert, 1990]. As early as 1979, the Court estab-
lished the ruling ("Cassis-de-Dijon") that a product or service legally supplied
in one particular EC country can automatically be traded in other EC coun-
tries.
4 The underlying country-of-origin principle was recommended in the
Commission's White Paper of 1985 as well. The traditional concept of ex ante
harmonization was abandoned in important respects indeed. Notable examples
are: (i) the mutual recognition of inspection and test procedures (e.g. with
regard to foodstuffs); (ii) the opening up of national markets for foreign insur-
ance companies and financial intermediaries; (iii) the liberalization of capital
movements; and (iv) the general recognition of professional diplomas.
Mutual recognition is not automatic, however, but must be endorsed by the
Council of Ministers (Art. 100 b, para. 1, Single European Act). Moreover, the
long list of measures relating to technical trade barriers clearly indicates that ex
ante harmonization was not confined to cases of principal health and security
needs [for details, see Dicke, Langhammer, 1991]. In contrast to earlier an-
nouncements, the country-of-origin principle was not applied as far as possible.
Most importantly, institutional competition was not allowed between different
national tax systems. The significant differences in value-added and sales tax
rates were narrowed down in a protracted process of ex ante harmonization.
Hence, it can be concluded that some welfare effects were forgone, notwith-
standing the considerable progress in ensuring the free movement of goods,
services and factors of production.
2. Industrial Policy
Traditionally, industrial policy measures in Europe were focused on containing
sectoral adjustment crises in industries under heavy pressure due to the superior
competitiveness of newly industrializing countries. This motivation is still
prevalent in aging industries such as iron and steel, textiles and footwear (see
also Section D.III). Recently, active industrial targeting gained momentum in
sectors that policy-makers considered to be future growth industries. Strategic
policy interventions were concentrated on high-tech industries to strengthen the
In the case of services such as insurance and financial services, the application of
the country-of-origin principle in intra-EC trade was restricted to large customers
for reasons of consumer protection.26
position of European companies in international competition and to prevent
technological dependence on foreign suppliers [Bletschacher, Klodt, 1991;
Koopmann, Scharrer, 1989].
Strategic industrial policy has several means at its disposal to counterbalance
foreign competition. Trade policy measures can be applied to protect strategic-
ally important domestic industries. State-aided cooperation and concentration
within the corporate sector provide a second means. Finally, outright subsidies
may be granted, e.g. to stimulate research and development activities in high-
tech industries and to subsidize their exports. All these measures were applied
extensively, and a multitude of different promotion schemes were implemented
at the national, multilateral and Community level. Two prominent examples of
industrial targeting in Europe are the aircraft industry and microelectronics.
5
The formation of Airbus Industries in 1970 represented the major step of
industrial policy in the aircraft industry [Bletschacher, Klodt, 1991, pp. 18 ff.].
Several EC governments pushed the cooperation among European producers
and granted subsidies in huge amounts. Estimates suggest that the increase of
the European market share in civil aircraft sales (Table 4) was achieved only at
the cost of about US$20 billion of government subsidies.
6 When the United






























































Source: Bletschacher, Klodt [1991, p. 19].
The automobile industry is another key sector at which strategic policy interven-
tions are targeted. In this case, trade policy was used as the principal tool; for de-
tails, see Sections D.III and E.III.
Additionally, the German government subsidized exports of the Airbus. It guaran-
teed sales prices at a notional exchange rate of DM 2.0 to the US-dollar, and made
up the difference in receipts if the market exchange rate was lower [Koopmann,
Scharrer, 1989, p. 213]. According to a GATT panel decision in 1992, this measure
was classified to be GATT inconsistent.27
States presented this case to the GATT, European governments justified tempo-
rary state aid as a means to induce learning effects. After a transition period,
the European industry was expected to cope up with the competition of US
corporations. This infant industry argument has been discredited by the perpe-
tuation of subsidies over more than two decades. Moreover, the welfare effects
of permanent subsidization of the aircraft industry are reaped by its customers,
rather than by the European taxpayers.
European manufacturers of microchips were protected by an import tariff of
14 per cent. Japanese competitors, facing the threat of anti-dumping proce-
dures, agreed to a "voluntary" export restraint. Subsidies were granted by EC
governments to varying degrees [Koopmann, Scharrer, 1989, p. 212]. Consider-
able public funds were made available to finance the research activities of
European corporations. For example, DM8 billion were devoted to the JESSI
project (Joint European Semiconductor Silicon) at its start in 1989 [Bletsch-
acher, Klodt, 1991, p. 26]. These measures were intended to support the estab-
lishment of manufacturing capacity in Europe, in particular for semi-conduc-
tors. This attempt proved largely unsuccessful, although the production of
semi-conductors was protected more heavily in Europe than in the United
States and Japan [ibid]. After the decline of Europe's world market share in
1978-1983, its share remained stable at a low level of about 10 per cent (Figure
2).
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The dismal experience with industrial policy experiments in Europe is not
surprising. Strategic behaviour provokes retaliatory measures. As a conse-
quence, all countries would suffer [Siebert, Koop, 1990]. Typically, the oppor-
tunity costs of subsidies granted to high-tech industries are not taken into ac-
count by advocates of industrial policy. The result may be a deteriorating sup-
ply of public goods, for example. Moreover, granting sector-specific aid runs
the risk of a serious misallocation of resources, compared with a general im-
provement of R&D conditions.
Notwithstanding its inherent drawbacks, industrial and technology policy has
gained momentum in Europe recently. The Treaty of Maastricht endows the EC
with new and far-reaching interventionist competences [Schmieding, 1992, p.
15]. The promotion of the competitiveness of European industries shall become
a major task of EC authorities [for details, see NWB, 1992; Hrbek, 1992, pp.
236 ff.]. Article 130 of the Maastricht Treaty lists various policy instruments,
ranging from public assistance for structural adjustment to support for coopera-
tion among enterprises, which aim at industrial targeting and conflict with an
undistorted international competition. Pressure groups may easily refer to such
provisions and ask for subsidies and protection. Similar opportunities are of-
fered in the field of technology policy. Specifically designed promotion
schemes may be adopted by the Council of Ministers at the request of the EC
Commission (Art. 130i). The Community may establish "common enterprises"
or make similar arrangements to carry out common research programmes and
foster technological development at the EC level (Art. 130n). Comparable
measures at the national level are largely exempted from EC provisions against
cartelization and concentration.
The practical consequences may be exemplified by the recent request of
France and Germany to support the development of a European variant of the
high-definition television (HDTV). The EC was asked to provide ECU 600 mil-
lion over five years for this purpose [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 De-
cember 1992]. Public assistance for indigenous industrial take-off was consid-
ered necessary to cope up with the Japanese HDTV system, which was already
fit for production in 1989 [Koopmann, Scharrer, 1989, p. 213]. From an eco-
nomic point of view, the proposed subsidy scheme is a good example for indus-
trial policy resulting in a waste of public resources.
3. Agricultural Policy
Strategic industrial policy has sometimes been justified on the grounds of en-
suring continuity of supply, e.g. in the case of microelectronics [Koopmann,
Scharrer, 1989, p. 212]. This argument was raised time and again in support of29
the CAP, the disastrous results of which have become commonplace [Guth,
1992; The Economist, 1992]. According to OECD calculations, the costs of the
CAP reached US$142 billion in 1991 (Table 5). Consumers contributed nearly
60 per cent to the transfers to agriculture through higher than market clearing
prices.
7
The traditional features of the CAP may be summarized as follows.
8 Apart
from classical import protection through tariffs or quotas, numerous internal in-
struments are applied influencing consumption, production and storage of agri-
cultural products. The highly interventionist system of Common Market Organ-
izations covers the vast majority of products grown within the EC. The specific
administrative arrangements differ depending on the product and the trading
partner concerned. However, the increase of producer incomes above free mar-
ket levels is mainly brought about by price support or production-tied aid.
9 The
ultimate results are increased internal production, reduced imports, as well as
depressed and destabilized world market prices due to subsidized exports.





































Source: The Economist [1992] on the basis of OECD calculations.
In per-capita terms, EC transfers to agriculture ranked between Australia, paying
hardly any subsidies, and some EFTA countries exhibiting extraordinarily high
subsidies. Within EFTA, Finland represented the most extreme case. In most
EFTA countries, the burden sharing between taxpayers and consumers was similar
to that in the EC.
For a comprehensive assessment of the CAP and its effect on the exports of DCs,
see Hiemenz et al. [1990, pp. 327 ff.].
Traditionally, internal market support prices combined with external protection by
variable import levies covered more than 70 per cent of total agricultural produc-
tion in the EC. Another 25 per cent of production benefitted from external protec-
tion exclusively.30
The core instruments of the CAP are threshold border prices and intervention
prices, both of which are derived from target prices fixed by annual decisions
of the Council of Ministers. Intervention prices function as guaranteed mini-
mum prices at which all quantities can be sold to market authorities. Levies on
imports are fixed according to the difference between the lowest offer price and
the threshold price.
1
0 Although differentiated by country of destination, export
subsidies basically compensate for the price difference between the internal EC
price and the (typically lower) world market price. As a logical consequence of
this support scheme, excess EC production has become a common feature for
most basic food commodities. Furthermore, budgetary costs of the CAP have
increased continuously.
The tremendous costs, the excess production induced by artificially high
administered prices and the ensuing conflicts with the EC's trading partners
during the GATT negotiations
1
1 rendered reforms of the CAP imperative.
Throughout the 1980s, the main policy response was recourse to bureaucratic
ways of rationing output. Examples for administrative interventions were: (i)
quotas for milk (since 1984); (ii) the reshuffling of outlays from the EC to the
national level; (iii) acreage set-aside schemes; and (iv) stabilizers in the form of




The policy adjustments of the 1980s merely addressed the symptoms of the
CAP, i.e. surplus production and rising public expenditures, rather than the un-
derlying cause. Administered internal prices continued to exceed world market
prices so that excess production remained profitable for farmers. Systematic
policy changes were delayed until recently. Even the 1992 reform was re-
stricted to specific agricultural markets that were plagued with the worst prob-
lems, i.e. the common markets for cereals and beef. However, a drastic reduc-
tion of prices was agreed for the first time in the history of the CAP (minus 30
per cent within three years for grain, minus 15 per cent for beef). It was de-
cided to offset the ensuing income losses by direct transfer payments to the af-
™ For some commodities (e.g. fruit and vegetables), import levies are not based on
the lowest offer price, but rather on the difference between any particular offer
price and the regulated EC price. Price competition between foreign suppliers is
eliminated in this way.
These conflicts were because of the EC's attempt "to externalise their internal
problems by either restricting imports of competing agricultural products from the
world market or by exporting surplus production to the world market" [Guth, 1992,
p. 215].
1 0
For details on the 1988 agricultural reform, see Koester, Cramon-Taubadel [1992].
The following paragraphs on recent changes of the CAP also refer to Koester,
Cramon-Taubadel [1992].31
fected farmers. From an economic point of view, the replacement of price sup-
port by explicit income support is well suited to remove the perverse produc-
tion incentives of the CAP.
The effects of the 1992 reform on agricultural production and resource allo-
cation in the EC have been weakened in several respects, however:
— Price-related support arrangements have been maintained for products
such as milk and sugar. Moreover, "there is a clear tendency to maintain
the quota systems" [Guth, 1992, p. 221] in sectors where production
quotas are already applicable, and "to make the necessary quantitative
and price adjustments within the systems" [ibid].
— The compensatory transfer payments have not been decoupled from pro-
duction. Grain producers can obtain income transfers only if they grow
eligible products. In the beef market, transfers have been linked to the
number of cattle. In other words, incentives persist to produce on mar-
ginal land even though the costs are not covered at the reduced support
prices.
— Farmers with farms above a certain size have to set aside 15 per cent of
their arable land in order to be eligible for transfer payments. This provi-
sion adds significantly to bureaucratic controls and regulations.
1
3 More-
over, the compulsory uniform set-aside scheme seriously interferes with
an efficient allocation of a particularly scarce factor of production. The
use of land is constrained irrespective of the comparative cost advan-
tages of farms.
1
4 As a result, agricultural production cannot move freely
to the most favourable location, which is clearly inconsistent with the
Internal Market programme of the EC.
All in all, the 1992 reform of the CAP was an important step in the right di-
rection. The chance to fundamentally overhaul the CAP was missed, however.
Compensatory income transfers are not production neutral. The reform of the
cereals market was identical to the acreage-based support scheme for oil-seeds,
1 1
A complex verification apparatus is also required because the acreage-based assis-
tance scheme is differentiated according to specific products: "Each and every
farm will have to be inspected" [Koester, Cramon-Taubadel, 1992, p. 155].
1<f* The total acreage for which applications for direct transfers are submitted may ex-
ceed the upper limit given by a region's "basic area", i.e. the area under grain in
the past. In this case, sanction mechanisms will be applied which may have alloca-
tive effects not at all related to productivity and efficiency. In some regions, for
example, "a small number of fairly large farms will be forced to take a consider-
able area of land out of production because a large number of small producers have
increased their cultivation of products eligible for assistance" [Koester, Cramon-
Taubadel, 1992, p. 154].32
which a GATT panel judged to be non-conforming with GATT rules upon re-
quest of the United States.
1
5 Conflicts with major trading partners thus con-
tinued in agriculture. Furthermore, the reluctant liberalization of the CAP hin-
ders "a more constructive response to the problems arising from the future en-
largements) of the Community and trade relations with the Central and Eastern
European countries" [Guth, 1992, p. 221]. The remaining market interventions
in agriculture are clearly inappropriate for meeting these challenges (see also
Section D.III).
4. Macroeconomic Policy
The future of macroeconomic policy coordination remains completely open to
question. This is not too surprising given that macroeconomic policy is still the
national domain of EC member governments. Recently, however, attempts at
coordinating fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies have ranked high on
the policy agenda. This new focus is due to two opposing factors:
— In December 1991 the Treaty of Maastricht was agreed, which sets a de-
tailed plan and timetable for the EMU (see Section C.I for details).
— Only shortly afterwards, the forerunner, the EMS of fixed though ad-
justable exchange rates was subject to significant turbulences. Several
realignments proved necessary after more than five years of stable ex-
change rates among EMS member countries.
The recent turbulences in the EMS contradict the widespread belief that
macroeconomic policy convergence among EC countries has proceeded to the
point where exchange-rate adjustments are no longer needed. This belief was
nourished by the declining number and the reduced size of currency realign-
ments within the EMS [for details, see Emerson et al., 1992, pp. 41 f.]. In
1979-1983, 27 realignments took place vis-a-vis the Deutschmark with an av-
erage size of 5.3 per cent. These figures were reduced to 12 and 3.8 per cent in
1984-1987; until mid-1992 no further realignments occurred.
The subsequent protracted EC-US negotiations on oil-seeds resulted in a compro-
mise in November 1992. Again, however, the agreed amendments of the oil-seed
market organization require extensive bureaucratic controls, rather than strengthen-
ing market forces [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 November 1992]. The oil-
seed acreage in the EC was restricted to 5.1 million hectares; the set-aside of acre-
age has to be verified for each farm. Additional controls and regulations are neces-
sary to enforce the EC's commitment to reduce the volume of production dumped
on to the world market on a product-by-product basis (by 21 per cent within six
years).33
The proponents of the EMS have attributed this development to the discipli-
nary effects of the system. The need for realignments resulting from different
inflation trends in member countries has indeed been reduced significantly
(Table 6). Stabilization efforts were most pronounced in countries that had
experienced double-digit inflation in the late 1970s (minus 7-9 percentage
points in France, Italy and Ireland). As a result, the difference in inflation rates
between the two most stable countries and the two least stable countries nar-
rowed from more than 9 to 3.5 percentage points during the 1980s.
Declining inflation rates and smaller inflationary differences within the EMS
were mainly the result of monetary policies of member countries acting in the
same direction [Scheide, Trapp, 1991]. Explicit policy coordination proved un-
necessary since the national central bank then least prone to inflation, the Ger-
man Bundesbank, acted as a de facto leader.
1
6 With fixed central parities and
the fairly stable Deutschmark as an anchor currency, there was no room for an
autonomous monetary policy except for the possibility of exchange-rate move-
ments within the narrow bands of the EMS [Emerson et al., 1992, p. 41].
Notwithstanding enhanced monetary policy coherence, it proved to be an il-
lusion that realignments were no longer necessary. Exchange-rate adjustments
might still be helpful in the case of country-specific shocks and differences in
productivity growth. Furthermore, the recent experience of the EMS suggests
that policy coherence has remained imperfect. After several devaluations, start-
ing with the Italian Lira in September 1992, and the subsequent withdrawal of
Italy and the United Kingdom from the EMS, it was finally agreed in August
1993 to substantially extend the bands within which the remaining EMS cur-
rencies are allowed to fluctuate (from 2.25 to 15 per cent in each direction of
Table 6 — Inflation Rates in Seven EMS Countries
















aCountries that participated in the EMS from its beginning in 1979.




16 For a critical assessment of the EMS, see Vaubel [1989] and Minford [1990]. Min-
ford [ibid., p. 333] concluded: "... the EMS does indeed act as is claimed as a de-
flationary discipline, an alternative to the domestic discipline of monetary targets.
Its properties however are not as stabilising as floating with domestic monetary
targets; nor do they act as a surrogate for cooperation".34
the bilateral parity). These developments were basically the result of two fac-
tors: (i) accumulated inflationary differences over the past, and (ii) the expecta-
tion prevailing in financial markets that some EMS countries were prepared to
react to deteriorating business cycle conditions by relaxing monetary and fiscal
discipline.
The recent turbulences in the EMS, if continuing, may well have adverse
effects on the further steps towards monetary and currency union. The smooth
performance within the EMS over two years is one of the qualification criteria
for full membership of EC countries in the EMU. In addition, EC countries will
be judged according to a set of fiscal and monetary criteria (for the blueprint of
realizing EMU in three stages, see Section C.I). Notwithstanding the formal ac-
curacy of the convergence criteria, it is open to question whether they will lead
to a more effective macroeconomic policy coordination in the Community.
This can be doubted on both theoretical and politico-economic grounds. It has
been argued that the adoption of the fiscal criteria would be arbitrary and eco-
nomically meaningless [Buiter, 1992]. Among the long list of theoretical argu-
ments, the following are particularly noteworthy:
— The asymmetric fiscal norms (i.e. permitting values below but not above
the norm) are feared to result in a contraction during the next years.
1
7
— It is maintained that countries with higher economic growth rates can,
ceteris paribus, safely support a higher budget deficit than the agreed 3
per cent of GDP.
— The deficit norm should make an allowance for the distinction between
nominal and real interest rates on the public debt [see also Tanzi, 1989].
— No apparent relationship exists between the fiscal norms and the criteria
commonly used by economists to evaluate the solvency of the govern-
ment.
— There is no need for international coordination of budgetary policies be-
cause possible external effects of government deficits and debt are by
nature pecuniary rather than technological.
— Finally, it is argued that the fiscal norms are neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for satisfying the other convergence criteria with respect to infla-




*' Buiter [1992, p. 7] claims that "even those approaches to positive economics and
to economic policy design that are furthest removed from the Keynesian paradigm,
can come up with prescriptions for the behaviour of public debt and deficits that
are orthogonal to the Maastricht rules".
1 o
Table 7 provides some support for this argument. Countries like Belgium, Ireland
and the Netherlands violated both fiscal criteria in 1991. Nevertheless, they be-35
The above arguments imply that a common, stability-oriented monetary pol-
icy should be the major macroeconomic policy concern. Scepticism prevails,
however, whether the envisaged EMU guarantees monetary discipline. It is
feared that the relevant convergence criteria are not binding so that the eco-
nomic policy of EC countries is not constrained effectively [Schmieding, 1992,
p. 19]. Plenty of leeway remains in interpreting price stability in actual practice
[Paque, Soltwedel et al., 1993, pp. 32 ff.]. In 1991, the inflation target was vio-
lated by five countries and average inflation was twice the target figure (Table
7). Recent inflation rates in Germany exceeded 4 per cent. As a result, the EC
country that was thought to be most inflation-adverse surpassed most of its EC
partners in terms of inflation [IMF, c].
1
9
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longed to the relatively stable EC countries in terms of inflation and interest rates.
By contrast, inflation rates were beyond the target rate in Spain and the United
Kingdom although the fiscal indicators were rather favourable by EC standards.
Among the EC countries for which comparable data were available for the first
quarter of 1993, only Greece and Portugal reported higher inflation rates than
Germany.36
While the Treaty of Maastricht seems to promise more stability, there is no
mechanism that will enforce this commitment. It remains an open question
whether the European Central Bank (ECB) will be in a position to pursue an ef-
fectively independent policy of low inflation. Notwithstanding its formal inde-
pendence, the ECB has to support EC policies, which are highly likely to aim
at other goals as well. Furthermore, the ECB does not have a clear-cut compe-
tence for exchange-rate policies vis-a-vis non-EC currencies, which may seri-
ously limit its factual independence [see also Buiter, 1992, pp. 13 ff.].
In the transition to thefinal stage of the EMU, the political struggle on
whether the convergence criteria will be strictly applied is likely to continue.
The design of macroeconomic policy of EC countries is going to face a major
dilemma [Paque, Soltwedel et al., 1993, p. 33]. If the commitment to stability
is not taken seriously, the desired convergence of major macroeconomic vari-
ables will be unlikely to occur. This will add to the widespread concern that
stability will be further undermined under EMU conditions in the future. If,
however, the convergence criteria are taken seriously, the considerable need for
fiscal and monetary correction in several EC countries will put a large burden
of adjustment on labour and capital. Nominal realignments will no longer be
available as a shock absorber for individual EC countries. Real adjustments to
country-specific shocks will critically depend on the downward flexibility of
nominal factor rewards.
It is unlikely that the greater demand for flexibility will materialize in prac-
tice. Rather, the Treaty of Maastricht obstructs adjustment incentives where
they are needed most urgently [Schmieding, 1992, p. 21]. The poorer EC coun-
tries, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, have been granted access to en-
larged compensation payments from a "cohesion fund". This will not only
weaken the adjustment flexibility at the periphery of the Community, e.g. by
inducing wage rigidities, but also add a further destabilizing burden to the
Community budget.
II. Expected Effects on Member Countries
1. Overall Economic Gains
Shortly after the EC Commission had launched the White Paper in 1985, sev-
eral attempts were made to quantify the economic gains from the Internal Mar-
ket programme for member countries. The starting point for the intensive and
ongoing debate was provided by a major EC-funded research project on the37
cost of non-Europe.
2
0 The potential welfare effects were estimated in the
Emerson Report on the assumption that internal market barriers would be re-
moved by end-1992 [Emerson et al., 1988]. In this report, a first set of calcula-
tions is based on partial equilibrium estimation methods. The bottom line of
this microeconomically oriented evaluation is given by an additional 2.2 per
cent of GDP (Table 8). This figure is derived from a narrow conception of the
benefits of removing internal market barriers such as customs formalities and
delays (line (1)), as well as discrimination in public procurement, divergent
national standards and regulations, and restrictions on business activities in
services and manufacturing (line (2)). The figure captures only the direct
welfare effects of liberalization-induced cost reductions on economic agents,
i.e. producers, consumers and governments.
The gain in GDP, to be achieved within about five years, increases to 4.3-
6.4 per cent if enhanced competition in an integrated EC market is taken into
account. Indirect GDP effects are attributed to the adjustment of economic
Table 8 — Estimates of the Overall Economic Gains from Completing the In-
ternal Market (per cent of GDP at 1985 prices)
a
(1) Removing barriers affecting trade only
(2) Removing barriers affecting all production
(3) Total direct effects (1) + (2)
(4) Economies of scale from restructuring and increased
production
(5) Competition effects on X-inefficiency and monopoly
rents
(6) Total market integration effects
0 (4) + (5)
(7) Alternative measure of market integration effects
0
(8) Total direct and market integration effects
Variant I (3) + (6)























aAll estimates according to partial equilibrium methods; based on benchmark data for
1985. — Variants A and B use alternative primary sources of information. —
 cDif-
ferences due to alternative approaches to evaluating competition effects.
Source: Emerson et al. [1988, p. 157].
For the summary of the basic studies conducted in this research programme, see
Commission of the EC [1988].38
agents to the new business environment. The range of estimation results is
partly due to alternative primary sources of information on cost reductions
(variants A and B in Table 8).
2
1 More relevant in explaining the differences are
alternative methodological approaches to evaluating competition effects (vari-
ants I and II):
— A relatively modest GDP increase is achieved if a price convergence ap-
proach is applied to calculate the indirect market integration effects (line
(7)). The underlying assumption is that the observed price dispersion be-
tween EC countries is reduced or abolished (depending on sector-spe-
cific characteristics) after the removal of non-tariff barriers. However, it
is not considered that prices may fall below the lowest price observed
before and that such a drop in prices results in higher demand and out-
put.
— The gain in GDP increases significantly (to 5.8-6.4 per cent) if the
above omissions are taken into account, which is attempted by the so-
called welfare gains approach (lines (4)-(6)). The focus is on the effects
of industrial restructuring and enhancing efficiency, for example, by
scaling up production (economies of scale), gaining experience of how
to produce most efficiently (learning curve effect), eliminating manage-
ment inefficiencies (X-efficiency), and improving the capacity to inno-
vate [Cecchini, 1988, p. 72].
2
2
In addition, a macroeconomic assessment of completing the Internal Market
has been made to accompany the above mentioned microeconomically based
estimates [Emerson et al, 1988, pp. 157 ff.]. This analysis refers to simulations
made and scenarios worked out with the help of macroeconometric models [for
details, see Catinat et al., 1988]. In modelling the feedback effects of the initial
shock, i.e. the removal of internal market barriers, the focus is on GDP effects
and macroeconomic constraints such as inflation, budget deficits and the exter-
nal account.
2
3 The overall effect is differentiated according to the most rele-
For details of the microeconomic methodology and data questions, see Emerson et
al. [1988, pp. 171 ff.]; the various studies on the cost of non-Europe [Commission
of the EC, 1988] provided a rich body of information.
Theoretical models for international trade analysis were applied to some ten indus-
trial sectors in five country groups [Smith, Venables, 1988].
The simulated consequences are said to cover the medium term of five to ten years.
Long-term effects resulting from structural changes in the behaviour of economic
agents are ignored.39
vant shocks and the supply effects resulting from the strategic reactions of
firms faced with the new competitive environment (Table 9).
2
4
On average, the supply effects are clearly the most important element. They
account for nearly half of the gain in GDP and employment, and for nearly two
fifths of the decline in inflation. The liberalization of financial services ranks
second. The macroeconomic effects of intensified competition in public pro-
curement and abolishing border controls are considerably weaker. On the
whole, EC market integration is shown to relax budgetary and external con-
straints, stimulate economic activity, boost employment and, simultaneously,
reduce inflation. The spread in the expected GDP effects (3.2-5.7 per cent) re-
veals a similar, though somewhat narrower range as compared with the micro-
economic estimates.25
Table 9 — Macroeconomic Consequences of Completing the Internal Market
a























































 cAverage of different scenarios reflecting optimistic and pessimistic hy-
potheses on the strategic reactions of firms. — Accounts for nearly 2 per cent of the initial employ-
ment level in the EC. —
 eDue to different scenarios concerning the supply effects.
Source: Emerson et al. [1988, p. 159].
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As concerns the supply effects, different scenarios were developed reflecting opti-
mistic as well as pessimistic hypotheses on the strategic reactions of firms [for de-
tails, see Emerson et al., 1988, pp. 189 ff.].
Emerson et al. [1988, pp. 162 ff.] argue that the GDP effect can be raised from an
average of 4.5 per cent to about 7 per cent if the eased budgetary and external
constraints lead to a more active, expansionist macroeconomic policy.40
The Emerson Report stresses that the various empirical estimates are con-
sistent, but, at the same time, "very approximate" [Emerson et al., 1988, p. 18].
The underlying assumptions and judgements have been the major subject of the
ongoing debate on the growth and welfare effects of the Internal Market pro-
gramme. On the one hand, it is argued that the potential welfare gain due to dy-
namic growth effects is underestimated. On the other hand, the discussion has
also raised some critical points suggesting an over optimistic bias of the
Emerson Report.
As concerns a first critical point, it has been shown that the welfare effects
are reduced considerably once it is taken into account that the realization of the
Internal Market programme remains incomplete. Bakhoven's [1990] evaluation
of the expected, rather than the potential, effects of completing the Internal
Market reveals a much smaller gain in GDP (2.3 per cent, as compared with 4.5
per cent in Table 9), a minor deflationary effect on consumer prices and a slight
decrease of employment.
2
6 The qualifications made with regard to the effective
realization of the Internal Market programme are justified in principle. How-
ever, it is unreasonable to argue that the GDP effects will be halved because of
remaining internal market barriers. Though delayed in several respects, the
large majority of the White Paper proposals had been implemented by mid-
1992 (see Section D.I).
A second critical point relates to the role of economies of scale [see Winters,
1992, p. 17, and the literature given there].
2
7 The fairly strong contribution of
this factor, amounting to one third of the overall GDP effect according to Table
8, is heavily debated. It has been doubted that the average size of firms in EC
countries is substantially below the cost-minimizing optimum [Geroski, 1989;
Grimm et al., 1989, pp. 15 f.]. Furthermore, the extent to which potential
economies of scale can be realized not only depends on the size of the enlarged
internal EC market, but also on the preferences of consumers. The larger the
number of varieties wanted by consumers, the smaller is the importance of
economies of scale [Siebert, 1991, pp. 9 ff.].
An obvious third critical point of the Emerson Report and the related back-
ground studies is the fundamentally partial equilibrium nature of the models
^" Bakhoven [1990] based his calculations largely on the background studies of the
Emerson Report, most notably Catinat et al. [1988]. However, the interpretation of
these background studies differs with respect to the composition of the initial im-
pulses and the underlying data. Furthermore, Bakhoven added new elements such
as the relocation of enterprises to the EC and policy responses of governments, and
applied a different (world) model. These modifications are at least partly responsi-
ble for the different estimation results.
The implications of economies of scale and the related modelling efforts will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter G.41
applied. General equilibrium analyses have shown that partial equilibrium
models tend to overstate the positive GDP effects [Gasiorek et al., 1992;
Haaland, Norman, 1992]. Assuming full employment, industries with increas-
ing returns to scale would draw on labour from sectors with constant returns.
The production of sectors with constant returns would drop as a result. More-
over, it seems unlikely that the rather modest increases in output revealed for
industries that are considered to be most susceptible to integration gains would
gross up to the above mentioned gain in GDP of about 5 per cent [Winters,
1992]. However, the computable general equilibrium (CGE) models applied so
far do not fully capture gains from deregulation so that they tend to under-
estimate the EC 1993 effects in this respect.
Particularly the dynamic effects of EC 1993 are difficult, if not impossible to
quantify. First attempts to evaluate the growth effects of the Internal Market
programme suggest that "they are likely to dwarf the one-time gains" [Baldwin,
1989, p. 247] on which the Emerson Report focuses. In addition to the initial
static effect, Baldwin provides evidence pointing to a substantial growth bonus
in the medium run. The static efficiency gains induce higher savings and in-
vestment, and the extra investment causes an increase of output, which is likely
to be of the same order of magnitude as the one-time effect given in the
Emerson Report.
2
8 Furthermore, arguments derived from the so-called new
growth theory suggest that growth rates may be permanently increased. This
effect, which is expected to be the largest of all, depends on the realization of
economies of scale, however. With scale economies, "1992 might add between
0.2 and 0.9 percentage points to the EC's long-term growth rate" [Baldwin,
1989, p. 249]. This is a particularly large number, given that the "normal"
growth rate is about 2 per cent.
All modelling exercises are subject to wide margins of error. Most impor-
tantly, the growth effects from liberalizing trade in services, which was highly
regulated prior to 1993, are largely ignored. In addition, the fiercer competition
under internal market conditions can be expected to lead to various behavioural
changes (especially with regard to investment), which largely escape quantita-
tive analysis. Examples are: the reorganization of production and management
to reduce X-inefficiencies, greater specialization because of a finer division of
labour, the relocation of production facilities to exploit locational advantages,
and intensified efforts at technological innovation. Such stimuli to economic
The expectation that the Internal Market programme will have about twice as big
an output effect as anticipated in the Emerson Report is based on a wide range of
estimation results for five EC countries. At a minimum, output increases by an ad-
ditional 0.6 per cent in the United Kingdom (under pessimistic assumptions). At a
maximum, more optimistic assumptions result in an additional increase of GDP of
more than 8 per cent in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.42
growth are much more important than the static welfare gains reflected by the
well-known Harberger triangles [Giersch, 1988; Waelbroeck, 1990]. In addi-
tion, political-economy arguments suggest favourable growth effects to result
from the removal of internal market barriers. Free intra-EC trade may under-
mine the power base of national lobbies so that inefficiency and inflexibility
can no longer be sustained [Waelbroeck, 1990, pp. 12 ff.].
2
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All in all, it depends primarily on the course of economic policies at the EC
level and the national level whether the higher potential welfare gains will be
fully realized [see also Waelbroeck, 1990, pp. 20 f.]. Dynamic growth effects
can be triggered by the liberalization of trade in services, free factor move-
ments and fiercer competition in the first place. As argued in Section D.I, the
EC's harmonization approach to economic integration has reduced competitive
pressures in several respects. Presently much depends on the national imple-
mentation of and the effective compliance with principally agreed liberaliza-
tion measures, which have remained critical issues. Preserving external compe-
tition may be even more important for exploiting potential welfare gains [Win-
ters, 1992, p. 42]. External EC imports are most relevant in reducing profit
margins and constraining monopoly power in the EC [see also Jacquemin, Sa-
pir, 1991].
Finally, it is an open question whether the EMU would add significantly to
the welfare gains to be achieved by the Internal Market programme. Emerson
et al. [1992] have stressed as the main benefits of the EMU: (i) enhanced in-
vestment and economic growth due to the elimination of exchange rate uncer-
tainty and transaction costs; (ii) better overall price stability by basing the EMU
on the monetary stability of the EC's least inflationary member countries; (iii)
more effective competition with other major currencies as international reserve
and transaction currencies.
In most respects, a quantitative assessment of the effect of the EMU is not
feasible. What is quantifiable reveals only small gains. Total savings of trans-
action costs after the introduction of a single EC currency are estimated at ECU
13-19 billion per annum (in prices of 1990), which amounts to 0.3-0.4 per cent
of the EC's GDP [Emerson et al., 1992, p. 68].
3
0 More importantly, economic
gains are not the automatic result of the EMU-induced institutional changes.
They will only materialize if the commitment to stability is credible and eco-
nomic agents behave accordingly. Section D.I has shown that serious doubts
" However, it is an open question whether a shift from lobbying to productive ac-
tivities will be the consequence. Rather, interest groups may replace their lobbying
at the national level by lobbying at the EC level.
Hence, the savings in monetary transaction costs would be comparable to the sav-
ings resulting from the removal of border controls in the 1992 context.43
are justified in this respect. Furthermore, any economic benefits have to be
weighted against the costs of EMU. The net benefits of a common EC currency
may be significantly lower, or become negative, once the consequences of dis-
carding the nominal exchange rate as a shock absorber are taken into account
[see also Buiter, 1992, pp. 21 f.].
2. Trade and Industry Structure
International trade and industrial restructuring are the principal transmission
mechanisms through which the completion of the Internal Market effects on
economic welfare. Table 10 reveals that close trade relations between EC
members had prevailed already before the Internal Market programme became
effective. At the minimum, intra-EC exports accounted for more than half of
total exports in the case of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. For these
countries, exports of food were of minor relevance. Intra-EC exports were even
more important in countries that relied more strongly on food exports (such as
Greece, Spain and particularly the Netherlands). The structure of intra-EC
exports differed between EC members in other respects as well, most notably
with regard to the share of machinery and transport equipment, because of
country-specific resource endowments and different levels of industrial devel-
opment. On average, machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods
classified by material (mainly iron and steel, textiles, metal products and non-
metallic mineral manufactures), and chemicals accounted for two thirds of
intra-EC exports in the period 1989-1992.
Intra-EC trade relations are expected to gain further momentum in the
1990s. However, the estimated effects of the Internal Market programme on
trade flows are subject to qualifications similar to those discussed before.
3
1
Again, the investigations concentrate on the industrial sector and largely ne-
glect the potential of trade in services resulting from the removal of trade barri-
ers in this highly regulated sector. In the national accounts, the service sector
includes a wide range of activities (and also unallocated items; Table 11).
Nevertheless, it can be maintained that the service sector is much more
important than the industrial sector. This applies to all EC member countries
for which recent data are available. In 1991, the share of services in overall
The following paragraphs are restricted to portraying some broad trends in pro-
duction and trade in the EC. The subsequent sections of this study will provide
more detailed insights into the trade effects on external regions (Chapters E and F)
and the sectoral effects of industrial restructuring in the EC (Chapter G).44
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Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities [d].
production was twice to four times as high as the share of manufacturing (Table
11). Within manufacturing, the relative importance of broadly defined indus-
tries varied significantly across EC member countries. Similar to the structure
of intra-EC trade, such differences can be attributed to country-specific re-
source endowments and income levels.
Completing the Internal Market affects EC industries to varying degrees.
There is an obvious reason for such differences. The research on the cost of
non-Europe reveals that the incidence of internal market barriers is industry
specific [for the case of technical barriers, see Groupe MAC, 1988]. Conse-
quently, the direct trade and production effects of removing such barriers vary
across industries. For example, the liberalization of public procurement prac-
tices is most relevant in areas like telecommunication and Pharmaceuticals
[Cecchini, 1988, p. 50]. The evident degree of the initial distortion is such thatTable 11
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990 at current prices.
Source: World Bank [1993, pp. 243 and 249].
significant changes in trade patterns are predicted even if the analysis is based
on the traditional concept of trade creation and trade diversion, which assumes
perfectly competitive markets and, implicitly, internationally segmented mar-
kets [Winters, 1992, pp. 3 ff.].
On the whole, however, the traditional tools of customs union theory reveal
only modest trade effects from removing internal market barriers in the EC [for
a detailed analysis of 65 industries, see Cawley, Davenport, 1988]. In the ab-
sence of barriers to intra-EC trade, trade diversion is found for every good. But
the total is equivalent to only about 2.5 per cent of final goods imports; the as-
sociated intra-EC trade creation is around 4 per cent. Trade diversion at the ex-
pense of external EC imports rises to about 10 per cent if the effects of elimi-
nating cost-increasing restrictions on all production activities in the EC are
considered additionally. The latter aspect of market integration has no effect on
trade creation as long as efficiency improvements are assumed to be distributed
uniformly across EC suppliers.
It is frequently argued that the predictions of the traditional competitive
model are likely to underestimate the increase of intra-EC trade and overesti-
mate the reduction of external EC imports caused by the removal of intra-EC
trade barriers [for a comprehensive discussion, see Winters, 1992]. This is attri-
buted to the restrictive assumptions underlying this model. The import-expand-
ing effect of economic growth will at least partly offset trade diversion. The
above mentioned 10 per cent reduction of external EC imports is eliminated
completely if the EC's estimate of a GDP gain of around 5 per cent is accepted,46
and the average income elasticity of demand for external EC imports is around
2 [Winters, 1992, p. 20]. Furthermore, the estimates ignore the trade and pro-
duction effects induced by increased competition and market integration in im-
perfectly competitive markets. Structural differences among industries in terms
of competitiveness and market segmentation are said to represent a crucially
important reason for an industry-specific effect of the Internal Market pro-
gramme on trade and production. Smith and Venables [1988] have studied ten
industries in partial equilibrium and have performed various simulations:
3
2
— If EC markets remain segmented after 1992, the fiercer competition in-
duced by removing internal trade barriers will increase intra-EC output
and trade as well as EC exports, and reduce external EC imports.
3
3 The
variation across industries is considerable. The increase in production
ranges from less than 1 per cent (cement, Pharmaceuticals, electric mo-
tors) to 6.6 per cent for synthetic fibres and 12.5 per cent for office ma-
chinery. Intra-EC trade expands at a maximum of 180 per cent for ce-
ment and at a minimum of 13 per cent for Pharmaceuticals.
— The picture changes significantly if EC markets are assumed to be inte-
grated, which is the clear objective of the Internal Market programme.
In the case of integrated EC markets, firms lose the ability to price high
in their relatively captive domestic markets.
3
4 This causes demand to
switch towards domestic producers, and thus it tends to reduce both
intra-EC trade and external EC imports [Smith, Venables, 1988, pp.
1522 f.]. The gain in domestic production ranges from 0.03 per cent
(cement) to more than 25 per cent (office machinery, motor vehicles).
Intra-EC trade is reduced by more than 40 per cent in four out of ten
industries, but still increases by at least 25 per cent in three industries.
External EC imports fall by more than one third in half the cases.
These production and trade effects should be interpreted with great caution
because of the partial equilibrium nature of the simulations. General equilib-
3
Z In the following, we refer to some simulation results achieved under the assump-
tion of Cournot competition, a variable number of firms, and a constant number of
varieties produced by each firm. Smith and Venables [1988, p. 1518] "regard the
variation in results across different variants of the model as surprisingly small".
The reduction of barriers is considered equivalent to 2.5 per cent of the gross value
of trade. It is an open question to which extent external EC imports will also
benefit, relative to domestic EC supplies, from reduced trade barriers, e.g. from the
harmonization of standards and testing procedures [Winters, 1992, p. 4]. This
would result in more trade creation.
The view of Smith and Venables [1988] that the consequence will be a reduction of
domestic prices is challenged by Haaland and Wooton [1992].47
rium analysis allows for input and factor price increases, thereby mitigating the
tendency in partial equilibrium analysis for all industries to expand after 1992.
Recent examples of CGE models analysing the EC 1993 effects on the indus-
trial structure and trade flows are Gasiorek et al. [1992], and Haaland and
Norman [1992]. Important results may be summarized as follows:
3
5
— EC output expands in all imperfectly competitive industries, but only by
modest amounts if market segmentation persists. Output expansion is
enhanced if EC markets are integrated. The overall output effects are ex-
pected to be quite small, however: 1.5 per cent of GDP according to Ga-
siorek et al. [1992], and 0.5 per cent according to Haaland and Norman
[1992].
— The differences across industries depend on several structural character-
istics. The industrial structure in the EC is expected to change in favour
of sectors with greater economies of scale and a high proportion of out-
put traded within the EC. Relatively large output effects are revealed in
highly concentrated industries, in which the pro-competitive effect of in-
tra-EC liberalization is supposed to be greatest. Furthermore, Haaland
and Norman [1992] show that the expansion is strongest in engineering
and other skill-intensive industries. The evidence for capital-intensive
industries is mixed, whereas output effects remain fairly small for
labour-intensive industries.
— As a corollary, the effect on external EC trade is most pronounced in in-
dustries where EC output grows the most: EC exports to the rest of the
world rise by 25-36 per cent for metalliferous products, non-metallic
mineral products, transport equipment and food products. The external
EC imports in the same sectors fall by 14-40 per cent [Gasiorek et al.,
1992].
In summary, some CGE simulations predict large sectoral production and
trade effects associated with imperfect competition but relatively modest over-
all GDP effects. Resources will be shifted into rapid-growth industries, typi-
cally R&D and skill-intensive engineering sectors. Hence, the degree of sector
specific trade diversion may be substantial according to these models. The
specification of the CGE models must be subjected to important qualifications,
however. The classification of industries into perfectly and imperfectly compe-
•" The CGE models repeat the segmented and integrated market experiments of
Smith and Venables [1988]. Again, we concentrate on results achieved for the long
run, i.e. with free entry and exit of firms.48
titive sectors is based on arbitrary indicators such as concentration ratios.
3
6
Moreover, the assumption of a uniform reduction of trade costs by 2.5 per cent
is highly unrealistic as was shown already in the Cecchini Report. Both qualifi-
cations are particularly relevant for services that are generally treated as per-
fectly competitive in the CGE models. For these reasons, production effects in
manufacturing are most likely to be overestimated, while they are definitely
underrated in services. This implies that the conclusions for trade creation and
trade diversion would also differ significantly from those based on CGE models
(see Chapters E-G).
3. Capital Flows and Direct Investment
In contrast to the considerable work done on the production and trade effects of
the Internal Market programme, the effects of the programme on capital flows
have largely been ignored so far. Net capital flows are, of course, the reverse of
net trade flows. Thus, the development of net capital flows to the EC will
largely depend on changes of net EC exports to the rest of the world. The EC
will logically absorb less foreign capital or become a net capital exporter if
completing the Internal Market results in substantial trade diversion rather than
external trade creation. By contrast, net capital flows will be affected only mar-
ginally if trade diversion remains negligible.
Even if a small effect of the Internal Market programme on total (net) capi-
tal flows is considered to be more likely, this result does not necessarily hold
for different types of capital flows. This refers to foreign direct investment
(FDI) in the first place. In fact a wide consensus exists that the EC will gain in
attractiveness as an investment location. Previous studies have identified the
size and the growth of host-country markets to be important determinants of
FDI [Stehn, 1992; Agarwal et al., 1991]. The completion of the Internal Market
and the favourable growth prospects thus can be expected to stimulate FDI in
the EC [see also Young et al., 1991]. Uncertainties of foreign enterprises con-
cerning the future trade policy of the Community are considered to be another
incentive to invest in rather than to export to the EC.
3
7 Restrictive local content
requirements and rules of origin are particularly relevant in this respect [Agar-
wal, 1992]. Foreign companies already established in the EC may encourage
For example, Haaland and Norman [1987, p. 219] have reported that despite appar-
ently high concentration in the steel industry, the assumption of perfect competi-
tion gave the best fit.
IT
For the case of Swiss FDI in the EC, see Biirgenmeier [1991].49
follow-up FDI by input suppliers, in order to be able to draw on their preferred
input sources and benefit from unrestricted access to EC markets.
3
8
The extent to which these investment incentives will affect future FDI in the
EC is impossible to quantify. However, foreign investors could easily anticipate
that the Community was heading towards economic integration, even if the
final shape of the Internal Market was not quite discernible when the White
Paper was published in 1985. Casual empirical evidence and survey results
have shown that multinational corporations did indeed take into account the
Internal Market programme in their strategic planning in the 1980s already
[Gittleman, 1990] .
3
9 Therefore, recent data on FDI flows should be able to
provide first insights as concerns the effects of the Internal Market programme.
The short discussion on FDI motivations suggests that the response of EC
and non-EC investors to the completion of the Internal Market may differ. For
example, the incentive to circumvent trade barriers through FDI may be impor-
tant for investors from non-EC home countries, while it is irrelevant for intra-
EC investment. A differentiated analysis is subject to serious data constraints,
however. The reaction of major home countries outside the EC can be evalu-
ated on the basis of Japanese and US statistics on FDI outflows. This will be
done in Section E.III, which also provides evidence on the sectoral structure of
investment by these countries. As concerns total FDI inflows to the EC, bal-
ance-of-payments data have to be relied upon (Table 12). This data set includes
intra-EC investment so that a clear-cut breakdown into intra-EC and external
FDI is not feasible. As a first indication of the reactions of investors within the




As a host region of FDI, the EC lost importance until the mid-1980s. Its
share in total FDI inflows to OECD countries dwindled from 57 per cent in
1970-1979 to about 37 per cent in 1980-1987 [Koopmann, Scharrer, 1989, p.
209]. Recently, though, a turnaround in this trend is to be observed (Table 12).
Total FDI inflows increased more than fourfold between 1986 and 1990, and
the EC's share in worldwide FDI flows nearly doubled. Although various other
Investment in the United Kingdom by Japanese car manufacturers is a case in point
(see Sections D.III and E.III below).
" Casual evidence refers to Japanese FDI in the EC, which aimed at circumventing
export restraints. Moreover, companies from EFTA countries "have launched ag-
gressive merger-and-acquisition offensives inside the European Community to gain
a stronger foothold in the Single Market" [UN, b, p. 19].
™ Molle and Morsink [1991] provide a comprehensive data set on the size and struc-
ture of FDI flows among EC countries. However, these data are not useful in the
present context since they refer to the period 1975—1983.50












































































































































































factors may have played a role, it is hardly a pure coincidence that this favour-
able development started shordy after the White Paper had been launched, and




The aggregate figures for the EC obscure considerably different develop-
ments in individual EC countries as hosts of FDI. Two large EC countries rep-
resent the extremes, i.e. Germany and the United Kingdom. Germany, which
had traditionally been a minor host of FDI, did not participate in the boom of
FDI in the EC. This is probably because of its reputation as a high-cost loca-
tion, which made foreign investors to look for more attractive locations in the
Community. The United Kingdom ranks at the other extreme largely because
of Japanese investment [Koopmann, Scharrer, 1989, p. 207]. The UK ac-
counted for 38 per cent of FDI in the EC in 1990 and contributed nearly 40 per
cent to the rise in the EC's share in total FDI flows. The remaining EC coun-
tries can be divided into two groups:
— Measured by the share in total FDI flows, foreign investors considered
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Italy to be relatively unattrac-
tive investment locations within the Community.
4
2 It may be surprising
that three of the four poorer EC countries belong to this category (except
Spain). Greece, Ireland and Portugal did not succeed to any significant
extent to divert FDI from traditionally preferred locations with similar
resource endowments, i.e. newly industrializing countries in the Third
World [see also Agarwal, 1992].
— FDI flows increased fourfold in the period 1986-1990 in the Benelux
countries, in France and Spain. The contrast between Spain and the other
relatively poor EC members is striking. Although FDI soared only re-
cently in Spain, it became the second-largest host country within the EC
in 1990.
The data suggest that extremely high unit-labour costs, such as in Germany,
discouraged foreign investors, while a favourable cost situation was no suffi-
cient condition to participate in the boom of FDI in the EC. When the develop-
ment of German FDI stocks in EC countries is considered to be a yardstick
(Table 13), the latter conclusion also holds for intra-EC investment. The com-
41 As concerns external influences, the persistent difficulties of debt-ridden DCs to
attract FDI and the dramatically reduced FDI flows to the United States in 1990
contributed to boosting the EC's share in total FDI flows [UN, b, pp. 311 ff.].
The shares of these countries remained constant (Greece, Ireland), increased only
marginally (Denmark, Portugal) or fluctuated heavily (Italy).52
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [1992a; 1993].
mitment of German investors remained extremely weak in Greece and Por-
tugal, and percentage shares were basically stagnant. The same applied to Ire-
land until the most recent past. Again, in sharp contrast to the rest of the EC
periphery, Spain attracted a significant and rising share of German FDI.53
However, Spain still ranked only fourth among EC hosts of German FDI in
43 Traditionally, close investment relations prevailed with regard to
France. Similar to the development of total flows, Belgium, the Netherlands
and, most notably, the United Kingdom attracted increasing shares of German
FDI.
4
4 Since recently, Ireland has also received significantly higher FDI. Fur-
thermore, the relatively unattractive position of Denmark and Italy revealed
above is substantiated by more or less stagnant shares in total German FDI
stocks.
All in all, the behaviour of German investors appears to be similar to the
response of non-EC investors to the Internal Market programme. Not surpris-
ingly, the changes in FDI stocks are less pronounced, as compared with FDI
flows. Nevertheless, a significant shift of FDI towards the EC, mainly at the
expense of other industrialized countries, is evident from both data sets. This
supports the proposition that completing the Internal Market has enhanced the
attractiveness of the EC for external as well as internal foreign investment.
4. Disparity between Member Countries
The second issue of economic integration largely neglected so far concerns its
effects on individual EC countries. The sharing of the expected welfare gains
from completing the Internal Market was not addressed in the Cecchini and
Emerson Reports [Cecchini, 1988; Emerson et al., 1988].
On theoretical grounds, it is debatable whether completing the Internal Mar-
ket will contribute to a balanced distribution of wealth among EC members
[Paque, Soltwedel et al., 1993]. Convergence rather than widening disparity is
anticipated by those who stress the role of the four freedoms in stimulating the
intra-EC movement of goods and production factors. Most importantly, it is ex-
pected that capital moves to labour-intensive sectors in low-wage regions at the
EC periphery if wages and the productivity of capital are inversely correlated
[Molle, 1990b, p. 177]. Furthermore, capital imports may help to narrow the
technology gap and enable backward countries to catch up with leading coun-
tries by a strategy of imitation. Hence, economic growth would be faster in
peripheral than in central regions.
^ The 1991-share of the Benelux countries can be decomposed as follows [Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1993]: Belgium: 7.4 per cent; Luxembourg: 3.3 per cent; the Nether-
lands: 6.3 per cent.
4^ The share of Luxembourg declined from 4.9 per cent in 1984 to 3.3 per cent in
1991.54
Another school of thought claims that the existing technology gap perpetu-
ates unbalanced development and leads to greater divergence instead of conver-
gence. This may happen if advanced countries invariably claim "for themselves
the high-value new products, leaving to peripheral regions mature productions
which sustain only low incomes" [Molle, 1990b, p. 178]. Factor movements
may even reinforce this tendency, e.g. by advanced countries drawing on quali-
fied labour not finding adequate employment in peripheral regions.
The theoretical debate reveals that our understanding of the relative impor-
tance of and the interaction-between factor endowments and prices, imperfect
competition, economies of scale and transaction costs has remained seriously
deficient [Winters, 1992, pp. 16 f.]. It can be shown that variations in the im-
portance of these factors can lead industries variously to concentrate in either
richer locations, or poorer ones, or not to concentrate at all [Krugman, Ven-
ables, 1990].
Although there is some support for the convergence hypothesis, recent em-
pirical evidence remains inconclusive as well.
4
5 According to simulation exer-
cises [Gasiorek et al., 1992], the expected output effects are relatively large for
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The highest welfare gains resulting from
EC 1993 are predicted for "economies in which labour is relatively cheap and
initial industrial concentration relatively high" [Winters, 1992, p. 23]. This
would foster convergence. Similarly, Neven [1990] concludes from analysing
labour costs across the EC that there is little unexploited comparative advan-
tage between the northern EC members, but plenty of scope for increased
labour-intensive exports from the southern members.
As concerns the critical factor of technology transfers through capital flows,
however, the preceding section has revealed an ambiguous picture. A clear
pattern of FDI flowing to less advanced EC countries is not to be observed so
far. This piece of evidence suggests that there is no determinism with regard to
the relation between economic integration and regional disparity. Rather, it in-
dicates that two major conclusions from earlier assessments of the regional
effect of EC policies are still valid: (i) such policies tend to have contradictory
effects [Molle, Cappellin, 1988], and (ii) "much depends on ... the capacity of
regions to adapt" [Molle, 1990a, p. 419].
Arguably, a linkage exists between regionally oriented EC policies and eco-
nomic adjustment at the regional level in the sense that the former tend to
undermine the latter. The incentives for backward regions of the EC to develop
Historical analyses of the regional development in the EC came to the conclusion
that disparity decreased considerably and consistently [for a summary, see Molle,
1990b, pp. 186 ff.]. The national GDP figures converged as manufacturing and
services grew faster in the poorer member countries than in the richer ones.55
their economies by efficiently using domestic and imported resources may be
weakened if adjustment needs are camouflaged by an easy access to intra-EC
transfers from official sources. In this respect, it is important to note that the
Treaty of Maastricht has strengthened the tendency to achieve economic and
social cohesion by Community decrees rather than by economic adjustment at
the national level [Schmieding, 1992]:
— The treaty stresses the need for "financial solidarity" of the advanced
EC members. The poorer countries at the EC periphery have been
granted further payments under the label of a "cohesion fund".
— Moreover, the Social Charter of 1989 shall be complemented by a set of
common minimum standards with regard to working conditions and,
possibly, also social security provisions [for details, see Paque, Soltwe-
deletal., 1993].
Eventually, the set of regional and social policies envisaged by the Treaty of
Maastricht may result in a vicious circle of widening economic disparity among
EC countries and of mounting needs for financial compensation [see also Flass-
beck, 1992]. The reduction of differences among the national social regulations
is held necessary to equalize competitive conditions among member countries.
However, the attempt to avoid "unfair" competition in the form of "social
dumping" triggers serious boomerang effects. The mandated social benefits
raise labour costs at the EC periphery, especially for less productive workers.
The option of parity changes being no longer available under EMU conditions,
the likely consequences are: higher unemployment, less economic growth and
reduced capital inflows. The chances of poorer EC countries to catch up with
the richer ones are eroded, which will make the former to ask for more official
financial support from the latter. Ever increasing financial support would, in
turn, further undermine wage discipline.
To summarize, policy induced wage rigidity at the EC periphery would not
only pervert the stated aim of regional and social policies, i.e. to reduce dispar-
ity among EC countries. Furthermore, it "could really blow up social cohesion
by ruining the willingness to pay of the taxpayers in the net-payer countries"
[Paque, Soltwedel et al., 1993, p. 39].56
III. Remaining Trade Barriers
The external trade policy of the EC can still be characterized by instability, dis-
crimination, lacking transparency and conceptual deficiencies.
4
6 Differences in
protection levels among individual EC member countries remained sizeable
until the early 1990s, since national governments handled important non-tariff
trade barriers (NTBs). In many cases, the EC Commission's authorization to re-
strict intra-EC trade according to Art. 115 of the EEC Treaty frustrated at-
tempts to circumvent national barriers by "indirect" imports via less restrictive
EC member countries (Table 14).
4
7 The decline of Art. 115 authorizations until
1990 to roughly one third of the 1980-figure indicates that the process of trans-
forming national NTBs into a common protection level was well under way.
4
8
Table 14 — Number of Authorizations to Restrict Intra-EC Trade under Article






























































For an earlier and more detailed assessment, that is focused on EC protectionism
against DCs, see Hiemenz et al. [1990].
In the late 1980s, about 70 per cent of Art. 115 authorizations were directed against
exports of East Asian countries; for details, see Spinanger [1989].
Davenport [1990, p. 191] argued, however, that the declining relevance of Art. 115
"may partly be the result of third countries realising that deflection will be frus-
trated, particularly since Member States may now apply to the Commission for
'surveillance'. This means that import licences must be obtained for each ship-
ment". Furthermore, national EC governments may continue to restrict intra-EC
trade even under Internal Market conditions. In the Treaty of Maastricht, Art. 115
of the EEC Treaty was not eliminated, but slightly modified only [NWB, 1992, pp.
77 and 137]. Furthermore, a GATT draft proposal for textiles trade would enable a
customs union to apply restrictive measures not only for the entire area but under
specific circumstances also for parts of it.57
Recourse to Art. 115 has further declined recently [GATT, 1993, Vol. A, p.
20]. New authorizations were reduced to 48 and 8 in 1991 and 1992 respec-
tively; and in spite of pressure from some member states, no authorization was
given in 1993. Many long-standing "residual" national trade restrictions have
been removed [ibid., p. vii]. Therefore, the subsequent review of remaining
trade barriers concentrates on the protection against imports from non-members
of the EC. A distinction is made between European and non-European trade
partners. EC trade policies towards EFTA and Central and Eastern Europe un-
derwent significant changes recently (see also Sections C.II-III). By contrast,
protectionist measures against non-European competitors are basically. un-
changed.
1. EC Trade Policies towards European Neighbours
The EC is an extremely important export market for both EFTA countries and
the post-socialist countries in Europe (Table 15). While EC exports to EFTA
and Central and Eastern Europe account for a relatively small and stagnant
share of total EC exports, the exports of neighbouring non-members rely to a
large and increasing degree on open EC markets. The importance of the EC for
Central and Eastern Europe has further increased with the recent collapse of
CMEA trade. This pattern of trade of the EC with EFTA countries and post-
socialist countries is not surprising because economic distance (geographical
distance plus language barriers) is small and therefore does not impose high
transaction costs upon trade and capital flows within total Europe. Furthermore,
the absorptive capacity of the Community is so large relative to the size of the
domestic markets of EFTA and Central and Eastern Europe that there is no
alternative to trade with the EC. Gravity models unanimously confirm eco-
nomic size and distance to be the most important determinants of the direction
of world trade in general and of intra-European trade in particular.
Export dependence is particularly strong for EFTA countries. Trade figures
suggest that EFTA exports received a relatively liberal treatment on EC mar-
kets. Exports to the EC increased by 121 per cent in 1985-1991, which was
only slightly below the growth of intra-EC trade (139 per cent) [GATT, 1992;
UN, a].
4
9 This favourable development can be attributed to long-standing spe-
cial trading arrangements (see Section C.II).
" In marked contrast extra-EFTA exports to non-EC partner countries rose by only
54 per cent in 1985-1991, which was below the growth of world trade.58












































Source: GATT [1992]; UN [a, February 1993; May 1993].
However, European markets continue to be fragmented despite the fact that
EC-EFTA trade in manufactures is freed from tariffs and quantitative restric-
tions.
5
0 Various obstacles to market integration via trade persist [for details, see
Abramsetal., 1990]:
— Some form of border control between the two blocs will be maintained,
although progress has been made in cutting the related administrative
costs.
5
1 The EES is not a customs union, which is also responsible for
the persistent struggle on rules of origin. Only since 1989, the EC has
agreed that inputs provided by all EFTA and EC countries can be
accumulated to meet the rules-of-origin requirements. Originally, the
rules had been applied on a strictly bilateral basis between the specific
EFTA member and the EC.
50
51
Abrams et al. [1990, pp. 21 ff.] provide evidence on the large price differences for
many commodities between different markets.
In 1988, it was agreed to replace all customs documents used in EC-EFTA trade by
the single document required for intra-EC trade. The computerization of customs
procedures by 1992 was expected to minimize the relative cost disadvantage of
EFTA exporters.59
— Another concern of EFTA-based firms has been that they may become
vulnerable to anti-dumping actions by the EC, once price cuts are neces-
sary to remain competitive on EC markets. The EC has indicated that
anti-dumping rules would be dropped with regard to EFTA only if they
were replaced by uniform competition rules.
— As stressed in the White Paper, a strong competition policy requires that
"discipline on state aid be rigorously enforced" [Commission of the EC,
1985, para. 158]. In practice, however, EFTA countries complain about
the EC for not meeting this requirement. Proposals for an EC-EFTA re-
porting system on state aid and consultation procedures have been under
study since 1988.
— Similarly, progress has been slow to ensure undistorted competition in
public procurement. EC legislation on open tenders was bypassed and
ignored by national and local purchasing bureaucracies [Cecchini, 1988,
pp. 18 ff.]. The Luxembourg Declaration of 1984 listed public procure-
ment as a primary area of EC-EFTA cooperation, but no proposals were
made.
— As concerns the replacement of national technical standards by EC stan-
dards, EFTA members are in a relatively favourable position as com-
pared with other trading partners of the EC. EFTA participates in the
setting of EC standards and already uses them whenever possible.
5
2 Fur-
thermore, an EC-EFTA agreement on the mutual recognition of test re-
sults and certification was signed in 1988.
EC-EFTA disputes in the field of services may adversely affect merchandise
trade in an indirect way. Negotiations on transport issues, for example, on regu-
lating Alpine road transport, proved to be protracted. Financial integration has
been impeded by the EC's reciprocity requirements with regard to lifting limi-
tations on foreign ownership and establishment of financial institutions. All in
all, however, trading conditions with regard to the EC are quite favourable for
EFTA. EFTA members face lower trade barriers than other non-members of the
EC due to the tradition of preferential trading arrangements.
Since recently, several post-socialist countries in East Central Europe have
come close to the favourable EFTA status (see Section C.III).
5
3 However, the
Europe Agreements with the former CSFR, Hungary and Poland [Commission
52 EFTA members discount the argument that EC standards are drafted to discrimi-
nate against non-members.
•" The subsequent paragraphs draw heavily on Langhammer [1992a], who evaluates
the Europe Agreements in considerable detail.60
of the EC, 1991] fall short of free trade arrangements.
5
4 EC concessions are
most generous where a significant supply response of East Central European
countries is highly unlikely, for example, for "non-sensitive" manufactured
goods the production of which is technology-intensive (for an overview, see
Synoptical Table 4). In "sensitive" areas, the concessions boil down to a prefer-
ential market access of the post-socialist countries compared with third coun-
tries. Trade diversion at the expense of the latter will dominate over trade crea-
tion, since fundamental protectionist measures of the EC remain in place. The
best example is the CAP. Quota restrictions are maintained for most agricul-
tural products, though quotas will be enlarged gradually. Furthermore, quota









Date of full duty elimination and mode
of reduction
March 1992
One step (a few items by 1993)
January 1997
Four steps of 20 per cent, then two steps
of 10 per cent
January 1998
2/7th in 1993, then five steps of l/7th
January 1997
Five steps of 15 per cent, then 25 per
cent; duty-free GSP quotas for about
50 per cent of imports, growing at 20
per cent
Not specified
Reductions of tariffs on some non-CAP




Quota increase of about 200 per
cent in 1992 over original MFA
quota for 1991. Additional out-
ward processing quotas equiva-
lent to 100 per cent of in-
creased quotas for 1992. Full
phase-out by January 1998.
none
Preferential access for CAP prod-
ucts, except cereals, at 50—75
per cent reduced variable levies
and tariffs with 8 per cent
quota growth; levy reductions
phased over three years.
Source: Pohl, Sorsa [1992, p. 95].
54 In addition, negotiations on Europe Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria have
been concluded recently.61
imports are not tax free. The EC offered tax concessions, amounting to 50-75
per cent of the regular levies (except cereals). Restrictive health standards, for
example, for potatoes, may further undermine the liberalization of agricultural
imports from East Central Europe.
Preferential tax treatment is characteristic for "sensitive" manufactures such
as textiles as well. The more relevant NTBs persist, though MFA quotas were
increased considerably. The EC is prepared to shorten the transition period of
reintegrating textile trade into the GATT framework for the East Central Euro-
pean countries after the MFA's fate has been decided upon multilaterally in the
Uruguay Round. However, the EC insists on specific safeguard provisions,
thereby contributing to the uncertainty of exporters, and on quotas with regard
to offshore processing to stem a surge in labour-intensive textile imports.
The restrictions on imports of coal, iron and steel are even more subtle.
Tariffs on and quantitative limitations of coal imports will be abolished, though
with some delay in Germany and Spain. However, the agreements contain com-
petition rules, for example, on cartelization and state aid, which effectively
bind the EC's trading partners in East Central Europe, but do not apply to the
practices of EC members. For example, the partner countries had to agree not
to quarrel over subsidized supplies of national coal to the energy and steel
sectors in Germany. By contrast, they face the threat of countervailing actions
if state aid for their coal and steel producers causes injury to EC producers.
In summary, trade diversion will dominate in the short run. But the overall
liberalization effect may become stronger in the medium run. The Europe
Agreements have set a precedent for the rest of Central and Eastern Europe.
The concessions with regard to "sensitive" products, though limited, have
somewhat opened the door to highly protected EC markets. On these achieve-
ments the beneficiaries may build when the EC's dilemma gains momentum,
i.e. to open the door further or to be confronted with mass migration.
2. Trade Barriers against Non-European Competitors
While EC trade policy has changed significantly in a European context, the
considerable delay in concluding the Uruguay Round prevented major changes
in protectionism against non-European exports. Positively stated, "initial con-
cerns that, in the course of the Internal Market programme, the EC would turn
inward-looking have not been confirmed to date. There is little evidence of any
recent major intensification of protective measures on the part of the EC"
[GATT, 1991, Vol. I, p. 20]. Negatively stated, high barriers against non-Euro-
pean exports in "sensitive" sectors remained largely unaltered, as did the main
characteristics of EC trade policy, i.e. discrimination, selectivity and discretion.62
The first constant feature concerns the complex structure of preferential
trade arrangements (see also Section B.III and Figure 1). Apart from the afore
mentioned privileges of EFTA and East Central European countries, the EC
offers duty-free access for manufactured exports of the ACP countries, grants
tariff preferences in the context of its Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), and has established a network of special arrangements with Mediterra-
nean countries [Sideri, 1990]. Even before the Europe Agreements, about 60
per cent of external EC imports originated from countries participating in some
form of preferential trade scheme [GATT, 1991, Vol. I, p. 7]. Taking further
into account that trade is closely managed with a host of discriminatory export
restraints (e.g. Japan, Taiwan) or is largely agricultural and thus subject to the
variable levies of the CAP (e.g. Australia, New Zealand), MFN treatment by




The complex hierarchy of preferential arrangements is going to outlive the
Internal Market programme, and the Uruguay Round as well. The effects of
preferences on the EC's trade relations with the beneficiaries have been ana-
lysed time and again, and so have the inherent protectionist traps in many of
the preference schemes.
5
6 From the viewpoint of DCs, in particular, "serious
criticism can be levelled at the discrepancy between lofty objectives and nu-
merous impediments to free trade and security of access to the Community's
market" [Pelkmans, 1987, p. 38]. The benefits in terms of stimulating the bene-
ficiaries' export and income growth have remained modest at best.
5
7 At the
same time the restricted product coverage of privileges hampered the diversifi-
cation of exports,
5
8 and strict rules of origin interfered with an efficient divi-
sion of labour at an international scale.
5
9 Preferences were biased against the
most competitive suppliers. The schemes suffered from a serious lack of trans-
parency, and the ensuing uncertainty added to the reluctance of Third World
producers to invest [Langhammer, Sapir, 1987]. The cost-benefit analysis of
5
5 Sideri [1990, p. 29] estimated that only 25 per cent of the EC's total trade was
conducted on a MFN basis, compared with almost 90 per cent of US trade.
5
6 For an overview, see e.g. Hiemenz et al. [1990, pp. 337 ff., pp. 359 ff.]; Lang-
hammer, Sapir [1987]; Sideri [1990].
This is not surprising. Preferences are largely confined to tariff concessions,
whereas the more important NTBs remain in place. Furthermore, the eligibility to
the EC's GSP scheme is limited by a complex set of country-specific quotas.
5
8 In evaluating the EC's GSP scheme, Brown [1988/89, p. 757] concluded: "The
products of greatest immediate interest to the less developed countries have not
been the object of significant reductions in tariffs or nontariff barriers".
59 In negotiating the Lome IV Convention, for example, the EC insisted on a maxi-
mum outside content for manufactured ACP goods of 40-50 per cent.63
preference schemes will further deteriorate to the extent that multilateral nego-
tiations result in general trade liberalization, and preference margins are nar-
rowed in this way.
The second constant feature of EC trade policy relates to the traditionally
large differences in protection levels across sectors and industries [Weiss et al.,
1988]. For a wide range of industrial raw materials, fuels and manufactures,
moderate tariffs are the main factor affecting access to the EC market.
6
0 In
sharp contrast, a hard core of product areas has remained highly protected by
an outstandingly complex trade regime [for details, see GATT, 1991, Vol. I;
Hiemenz et al., 1990].
6
1
The bulk of agricultural commodities produced and consumed in the EC
continues to be insulated from the world market through a restrictive system of
variable levies (for a discussion of recent developments concerning the CAP,
see Section D.I). Commodities outside this system face substantial tariffs,
including specific tariffs (e.g. wine and spirits) as well as seasonal and alternate
tariffs (e.g. fruits and vegetables). Furthermore, countervailing charges are im-
posed if exporters of wine, some fruits and vegetables, and some fishery prod-
ucts do not comply with established reference prices.
The textile and clothing industries were protected by 19 bilateral restraint
agreements under MFA IV,
6
2 which covered nearly half of external EC textile
imports in 1988.
6
3 The technical complexity of the EC's MFA system renders
it extremely difficult for exporters to fully utilize the product and country-
specific annual quotas.
Coal and steel are regulated in a separate legal framework. The ECSC
Treaty allows for considerable government intervention and state aid until its
expiration in 2002.
6
4 Apart from internal support measures, "voluntary" export
restraint arrangements and autolimitations of major exporters had traditionally
°" In 1988, the average tariff rate for all non-agricultural products amounted to 7.3
per cent [GATT, 1991, Vol. I, p. 10].
* The following paragraphs do not take into account the distortions in competition
on EC markets that are due to subsidies granted to technology-intensive sectors,
state-aided cartels, etc. The motivation to support the development of new techno-
logies and industrial independence, e.g. in microelectronics and the aircraft indus-
try, is discussed in Section D.I.
By 1987 the EC had quantitative restrictions on more than 5000 individual MFA
categories on a country-by-country basis. The subsequent reduction in the number
of quotas during MFA IV exaggerates the liberalization effect since product cate-
gories were combined and redundant categories were dropped [Spinanger, 1991].
Imports from Mediterranean countries, partly under self-restraints, accounted for
an additional 22 per cent. Furthermore, EC member countries had imposed several
autonomous restrictions against centrally planned economies.
In 1988, production quotas were replaced by a system of surveillance.64
been manifest in the iron and steel sector. The share of steel imports under re-
straint arrangements dropped to 19 per cent in 1989 (1980: 68 per cent) due to
the gradual reduction in country and product coverage since 1985. Restraint ar-
rangements with South Korea and Venezuela were terminated in 1990. How-
ever, with stronger import competition, a dramatic decline in domestic demand
and deteriorating export markets, "the Communities' resolve to defend these
achievements is under challenge" [GATT, 1993, Vol. A, p. xvi]. Import sur-
veillance remains in force. Some imports from Central European countries and
Egypt have recently been made subject to anti-dumping duties or price under-
takings, as were imports from Mexico, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia
before.
Until recently, nationally administered protectionist measures dominated in
the automobile industry. Most of them were targeted against Japan.
6
5 The sub-
stantially different policy stance among national governments in the EC trig-
gered parallel interventions in intra-EC trade of imported automobiles. Indirect
imports, flowing from less restrictive (e.g. Germany) to more restrictive EC
countries (e.g. Italy, Spain), were contained on the basis of Art. 115 of the EEC
Treaty. Direct investment in the EC by Japanese car producers provided a pos-
sible way to circumvent the quantitative export restraints. However, high local
content requirements had to be met (reportedly up to 80 per cent in the case of
investments in the UK) in order to escape the national quota regimes for
Japanese made cars [GATT, 1991, Vol. I, p. 219].
The recent "voluntary" export restraint (VER) arrangement on automobiles,
which the EC concluded with Japan in 1991, provides an indication of the ef-
fect on the average level of protection, when national quantitative restrictions
are replaced by a common trade policy under Internal Market conditions (for a
detailed analysis, see Section E.III).
6
6 Japan agreed to restrict its automobile
exports to the EC to 1.23 million units until 1999 (about 8 per cent of the
estimated total market volume) [Siebert, 1992, p. 5]. This export figure, which
largely resembles the annual exports in the late 1980s [GATT, 1991, Vol. I, p.
218], was further reduced after protracted negotiations of the EC with Japan in
mid-1993. Furthermore, EC markets will remain segmented since some EC
" For example, Italy accepted only 2500 direct car imports annually from Japan in
the late 1980s. The respective number for Spain was 1000. In France, the market
share of Japan was limited to about 3 per cent.
°° Winters [1992, p. 34] provides another example by referring to the replacement of
French and Italian restrictions by EC-wide restraints on footwear imports from
South Korea and Taiwan in 1990. The latter were not more restrictive than their
predecessors, but redistributed the costs of protection at the expense of formerly
more liberal EC countries. The common trade policy with regard to automobile
imports will be of increasing relevance for some newly industrializing countries
(for details, see Section G.III).65
countries insisted on a maximum share of Japanese cars in total new registra-
tions in the order of 5-8 per cent.
6
7 For formerly less restrictive EC members
such as Germany, the agreement may result in a considerably reduced supply
and in higher prices of imported Japanese cars.
The third constant feature of EC trade policy concerns the preferred protec-
tionist instruments, which reflect the EC's bias towards bilateralism, selectiv-
ity, discrimination and discretion. The most important NTBs continued to con-
sist of "voluntary" export restraints, EC surveillance and anti-dumping proce-
dures [Hiemenz et al., 1990, pp. 311 ff.]. Not surprisingly, export restraints and
similar measures were concentrated on "sensitive" sectors (Table 16). Some 50
Table 16 — Export Restraint Arrangements
3 Affecting Imports into the EC and
Individual Member States (situation as of end-1992)
Sector Exporting country affected
b
Agriculture















Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, South Africa
South Korea
China, South Korea, Taiwan
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,




Japan (3), South Korea (3), Singapore
Japan (2)
Japan (2), South Korea (2)
aIncludes voluntary restraints, surveillance, industry-to-industry arrangements, price
and export monitoring, consultation mechanisms, and similar measures. — Number
of export restraint arrangements in parentheses if more than one; a number larger than
one is due to specific arrangements for different segments of the industry or with sev-
eral individual EC members. —
 CA11 third country imports are under retrospective EC
surveillance. — In addition, exchange of letters with 10 Latin American countries. —
eExport recommendation.
Source: GATT [1993, Vol. B, pp. 6-8].
67 Persistent market segmentation is to be expected for domestically produced cars as
well. This is because of highly different sales taxes for automobiles among EC
countries and the retention of the principle to tax cars according to the rules of the
country of destination.66
bilateral restraint arrangements were known to be in place by mid-1990, in-
volving the EC, individual member countries or their industries. Apart from the
"consensus" on motor vehicles with Japan, the EC has apparently not con-
cluded any new bilateral restraint arrangement until 1993 [GATT, 1993, Vol.
A, p. xi]. Formerly concluded arrangements have expired recently. However, in
the context of association or cooperation agreements, the EC and its Mediterra-
nean partners have continued export moderation and monitoring arrangements
on certain sensitive textile and clothing products. Monitoring arrangements
have also been negotiated in the Europe Agreements with East Central Euro-
pean countries, for instance for steel products.
Traditionally, Japan, Asian NIEs, and centrally planned economies were the
principal targets of export restraints. The EC's anti-dumping actions (Table 17)
were directed predominantly against the same countries.
6
8 Since the late 1980s,
the focus has shifted from price undertakings to definitive anti-dumping duties.
Important features of the regional distribution of anti-dumping cases initiated
during the 1980s may be summarized as follows [Weidemann, 1990, p. 33]:
6
9
— Japan: 8 per cent (1.1);
— Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela: 7 per cent (1.5);
— Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan: 8 per cent (2.0);
— centrally planned economies: 41 per cent (4.5);
— Yugoslavia: 7 per cent (6.3).
Though of declining importance during the preparations for the Internal
Market, a considerable number of unilateral quotas continued to be applied by
some EC member countries until the early 1990s. By mid-1990, quantitative
restrictions or import prohibitions were imposed on more than 120 non-textile
categories (at a four digit level), mostly by France and Italy [GATT, 1991, Vol.
For an earlier detailed assessment of EC anti-dumping regulations, see Messerlin
[1989]. Messerlin calculated an average duty burden of 23 per cent resulting from
anti-dumping tariffs, and a quantitative reduction in imports of 40 per cent. Since
1987, it has also been possible to impose anti-dumping measures on products as-
sembled in the EC if imports of those products are already subject to such meas-
ures and the proportion of parts supplied by the country concerned is at least 60 per
cent of the total component value ("screwdriver-plant legislation") [Koopmann,
Scharrer, 1989, pp. 211 f.]. Until mid-1990, 32 assembly operations were subject
to investigations under these provisions.
The first figure refers to the number of cases in per cent of total cases. The figure
in parentheses indicates the share of anti-dumping cases relative to the respective
countries' share in total EC imports (ranking according to this relative share; for
all other countries, the relative share is below 1.0).67




























aIn the period 1980-1989, nearly half of the measures related to chemicals and allied products,
followed by mechanical machinery (13 per cent), textiles (9 per cent), iron and steel (9 per cent) and
consumer electronics (6 per cent). — Until June 1992.
Source: GATT [1991, Vol. I, p. 114; 1993; Vol. B, p. 9].
I, p. 96] .
7
0 Most of them affected supplies from Japan and Asian NIEs. Only re-
cently, the picture has changed significantly. As of October 1992, the number
of restrictions was reduced from 71 to 30 cases and from 48 to 19 cases for
France and Italy respectively [GATT, 1993, Vol. A, p. 56].
The EC clearly preferred the above mentioned discriminatory instruments to
safeguard provisions according to Art. XIX of the GATT, after the EC had
failed in its attempt to agree on a selective use of the safeguard clause during
earlier GATT negotiations [Koopmann, Scharrer, 1989, p. 210].
7
1 Only two
Art. XIX actions of the EC, i.e. minimum prices for fruit imports, were in force
in December 1992 [GATT, 1993, Vol. A, p. 58].
To summarize, any empirical assessment of the protectionist effects of NTBs
is seriously flawed as long as it has to be based on the afore mentioned fre-
quency distributions of trade interventions. This inventory approach cannot
capture the price and quantity effects of NTBs. Notwithstanding its limited
informative value, it can be maintained that EC trade policy reveals a remark-
able propensity for sector specific interventions. Furthermore, strong elements
of discrimination and selectivity among trading partners have become en-
trenched in the trade policy regime. All this has resulted in greater uncertainty
among exporters with respect to their access to EC markets.
70
71
National quotas by Portugal and Spain, for which the Act of Accession to the EC
provided the legal basis, are excluded.
The preference is also because Art. XIX requires an increase in import restrictions
in a particular sector to be compensated with liberalization elsewhere in the econ-
omy.68
E. Implications of EC Integration on Other
Industrialized Countries
I. Effects of EC 1993 on EFTA Countries
The direction of trade of EFTA countries is seen as widely independent of the
type of institutional affiliation with the EC and the EC integration process it-
self, since there is no alternative to the EC as the most important trading part-
ner. Yet, what is influenced by institutional arrangements is the openness of the
regions approximately measured by their exporl/GNP ratio [Pohl, Sorsa, 1992,
p. 89] as well as their overall welfare. EFTA includes countries with income
levels similar to the EC member countries, similar factor endowments and
similar levels of trade barriers. EC exports to EFTA and EC imports from
EFTA concentrate on manufactures with the exception of Norway, which basi-
cally exports fuels and fuel products to the EC (Table 18). Intra-industry spe-
cialization (in particular with EC member countries) dominates inter-industry
specialization and has grown overproportionately [Balassa, Bauwehs, 1988;
Greenaway, Hine, 1990/91, p. 614].
Effects on EFTA countries are discussed in the institutional framework of
the EES (see Section C.II). The following mechanisms can be identified: First,
there is a pure comparative advantage effect under perfect competition and
constant returns to scale. The EFTA countries are expected to incur a welfare
loss because they continue to face trade costs. Even under EES conditions,
border controls between the EFTA and the EC will not be abolished. EFTA
terms of trade will deteriorate because the elimination of intra-EC border
controls will divert some trade away from EFTA products, and EFTA countries
will have to lower their export prices through cutting real wages. This trade
effect will be small, because standard trade effects of the Internal Market
programme are estimated to be negligible (Table 8). To the extent that intra-
industry trade mostly occurs under imperfect competition the following effects
are more important for the EC-EFTA economic relations.
Second, similar to EC producers, EFTA companies operating in oligopolistic
markets stand to gain from economic integration in the EES. These gains will,
however, be smaller than those enjoyed by EC companies because EFTA sup-
pliers will face a number of trade barriers. Finally, EFTA companies will gain a
competitive advantage alongside with EC companies in third-country markets
because their marginal costs will decrease.69
Table 18 — Sectoral Structure of EC Trade with EFTA Countries, 1991 (in per












































































































































The sum of shares does
Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities [d].
These arguments suggest that the positive effects of the EES for EFTA com-
panies are similar to those of EC 1993 for EC companies. Authors like Krug-
man [1988] concluded, therefore, that EFTA countries could not afford not to
participate in an EES. EFTA countries would need the facilitated access to the
much larger EC markets in order to reap the potential gains from scale econo-
mies and increased competition [Norman, 1989]. Industry-specific analyses for
individual EFTA countries [ibid; for Norway and Sweden] strongly supported
this view for oligopolistically structured industries like automobiles and electri-
cal machinery. Other studies [Abrams et al., 1990; Gardener, Teppett, 1992;
Pintado et al., 1988] have focused on service industries such as telecommuni-
cation, transport, energy, banking and insurance. They have assessed the impli-
cations of an adaptation of the EFTA regulatory framework to EC standards.70
The findings of these studies indicate substantial gains from EES membership
for EFTA service industries.
7
2
To consolidate these effects in a general equilibrium framework has proven
to be difficult. Two approaches were chosen. Either was the EES regarded as a
common market between the two groups of countries or it was assumed that the
EES would involve integration to the same extent as the Internal Market pro-
gramme, i.e. full membership. Under the second assumption, Haaland and Nor-
man [1992] not surprisingly estimate much higher income gains for EFTA
countries than for the EC, which would only marginally benefit from expanding
the Internal Market programme to EFTA countries. EFTA countries are esti-
mated to gain in terms of real income by 3.3 per cent of expenditures on traded
goods compared with 1.9 per cent for the EC due to EC 1993 and to only 0.1
per cent for the EC as an additional gain if the EFTA countries were included.
The Haaland-Norman model focuses on industrial restructuring. Within the
industrial sector, a shift from physical capital-intensive to more skill-intensive
industries is expected for both the EC and EFTA countries, while production of
labour-intensive goods will shift from EFTA to the more labour-abundant
member states at the EC periphery. More generally, Haaland and Norman ex-
pect the production of perfectly competitive sectors, including services, to de-
cline. The treatment of services as a perfectly competitive sector is debatable
(D.II.2). Gardener and Teppett [1992, p. 12] estimate — albeit in a partial equi-
librium setting — EFTA gains in the consumer surplus in financial sectors of
1.3 per cent of 1986 GDP for the EES scenario compared with only 0.9 per cent
for the scenario of bilateral integration between individual EFTA countries and
the EC, and to 1.1 per cent for the scenario of EFTA integration alone.
Both the EES and full membership scenarios describe stages of institutional
affiliation of EFTA countries to the EC that have not been accomplished by
mid-1993. The December 1992 referendum in Switzerland against a Swiss ac-
cession to the EES Treaty created new uncertainty regarding the implemen-
tation of the EES for the remaining EFTA countries (in particular, on the terms
of burden sharing). Given past experiences with the negotiations on the second
enlargement of the EC, the negotiations on full membership of Austria, Sweden
and Finland, which were opened in early 1993, were expected to be time-
The agricultural sector is a case sui generis as there is not yet free trade between
EFTA and the EC as in manufactured products. Brink [1991] concludes that the
integration of EFTA countries into the CAP would require the smallest adjustment
burden in Sweden and Austria and a much higher adjustment burden in Norway
and Switzerland closely followed by Finland. For the EC, Switzerland and Norway
as net importers would be more preferred partner countries than Austria, Finland
and Sweden, which either export to the EC or compete with EC suppliers on third
markets. Under given conditions of administratively fixed prices, these three coun-
tries could make the problem of excess production in the EC more serious.71
consuming. In such a stage of transition and with the Internal Market pro-
gramme by and large operating already, one of the immediate responses of
EFTA companies to the changing institutional environment could be to inten-
sify direct investment in the EC. This would mean to enjoy the same conditions
of production as their EC competitors. To what extent an investment inflow
from EFTA countries into the EC has already materialized can be shown by
changes in FDI inflows in three major EC member countries, i.e. West Ger-
many, France and the UK, during 1984 and 1991.
In fact, stock data for EFTA investment in West Germany yield more than a
doubling of investment between 1984 and 1991. Yet, as total foreign invest-
ment in Germany increased by similar rates of growth, the EFTA share in
foreign investment remained fairly stable except for the last year in which
EFTA investment rose overproportionately (Table 19). Expectedly, flow data
for France and the UK show much larger year-to-year variations, but again in-
vestment grew rapidly in absolute terms as did total foreign investment. Swe-
den and Switzerland were by far the largest EFTA investors. In 1991, the Swe-
dish car industry (Volvo) strongly invested in France in a pre-stage of a merger
with Renault which finally did not materialize. The rapid increase of EFTA
investment may support the hypothesis that the EC became more attractive as a
host relative to other hosts.
II. The Central and Eastern European Countries: Widening
of Integration and Economic Transformation
During the entire post-war period the Central and Eastern European countries
were isolated and delinked from their traditional trading partners in Western
Europe. This happened through supply-side measures, i.e. the enforced trade
and factor integration in the framework of the CMEA, as well as through
demand-side measures, such as binding quantitative restrictions of Western
Europe against allegedly dumped imports from Central and Eastern Europe or
export restrictions such as the COCOM list. EC 1993 had no direct effect upon
Central and Eastern European countries. They were fully integrated into the
centrally planned division of labour and, thus, could neither benefit from an EC
income-induced demand surge for their products nor lose markets in the EC
due to trade diversion because their market shares were very small. As internal
prices and exchange rates were widely distorted, the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean planners under the old system would have tried to countervail the price ef-72
Table 19 — EFTA Countries' Foreign Direct Investment in Germany, France
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Source: Banque de France [various issues]; UK [1991; 1992]; Deutsche Bun-
desbank [1993].73
fects stemming from EC 1993 by subsidizing their capital goods exports. In the
medium run, however, they might have incurred somewhat larger terms of
trade losses because of the resource-saving technological progress. Such pro-
gress supported by stricter environmental regulations within the Single Market
would have forced them either to lower prices of commodities in order to miti-
gate these effects or to subsidize other exports. On the import side, they might
have even gained from intensified competition on world markets for capital
goods caused by the second-round effects of EC 1993.
With the beginning of economic transformation following the collapse, this
picture changed fundamentally:
— Trade policy-induced price distortions for tradables were reduced rap-
idly when Western and Eastern Europe began to cut tariffs on the basis
of bilateral trade and co-operation agreements.
— Both sides, in particular the EC, also began to dismantle quantitative re-
strictions. As with tariffs, this shift will bring domestic prices in Central
and Eastern Europe closer to world market prices.
— Public loans and grants have increasingly been channelled from the EC
into Central and Eastern Europe to support the transformation process
externally.
— Technical assistance has been granted for a wide range of issues in order
to help Central and Eastern European countries to build up a legal and
institutional framework that could facilitate full membership in future.
The traditional links to the EC reemerged rapidly. In 1991, Hungarian ex-
ports to the EC, for instance, accounted for already 50 per cent of total Hungar-
ian exports compared with only 20 per cent for exports to Central and Eastern
Europe [KOPINT-DATORG, 1992, p. 119]. The geographical shift in Polish
and CSFR exports is similar. Gravity models suggest even higher "normal" EC
shares in Central and Eastern European trade of 74 per cent for Western Europe
in total [Havrylyshyn, Pritchett, 1991; for some lower estimates see Wang,
Winters, 1992].
The policy measures are not an integral part of EC 1993 but they are instru-
mental to let Central and Eastern Europe participate in its effects. Yet, before
discussing such likely effects, a qualification is needed. Unlike in EFTA or
other third countries, the effects of EC 1993 on Central and Eastern Europe are
crucially dependent on getting supply conditions in the partner countries right,
i.e. achieving a success in economic transformation. In this respect, Central and
Eastern European countries are in a similar situation as the African EC associ-
ates with their structural adjustment programmes. Unless stabilization and
transformation succeeds, there will be hardly any positive effect of the Single74
Market on Central and Eastern Europe. Given this qualification, the following
effects are likely.
First, EC 1993 will intensify the adjustment pressure on labour-intensive in-
dustries in the EC. In the short run, the Mediterranean member countries might
still be able to attract such industries from EFTA countries and more advanced
EC countries. In the medium run, however, EC 1993 will bring an equilibrating
effect on wage costs, i.e. a continuing of the upward trend in wage costs at the
EC periphery, which materialized already in attractive host countries for FDI
such as Spain. Both the "social dimension" of the Single Market and the
binding of exchange rates under the EMS will contribute to such a trend.
Neighbouring countries in Central and Eastern Europe with much lower wage
costs will benefit from the pressure to find new locations for labour-intensive
production outside the EC. This has already materialized in the aftermath of the
Interim Agreements with the former CSFR, Poland and Hungary in spring
1992, through which first steps were taken to dismantle quantitative restrictions
against textiles and clothing goods. Off-shore assembly as a pre-stage of FDI
has become very important in the three countries, and MFA quotas can now be
better exhausted. As a result, it is likely that the share of the three countries in
extra-EC imports of textiles and clothing, which increased from 3.7 per cent in
1988 to 5.2 per cent in 1991, will rise further [Langhammer, 1993, Table A2].
Second, Central and Eastern Europe will enjoy a terms of trade gain as
prices of imports of capital goods needed for economic transformation are
going to decline relative to the pre-1993 period because of intensified compe-
tition on world markets. To what extent Central and Eastern Europe will be
able to collect such gains depends on whether EC economic aid to import new
equipment is tied.
Third, the removal of border controls on persons within the Community will
make migration from Central and Eastern Europe more attractive. This will
apply to legalized guest worker contracts for which an option has been opened
in the Europe Agreements for individual EC member states. But the migrants'
drain will be stronger in informal (and illegal) migration for gaining jobs in
activities like construction, harvesting and maid services. Given high unem-
ployment in the process of economic transformation in the home countries, the
benefits of sending remittances might outweigh the disadvantages of losing
skilled and motivated labour.
Fourth, should the EC enforce stricter common environmental and social
standards after 1992 and should Central and Eastern Europe be allowed to
follow lower national standards, some relatively pollution-intensive industries
could find it attractive to move to Central and Eastern Europe.
To conclude, Central and Eastern Europe is a latecomer in economic rela-
tions with the EC because of its isolation from its natural trading partner75
Western Europe for more than 40 years. Thus, the region has much to gain
from product innovations, process innovations and locational innovations en-
couraged by the EC Single Market. Because of the profound differences in
resource endowment, the Heckscher-Ohlin type of inter-industry specialization
will prevail in trade between the two regions. The effects arising from such
specialization patterns are assessed to be clearly positive for Central and East-
ern Europe provided that the transformation process does not fail. Given the
early stage of the transformation process, it is obvious that quantitative assess-
ments of income and trade gains resulting from the Europe Agreements and
other trade preferences for Eastern Europe are not yet available.
III. Implications for OECD Countries
1. Implications for the US
Among third countries, the US were among those who have vigilantly ex-
pressed their concerns about possible "Fortress Europe" effects [Centre for
European Policy Studies, 1992, pp. 358-359]. This concern was based on three
aspects of EC-US economic relations: first, on the importance of the EC as the
largest US export market (almost 25 per cent of US exports in 1991); second,
on the disputes with the EC on multilateral trade policies (Uruguay Round);
and third, on the directives of the EC to liberalize trade in the rapidly growing
market of business services and service equipment (such as telecommunication
and related services). In this sector, the US were internationally leading suppli-
ers but felt discriminated against by some early EC directives on government
procurement allegedly favouring EC suppliers and by the monopolies of state-
owned companies in many EC member states [Hufbauer, 1990b, p. 19]. In the
course of implementing EC 1993, however, the early fears cooled down some-
what, and EC integration began to be viewed as "Opportunity Europe" [ibid, p.
13].
The economic rationale of assuming losses from EC 1993 is similar to that
in EC-EFTA relations, except for the fact that EFTA suppliers with their
smaller domestic markets are more dependent on EC markets than US suppli-
ers. The division of labour between the US and the EC is determined by strong
intra-industry specialization and imperfect competition. Under such conditions,
the EC companies are feared to gain a competitive edge over US suppliers. The
US suppliers would be forced to lower their prices and, thus, to accept terms of
trade losses in order not to lose in market shares. Such effects could materialize76
not only on EC markets but also on US markets and on third markets. Among
trade effects, the income-induced effect of increased demand for US imports is
rated lower than the price-induced effects of static trade diversion and the dy-
namic effects of process innovations (cost reduction) and product innovations
of EC suppliers [Arndt, Willett, 1991, p. 1569].
Beyond trade, there is the issue on foreign direct investment. It is feared in
the US that investment diversion occurs towards the EC. US companies would
then be forced to follow suit in order to defuse protectionist threats in the EC
(quid pro quo investment) [Bhagwati, 1989, p. 35] and to be able to participate
in EC-sponsored high-tech research consortia. Enhanced profit expectations
may also enable EC companies to borrow more on world capital markets thus
increasing costs of borrowing for US competitors or the risk of being crowded
out [Arndt, Willett, 1991, p. 1569].
More specifically, the US government has raised four controversial issues
with respect to EC 1993 [Hufbauer, 1990a, pp. 33^4].
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— There is the question how the US would have to reciprocate in order not
to see their companies discriminated against on EC markets.
— The dismantling of national quotas within the EC was expected to affect
US automobile exports to the EC from Japanese transplants. Commu-
nity-wide quotas against direct automobile exports from Japan could
trigger a stricter monitoring of US exports in order to keep Japanese
transplant cars out of the EC market.
— Ex ante harmonized EC technical standards could be instrumental to
deny American companies easy access to the single market. Even the
principle of mutual recognition of standards (ex post harmonization)
within the EC would not be helpful to non-EC parties unless the US
standards and norms would be included in this principle.
— Rules of origin and minimum local content requirements could emerge
as impenetrable barriers to US companies operating in industries like
cars and semi-conductors.
Finally, government procurement in telecommunication has been regarded
as an extremely relevant issue because of the closed-market character of this
sector in both the EC and the US.
Many of these technical issues were tackled either bilaterally or multilater-
ally in the Uruguay Round (for instance, in government procurement and stan-
dards). Others escape from quantitative assessments because such assessments
On a very detailed discussion of these issues and their effect upon core industries
like banking and securities, automobiles, telecommunication and semiconductors,
see Hufbauer [1990a].77
depend on how the US may reciprocate in order to protect their companies
against discrimination on EC markets.
Potential trade effects can be addressed by comparing an ex post income
elasticity of import demand of the EC towards the US between two short
periods, that is 1985-1988 as the announcement period and 1988-1990 as the
beginning of implementing the Internal Market programme. In the first period,
the ratio between the annual average growth rate of EC imports from the US
relative to the growth rate of the nominal GNP of the EC was 2.2 compared
with 1.8 in the second period. Including the year 1991 in the second period, this
ratio even drops to 0.4 as US exports to the EC declined heavily in 1991 while
they rose to other areas and in total.
7
4 This suggests a decline that cannot be
explained by exchange rate movements because the dollar depreciated further.
It is also doubtful, however, whether the 1991 drop of US exports can be attrib-
uted to the Internal Market programme.
Haaland and Norman [1992] run simulations on the effects of trade cost
reductions and market integration not only for the EC and EFTA but also for
the US and Japan. As concerns the US, they report very small real income
losses of about 0.04 per cent of expenditures on tradables [ibid., p. 13]. Losses
are estimated to be somewhat higher in the relatively skill-intensive industries,
which account for almost half of US exports to the EC, for example, office ma-
chines (loss of 0.2 per cent). This holds because intra-industry specialization,
imperfect competition and economies of scale are assumed to be particularly
relevant in skill-intensive industries. On the other hand, the US is expected not
to lose and even slightly to gain in some labour-intensive industries. No change
compared with the pre-1993 situation is expected for non-tradables. Gains and
losses do not exceed 0.2 per cent in each direction. This visibly contrasts to the
gains that the EC could hope for (1.9 per cent). Losses for the US become
marginally larger in the scenario of integrating EFTA and the EC.
With respect to FDI, there is no trend towards a growing attractiveness of the
EC as a host for US investors. In 1981-1986, more than 70 per cent of US
incremental manufacturing investment abroad went to the EC. This share
dropped to 50 per cent during the period 1986-1991, which overall saw much
higher growth of total US FDI. This is a clear indication that investment diver-
sion in favour of the EC did not take place. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile
the sectoral pattern of changes in US investment with the Haaland-Norman
results for structural change in Europe. These results suggest increasing FDI in
skill-intensive industries and decreasing FDI in labour-intensive industries.
These calculations are based on Statistical Office of the European Communities
[d].78







































Source: US Department of Commerce [various issues].
Table 20 shows, however, the opposite trends for (skill-intensive) non-electrical
machinery and (relatively labour-intensive) electric and electronic equipment.
In general, the quantified effects of EC 1993 for the US can be summarized
as small with minor losses for oligopolistically structured industries that com-
pete against EC-based counterparts. Service industries are usually excluded
from CGE models. This is highly unsatisfactory because a major part of adjust-
ment challenges for US companies will emerge in this sector.
2. Implications for Japan
Contrary to the US, which could not substantiate their initial "Fortress Europe"
concerns, Japan has actually suffered from measures specifically taken against
its exports (see Section D.III). Such measures concern EC imports of Japanese
cars, local content requirements for Japanese transplants and reciprocity re-
quirements.
In July 1991, the EC reached a tacit agreement with Japan on the issue of car
quotas. Japanese producers were to limit their share of the EC market to 16.1
per cent until 1999. This would mean an opening of the market from the pre-
sent 11 per cent market share (including transplants) [EC, 1991]. Japan agreed
to "avoid disruption" of European markets and to "monitor" direct car exports
in accordance with a "forecast" of 1.23 million exported units per annum until
1999 (under the assumption of total EC demand of 15.1 million units in that
year; Table 21). For the time being, Japan also monitors car exports to the five79
restricted national markets to ensure that exports to these EC markets do not
exceed specific maximum market'shares. The agreement is subject to revision
as far as annual exports of cars are concerned. In September 1993, for instance,
Japan, under the pressure of the EC Commission, agreed to lower exports to a
volume below one million units following a substantial decline in car sales in
the Community. The EC has announced to remove all internal barriers until
1999. Japan insisted on no ceiling for cars delivered from transplants either lo-
cated in the EC or elsewhere, but EC assumptions on Japanese transplant sales
are included in the ceiling of a 16.1 market share in 1999. Internal inconsisten-
cies in this agreement suggest that EC monitoring of Japanese car imports will
not be terminated by the end of this decade. First, the EC projections envisage
a decline of Japan's market share by 2.6 percentage points from 1998 to 1999.
Reasons for this abrupt change are not given. Second, the internal projections
of the EC Commission on market shares in formerly restricted and non-
restricted markets in 1998 still show much lower shares of both Japanese direct
export sales and transplant sales in France and Italy (the two largest "managed
trade" markets) than in the other markets (Table 21). Under such conditions a
free internal market after 1999 would probably lead to import surges in the for-
mer countries and to a shockwise adjustment pressure upon domestic suppliers.
One may express doubts whether the French and Italian governments are pre-
pared to accept such a rapid adjustment at the end of the transition period.
As concerns rules of origin, Japanese companies fear that the EC may intro-
duce restrictive measures severely affecting Japanese investment in the EC.
Such fears are empirically well-founded, as the EC has already set some strin-
gent local content rules for Japanese transplants operating in the Community.
Examples are Nissan UK in the car industry, which has to meet a 80 per cent
local content rule to qualify as a "non-Japanese product", and the so-called
screwdriver plants, which allegedly were set up in the EC to circumvent anti-
dumping duties imposed on products like photocopiers, electric weighing ma-
chines and electric typewriters. For the screwdriver plants, a minimum local
content of 40 per cent was fixed to avoid the extension of anti-dumping duties
to products assembled in these plants. In 1990, a GATT panel found this legis-
lation inconsistent with relevant GATT provisions [GATT, 1991, Vol. I, p.
117]. Furthermore, in 1989, the EC adopted rules of origin for semi-conductors
stipulating that only those microcircuits that were etched within the EC would
qualify as "EC originating products". This regulation was said to affect Japa-
nese producers heavily because companies had established only assembly
plants for semi-conductors in the EC with the exception of one factory.
Reciprocity requirements primarily relate to the EC's initial version of the
Second Banking Directive. This directive includes provisions that foreign in-80

























































































































































>ross vehicle weight. Figures in
parenthesis refer to market share in per cent. — internal European Commission projection, September 1990. —
EC/ Japanese forecasts as a basis for monitoring system,
Japan insists on no ceiling.
July 1991. — EC intema assumption, July 1991.
Source: EC [1991].81
vestment in the EC banking sector is only allowed if the home country of the
investor provides equal access to EC banks. The response of Japanese banks to
EC 1993 is likely to be three-fold [Hirota, 1990; MacKinnon, 1990]. First,
branches are transformed into subsidiaries in order to be recognized as true EC
banks and to receive a banking licence. Second, Japanese banks want to engage
in more partnerships with European banks. Third, Japanese banks will increas-
ingly enter into the most difficult market for non-resident banks, retail banking,
in order to exploit a relatively cheap funding source. Credit cards and other
consumer related products may serve as gateways for banks that lack a strong
customer deposit base. Again, joint ventures with European companies in non-
financial services as well as financial services will be expanded to facilitate
market access.
As concerns quantitative assessments of EC 1993 for Japan, there are esti-
mates on total exports and imports and on changes in real income derived from
general equilibrium world trade models. As far as Japanese trade and the EC
1993 induced changes are concerned, Stoeckel et al. [1990] examine two sce-
narios. In the first scenario, the Community's macroeconomic policy is con-
ducted in a way that improves the EC's trade balance as a result of higher, inter-
national competitiveness. In the second scenario, an expansionary macroeco-
nomic policy boosts domestic demand. Under the first scenario, the study esti-
mates a decline of Japanese exports by 8.2 per cent of 1988 exports, a decline
of Japanese imports by 4.2 per cent of total imports and of Japan's GDP by 0.6
per cent. Under the second scenario, Japan's losses would be negligible (0.4 per
cent in exports, 0.2 per cent in imports, and 0.1 per cent in GDP).
As for the US, Haaland and Norman [1992] have estimated changes in real
income for Japan due to the combined effect of trade cost reductions and mar-
ket integration in the EC. The losses incurred by Japan are slightly larger than
the losses incurred by the US. They amount to 0.06 per cent of the expenditures
on tradables [ibid., p. 13]". As Shigehara [1991, p. 19] points out, what matters
is the direction of industrial reorganization in the EC and the implications for
third countries rather than the numerical estimates of overall losses, which are
unanimously assessed to be small anyway and partly overlapped by other
events.
In this respect, two findings of the Haaland-Norman study are worth men-
tioning. First, Japanese losses are found to be mainly due to overproportionate
losses (-0.6 per cent) in one skill-intensive industry: transport equipment (auto-
mobiles). This is just the sector in which EC companies are expected to gain
most from market integration (4.5 per cent). Second, except for physical capi-
tal-intensive industries, where Japan is found to gain slightly, the only skill-
intensive industry for which gains from EC market integration are reported (0.1
per cent) is the computer industry (office machines). The significantly negative82
effects on transport equipment result from the assumption of substantial scale
economies in European car manufacturing. While this assumption may be sub-
ject to debate (see Section D.II), Japanese car producers may indeed be nega-
tively affected by the restrictive access to EC markets, which is not incorpo-
rated in the Haaland-Norman model.
Irrespective of the generally marginal implications of EC 1993 on Japanese
producers, earlier studies [Engering, 1989; Hirata, 1991] have anticipated an
expansion of Japanese FDI in the EC. Table 22 shows that there was in fact a
strong response of Japanese investors to anticipated European integration. For
all sectors, the EC's share in Japanese investment stocks rose from 13.7 to 19.1
per cent between 1987 and 1991 and to 18.3 per cent in the fiscal year 1992
[Japan Ministry of Finance, a, June 1993]. The increase was stronger in the
manufacturing sector, where it started from a lower level than in the non-manu-
facturing sector. Outstanding changes in individual sectors comprise investment
in real estate, in which Japan had almost no stakes prior to 1987, in banking
and insurance, where a high initial share of one third could even be expanded,
and in a number of manufacturing industries, in which investment shares dou-
bled (textiles, chemicals, machinery).
In spite of the growing importance of the EC as a host of Japanese invest-
ment, no more than 21 per cent of new Japanese foreign direct investment dur-
ing 1987 and 1992 was absorbed by the EC [Japan, Ministry of Finance:
Monthly Finance Review]. The US and Canada, which in this period an-
nounced the Canadian-US Free Trade Area and later on also NAFTA, still
remained a much more attractive host than the EC (48 per cent of Japanese
incremental investment). Given this ranking, it is not surprising that for Japan it
has not yet been possible to match foreign investors from other OECD coun-
tries in spite of its rising interest in the EC. In 1991, Japanese investment still
accounted for only 24 per cent of the US investment stock in Germany
(compared with 13 per cent in 1984) and for only 7.3 per cent of total FDI in
Germany (1984: 5.1 per cent) [Deutsche Bundesbank, 1993, p. 60].
Shares in net direct investment in the most important EC host country of
Japan, the UK, are not much different. In 1990, Japanese investment flows to
the UK were 34 per cent of US investment figures and only 10 per cent of total
net FDI in the UK [UK, 1992, p. 96]. Finally, also in the Netherlands, the
second largest host of Japanese investors in the EC, they accounted for only 16
per cent of US investment in 1990 (3.8 per cent of total FDI in the Netherlands)
[Nederlandsche Bank, 1992, pp. 64-65].
To conclude, starting as a latecomer in investment in the EC, Japan has
positively responded to the incentives and options of the Single Market. While
estimates on the effects of EC 1993 on Japan's income unanimously end up83
Table 22 — Share of the EC in Notified Japanese Foreign Direct Investment,







































































Source: Japan Ministry of Finance [b].
with very small losses, Japanese companies seemingly anticipated more disad-
vantages if they continued to focus on direct exports rather than investing in the
EC. Such anticipation cannot only be derived from the Single Market but more
generally from long-standing tensions between the Community and Japan on
equilibrating the bilateral trade balance. Thus, Japanese companies have in-
creasingly discovered the EC market as a host of FDI, first in the UK but later
on also on the continent, in order to counter restrictive rules of origin, to defuse
protectionist threats of Community-wide quotas, and to benefit from the same84
standards and norms as domestic suppliers. In doing so, they will also enjoy
side benefits of penetrating more easily the Central and Eastern European
markets than it might be possible from their home base.85
F. EC Integration and Developing Countries
I. The Overall Effect
Since the end of the 1980s, the external dimension of EC 1993 has extensively
been discussed for individual DCs, for groups of DCs and for DCs as a whole.
DCs could potentially be seriously affected by EC 1993 because
— for a large number of them, the EC is either the largest export market or
at least an important outlet for domestic production (Table 23);
— the majority of national quotas within the EC (including MFA quotas)
applied to products exported by DCs;
— the 1986 accession of Spain and Portugal as two countries with a
resource endowment similar to DCs may result in trade diversion.
With respect to the implications of EC 1993 for DCs, there are two major
questions. First, as concerns the trade effects, is trade diversion quantitatively
more relevant than additional import demand due to higher income in the EC
(external trade creation)? Second, will investment diversion occur in favour of
the EC periphery (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland) and to the detriment of
DCs? In general, these issues cannot be satisfactorily addressed without refer-
ring to specific areas and sectors. Differences among developing countries in
specialization profiles, export potential and adjustment flexibility are large, and
so are the implications of EC 1993 for sectors such as agriculture, natural re-
sources, manufactures and services.
Table 23 — Share of the EC in Developing Regions' Exports and Imports,

































Notwithstanding such differences, the following implications for DCs as a
whole can be summarized:
First, no major trade diversion is expected for primary commodities [Page,
1992; Koekkoek et al., 1990] because of lacking domestic substitutes in the EC.
Hence, the income effect will dominate the price effect [Matthews, McAleese,
1990]; but given elasticities of import demand below unity (except for fuels),
the overall trade effect is assumed to be small. Matthews and McAleese [ibid.,
p. 163] estimate an additional import demand of 2.5 per cent following a five
per cent EC GDP growth, i.e. 1 per cent of total DCs' non-fuel primary com-
modity exports in 1987. Effects could be smaller for products for which EC
competitive substitutes exist and higher for specific products such as coffee and
cocoa for which additional policy measures (e.g. domestic tax reductions in
consumer countries) would fuel demand (for details see Chapter G). In the me-
dium term, however, the Internal Market is likely to accelerate resource-saving
technological progress, thus delinking commodity consumption from economic
growth. This may hold in particular for mineral commodities used as inputs in
heavy industries. Such an effect would be detrimental to commodity exporters.
Second, exporters of manufactures may be more affected by trade diversion
. than commodity exporters because of competing supply from the Mediterra-
nean member states, but they may also benefit more from the income effect.
Which effects will dominate has been open to controversies concerning the
appropriate income elasticity of demand. Langhammer [1990], using own esti-
mates of income elasticities of EC import demand for manufactures from DCs,
argues that the income effect will be higher than the trade diversion effect.
Over a period of five years, additional import demand is expected to exceed the
trade diversion effect by more than four times [ibid., p. 137]. The main argu-
ment against using high income elasticities is that they are determined by a
very small number of NIEs as successful exporters of manufactures. Davenport
[1990] prefers much lower import elasticities and assumes trade diversion ef-
fects to be underestimated in the Emerson Report (about 10 per cent reduction
in extra-EC imports). As a result, his estimates show a rough balance between
income effects and price effects so that the net trade effects will be fairly small
for this group of exporters.
Davenport [1991] and Page [1992] summarize total net trade effects (the
residual of income and trade diversion effects) for various regions as follows
(in per cent of their exports to the EC): ACP countries: 2.3 per cent; Mediterra-
nean countries: 0.8 per cent; Maghreb countries: 0.9 per cent; South Asian
countries and China: -0.3 per cent; Asian NIEs: -6.1 per cent; ASEAN coun-
tries: -0.3 per cent; Latin American countries: 1.3 per cent; OPEC countries:
3.8 per cent; all DCs: 1.5 per cent. The assumptions underlying these estimates
clearly favour trade diversion over trade creation. The estimates reflect the87
logic inherent in the aforementioned CGE models: European integration bene-
fits commodity producers and negatively affects virtually all third country
suppliers of manufactures. This result is of course rather implausible if one
does not accept that EC producers still can realize substantial economies of
scale in manufacturing industries such as textiles and clothing or iron and steel,
in which DCs have achieved a high degree of international competitiveness in
the past.
Third, the effect of replacing national quotas by Community-wide quotas
leaving the total volume of imports unchanged is expected to affect but margin-
ally DCs' exports of sensitive items [Langhammer, 1990; Davenport, 1990].
These estimates critically depend on assumptions regarding import growth in
formerly constrained national markets and on the discipline in monitoring a
Community-wide quota. This discipline was much lower in large non-restricted
markets such as Germany under national surveillance (to the benefit of DCs)
but could be stricter under rules of Brussels. Such differences could explain
welfare losses due to a Community-wide quota because of the extension of re-
stricted markets from some member states to the entire Community. Economic
rents would accrue and be captured either by exporting companies forming a
coalition and raising prices or, alternatively, by the exporting state auctioning
export licences. The EC could only collect the rents if it introduced a tariff.
Fourth, very little is known about the overall effects on DCs' exports of non-
factor services. The effects are likely to differ significantly between various
segments of the service sector. Because of the large amount of restrictions in
the pre-1993 period the highest productivity gains are expected for business
services, and consequently this leads to higher "guestimates" on trade diver-
sion. Such "guestimates" hold for air transport, where intra-EC prices are likely
to decline and where some DCs penetrated EC markets in the past. By contrast,
gains for developing countries are likely to arise in consumer services such as
tourism, especially when wage costs rise in the main EC tourist resorts [Lang-
hammer, 1990].
Fifth, according to Table 24, DCs lost about ten percentage points of their
share of total FDI in 1990 compared with 1985. This decrease is mainly due to
the drop in the shares of the Middle East and Latin America. In none of these
cases the drop of shares can be directly related to developments in the EC. In
the Middle East, the FDI flows are quite volatile. FDI flows in this region
consist more of long-term intercompany loans than of equity capital. In Latin
America the trend of declining shares began in the 1970s, i.e. long before the
initial step for the completion of the Internal Market was made in 1985. The
further decline during the 1980s was conditioned by adverse domestic factors,
for example, high international indebtedness and the failure to service foreign88

















































































































loans, high inflation, poor prospects of economic growth, and budget deficits
arousing the concern of investors on a future drain of resources through high
taxes [Nunnenkamp, 1989]. The share of East Asian DCs in total FDI declined
in 1986 and 1987 with a little more than one percentage point but recovered in
the following years. In 1990, it was higher than in any of the preceding years.
Here, too, no conspicuous negative effect of EC 1993 can be found. On the
contrary, the annual growth of FDI in East Asia during 1985-1990 was higher
than for the world total. DCs as a whole lost in attractiveness as hosts but this
had little to do with EC 1993 [Agarwal, 1992].
II. Effects on Individual Developing Regions
1. Sub-Saharan Africa
All what has been said about the implications of EC 1993 on primary commo-
dity exporters holds for Sub-Saharan Africa, which is still almost exclusively
concentrating on commodity exports [Langhammer, Amelung, 1989]. While
some income-induced additional demand for commodities could benefit Afri-
can exporters in the short run, the medium-term perspectives look gloomy. EC
1993 will accelerate the ongoing delinking of commodity consumption from
economic growth in Europe. This may further lower income elasticities for
goods that are primarily exported by Africa. Stricter environmental rules in89
Europe may also affect Africa negatively because the continent's supply con-
sists of a large number of environment-intensive goods such as phosphates,
tropical timber, bauxite, etc. [Tovias, 1990]. As far as manufactured exports are
concerned, African countries have to face an erosion of their trade preferences
granted in the Lome Convention because of the Europe Agreements of the EC
with the three Central European countries (see Section CM).
There is little to say on investment diversion since Africa has become a mar-
ginal host of FDI long before the Internal Market programme was launched
[Langhammer, 1991].
2. Latin America
To some extent, the consequences for Latin America are similar to those for
Africa because of overlaps in the commodity supply [Langhammer, 1992c].
Specific policy measures for Latin American exports exist only for some agri-
cultural products such as bananas, coffee, cocoa, sugar and rum (see Section
G.II.5). The final shape of EC policies in these areas is still being negotiated.
The banana "solution" indicates that the EC is determined to protect the special
interests of associated ACP countries and domestic suppliers at the expense of
the more competitive Latin American suppliers. Any preservation of ACP trade
preferences will be detrimental to other Latin American suppliers.
Within manufactures, which figure much less prominently in Latin Ameri-
can exports to the EC (20 per cent of total exports to the EC), Latin American
exporters of "hypersensitive" textiles might gain after the national quotas have
been scrapped, but compared with Asian suppliers they are unlikely to be
among the major beneficiaries. As few items such as shoes dominate in their
export supply, they even stand to lose if the trading patterns of Germany (being
by far the major buyer of Latin American manufactures) change in favour of
Central and Eastern Europe and other developing areas [Page, 1992].
With respect to investment flows, Latin America's longstanding role as a
preferred host of German investment in DCs [Agarwal et al., 1991; Langham-
mer, 1991] may suffer for two reasons. First, export-oriented investment in
manufacturing outside the EC faces a better macroeconomic background in
East and Southeast Asia (including China) and — pushed by special investment
incentives — increasingly in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, the fre-
quently mentioned "bridge" function of Portugal and Spain, which was sup-
posed to link Europe and Latin America, does not materialize. It is a nice
phrase without any economic substance.
Summarizing, stagnant trade flows with Europe and the relatively income-
inelastic export supply of Latin America do not make the region a prime candi-90
date for medium-term gains from EC 1993. Given the emergence of regional
integration schemes in the Western Hemisphere (NAFTA, Enterprise of the
Americas Initiative) and the early success of Mexico to attract foreign capital,
there is much reason to assume a further deepening of trade relations within the
Western Hemisphere rather than between the EC and Latin America.
3. East and Southeast Asia
EC imports from East and Southeast Asia primarily consist of manufactures.
These products accounted for 86 per cent of their total exports to the EC in
1990. For this reason, the assessment of EC 1993 effects on East and Southeast
Asia is ambivalent.
Trade effects depend on the assumptions made with respect to productivity
gains in European manufacturing industries. If these gains were high, trade
diversion effects would be sizeable in the short run. This is reflected in the
estimated net trade loss of 6.1 per cent of the NIE's exports to the EC (see
Section F.I).
7
5 An alternative view is that productivity gains will be small in
those manufacturing industries in the EC that had already lost their inter-
national competitiveness in the past. In this case, East and Southeast Asian
countries could exploit their proven high capability for structural change and
adjust their export.supply, including services, to changing demand patterns in
the EC. Therefore, the medium-term prospects for these countries would be
positive [Verbiest, Tang, 1991; Page, 1992; Dicke, Langhammer, 1991].
7
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Even some proponents of high trade diversion effects admit [Page, 1992, p.
33] that the second scenario is more plausible, at least in the medium term.
First, the estimated efficiency gains of EC suppliers appear to be on the high
side in light of the unrestricted international competition in most manufacturing
industries. Second, highly protected industries such as iron and steel or ship-
building may react to market integration by closing down or relocating produc-
tion sites outside the EC rather than by attempting to realize productivity
Applying a trade overlap analysis and assuming that third countries would have to
lower their export prices (in order to defend market shares), Kreinin and Plummer
[1992] estimate trade diversion effects for ASEAN and South Korean exports to
the EC of 8 per cent and 5 per cent of their exports, respectively.
7
6 Verbiest and Tang [1991, pp. 20-21] show that the NIEs stand to gain significantly
(about one third of 1 per cent of baseline GDP by the end of a period of six years)
partly because of high income elasticities for their exports and partly because of
their export orientation. In contrast to the NIEs, the income gains of Indonesia and
the Philippines are marginal because the income elasticities for their exports are
lower and because these two countries depend relatively little on the EC market.91
increases within the EC. And third, export supply from East and Southeast Asia
is focused on sectors for which relatively low internal productivity gains were
forecasted (i.e. labour-intensive manufactures). These observations support the
tentative conclusion that EC integration to a Single Market by 1993 is likely to
open up substantial new export opportunities for suppliers from the Asian
region, which are not eroded by trade diversion [Hiemenz, Langhammer,
1991].
Concerning FDI, East and Southeast Asian economies appear to enter well
prepared into the international competition for risk capital. Multinational enter-
prises will hardly adopt a strategy of shifting investment away from the region
because such a strategy would endanger their chances in the rapidly growing
Asian markets. Especially European firms will have to strengthen their engage-
ment in Asia-Pacific economies to get a better foothold in this growth pole of
the world economy, where they have traditionally been underrepresented. Ad-
ditional investment in the EC will go at the expense of the US and other indus-
trialized countries and Latin America rather than at the expense of the Asia-
Pacific region.92
G. Effects on Developing Countries by Industry
I. The Pattern of Trade between the EC and DCs for
Selected Industries
EC 1993 will induce structural change within the Community, and this struc-
tural change will have implications for DCs as was shown in the previous
Chapter. The focus in this Chapter is on a number of specific industries that
seem to provide cases in point. The list of industries includes textiles and cloth-
ing, electrical machinery, automobiles and parts, iron and steel, and agriculture
and food. These industries are important for DCs because these countries have
already become internationally competitive exporters of these products or are
expected to emerge as competitive suppliers in the near future. The analysis in
Section D.III has shown that EC trade policies reveal a considerable propensity
for sector specific interventions, especially against non-European competitors.
For example, for most agricultural commodities the access to the EC market is
limited by an almost prohibitive system of variable levies and quotas. Exports
of textiles and clothing to the EC are limited by the EC's MFA system. In the
iron and steel industry, the ECSC Treaty allows for state subsidies until 2002,
and EC imports are limited by VERs, which, together with nationally adminis-
tered protectionist measures, also dominate in the automobile industry. Simi-
larly, VERs are used to restrict EC imports of electrical and electronic house-
hold goods. These trade restrictions must be borne in mind when the trade rela-
tions between the EC and DCs, and the EC market shares of DCs in the EC are
assessed.
Table 25 shows the trade flows between the DCs and the EC for selected
products in 1991, measured by EC imports (exports) from (to) DCs in per cent
of total EC imports (exports). EC import shares of DCs as a whole reveal that
EC 1993 trade diversion effects can only be expected for textiles and clothing,
electrical machinery, and agricultural products, where DCs account for a sub-
stantial fraction of EC imports. For automobiles and iron and steel, EC imports
from DCs are almost non-existent. Furthermore, certain subgroups of DCs will
be affected differently by sectoral effects, depending on the sectoral composi-
tion of trade with the Community. For example, the Asian DCs account for
more than 70 per cent of EC imports of textiles and clothing and for almost all
EC imports of electrical machinery from DCs. ACP and Latin American coun-
tries together account for roughly 60 per cent of EC imports of agricultural93
products from DCs. The potential sectoral effect of EC 1993 on DCs, whatever
its actual size may be, will have a strong regional component (see also Section
E.IV).
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icuador, Mexico. Asian NIEs:
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan. Other Asia: China, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Philippines, Thailand. —
 bIncludes office equipment and consumer electronics.
— Includes food products.
Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities [b]; own calculations.94
Table 26 provides additional insight on potential sectoral EC 1993 effects
for DCs. The import penetration ratios given in this table are defined as EC
imports from DCs in EC absorption. These ratios represent market shares of
DCs in the EC for selected manufactured products. First, they show that extra-
EC suppliers of manufactures had achieved market shares in the range of 9-13
per cent in the four largest EC economies (1987). These shares had increased
by between 10 to over 20 per cent in three out of the four EC countries in the
1980-1987 period. Among extra-EC suppliers, the DCs as a whole accounted
for 2-3 per cent of the EC market of manufactures in 1987. These shares in-
creased by similar magnitudes as the shares of extra-EC suppliers taken to-
gether. Second, turning to specific product categories the data show that the
DCs are major suppliers in textiles and clothing, and increasingly also in elec-
trical machinery. The changing market shares again reflect the growing impor-
tance of Asian suppliers in EC markets of these products.
Within the EC, the industries under consideration contributed between 1 and
3 per cent to the GDP of the Community, and employed between 1 and 5 per
cent of the total workforce in 1990. Table 27 shows the pronounced relative
decline of agriculture, textiles and clothing, and iron and steel in terms of
production and employment between 1980 and 1990, whereas the production
and employment shares of electrical goods, automobiles, and food products
declined only slightly and less than for total manufacturing. The first group of
industries has lost international competitiveness, because production technolo-
gies correspond more closely to the factor endowments of DCs. Therefore, such
industries are heavily protected by EC policies. By distorting international
trade, these policies lead to an inefficient allocation of resources, mainly at the
cost of European consumers and DCs' producers.
The above evidence does not suffice to assess the overall sectoral effects that
can be expected from EC 1993. This task requires taking into account the
economy-wide feedbacks that will arise. Usually, this is done by the application
of general equilibrium models, which can be calibrated to reflect observed
production and trade patterns and "shocked" with specific policy changes to
simulate EC 1993 effects. The presently available results of these exercises will
be summarized in the last part of this section. To fully appreciate their implica-
tions a closer look at the consequences of EC 1993 for selected product catego-
ries is necessary.95
Table 26 — Import Penetration Ratios
a in Selected EC Countries: Selected
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Source: Mobius [1991, Table 7].96
Table 27 — EC-7
a Value Added and Employment in Selected Industries, 1980,





























































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [1992b]; Statistical Office of the European
Communities [c]; own calculations.
II. The Consequences of EC 1993 for Selected Industries
1. Textiles and Clothing
Over the last two decades, a considerable restructuring process has taken place
in the textile and clothing sector world-wide. For example, from 1975 to 1985
EC employment in this industry fell by roughly 40 per cent, amounting to a loss
of one million jobs [Emerson et al., 1988, p. 74]. In the textile industry, tradi-
tional methods of production were readily adopted in many less developed and
newly industrializing countries, and, because of their low wage costs, they be-
came highly competitive in this labour-intensive industry. One of the character-
istics of textile technology is that there are few obstacles to its diffusion to
DCs. Given the existence of fierce international competition in textiles for
years, it is unlikely that completing the Internal Market will greatly alter the
competitive climate in the industry within the EC [O'Donnell, 1989, p. 30]. Put
differently, because a considerable amount of specialization has taken place al-97
ready, the scope for further exploitation of economies of scale seems to be
rather limited. The clothing industry has remained labour-intensive because of
the difficulty of automating and mechanizing the key stages of production.
Therefore, economies of scale could not be realized to the same extent as in the
textile industry, and labour costs have still an important effect on competitive-
ness.
Taken together, all EC producers of textiles and clothing are threatened
especially by producers from DCs, partly because the production technology is
easily available, and partly because labour is an important cost factor [Hamil-
ton, 1990]. As a consequence, the manufacturing in large production runs has
been shifted to DCs, whereas the European producers have increasingly spe-
cialized in the manufacturing of high quality and fashionable products. Thus,
the ability to react to quickly changing market conditions has become an im-
portant parameter of competitiveness, whereas strategies based on mass pro-
duction and concentration have lost ground in the EC.
All EC imports of textiles and clothing have been subject to quantitative
controls [Davenport, 1991, p. 29]. The criterion for intervention allowed under
the MFA refers to "market disruption", which has only been applied to low cost
producers, that is, to DCs. Therefore, the DCs have a keen interest in the over-
all approach of the Community towards the MFA. The debate on the effects of
1993 centres on one particular issue: the effects of removing national quotas. It
is expected that EC 1993 will expose the Community's textile and clothing in-
dustry to greater import competition, mainly for two reasons. First, the inte-
grated market will, through free circulation, permit full quota utilization. Sec-
ond, the transfer of quota management responsibilities from national govern-
ments to the Community level will make it more difficult for national indus-
tries to observe the actual level of imports from DCs and argue in favour of a
national interest case [Cable, 1990, p. 260].
There have been attempts to estimate the effects of abolishing member state
quotas while holding EC quotas at their 1987 level. By making use of alterna-
tive assumptions on the increase in imports following the removal of a binding
quota it was concluded that overall exports of MFA goods from DCs could rise
by 3-5 per cent [Davenport, 1991, p. 34]. The exporting countries that were
found to benefit most likely are Sri Lanka and Brazil, and possibly Peru, Thai-
land and the Philippines. By contrast, the ACP countries only hold a small
share in EC imports of textiles and clothing (see Table 25). Obviously, these
countries have not gained from the lack of formal MFA controls and from tariff
preferences. It has been found that the principle obstacles to ACP exports lie on
the supply side; they are not the result of EC protection [Langhammer, Ame-
lung, 1989]. The conclusion is that the marginal erosion of ACP preferences
from eliminating member state quotas will have little effect. The only excep-98
tions may be Mauritius and Zimbabwe, which will have to compete more ag-
gressively where market access for lower cost producers has been restricted.
Taken together, for the DCs as a supplier of textiles and clothing, EC 1993 is
expected to have an overall positive, but relatively modest effect. EC quotas for
many MFA products and vis-a-vis some 30 or more countries will be applied
until the late 1990s [Pelkmans, 1992, p. 34], despite the successful conclusion
of the Uruguay Round. More substantial gains can be expected for specialized
low cost producers that were restricted by the pre-1993 system of national
quotas.
2. Electrical Machinery
Broadly speaking, electrical machinery encompasses two rather different sub-
categories: the skill-intensive production of computers and office equipment,
and the more traditional production of electrical and electronic consumer
goods. While the electronics industry in general is widely regarded as one of
the growth industries providing the inputs for future production technologies,
the production of electrical consumer goods in the EC is held to be a rather
mature industry, with increasingly declining international competitiveness rela-
tive to DCs, especially in Southeast Asia.
The reduction of trade costs as a result of EC 1993 is expected to affect both
subcategories. Based on currently existing trade patterns,
7
7 it can be argued
that the implications for DCs could be more severe in the production of electri-
cal and electronic consumer goods. However, it is important to note that the in-
dustry as a whole has already been subject to restructuring and transformation
in the recent past, partly independent of the foreshadowing of EC 1993. There-
fore, the apparent rapid structural change in electronics-related industries
should be interpreted first of all in the context of global competition for mar-
kets and technologies. That is, the EC 1993 effects can be seen as simply sup-
porting a restructuring of the EC electronics industry, which would also occur
without EC 1993.
The main world-wide trends influencing the market for electrical machinery
are the rapid technological innovation and, as a result, the intensifying compe-
titive pressures. Historically, the industry has been rather fragmented into sepa-
rate branches such as electrical consumer goods, electronic components, com-
puters and office equipment, and telecommunication [Wong Poh Kam, 1991,
pp. 154 f.]. Beginning with the microelectronics revolution, this has changed.
'' For an analysis of ASEAN-EC trade in electronics see, Schmitt-Rink and Lilien-
becker [1991].99
The resulting increase of economies of scope for producing related electronic
products has led to a speed up of integration of the separate sub-branches. In-
creasingly, most electronic products are based on the use of very few standard-
ized electronic components, reducing the rest of the hardware to relatively
simple products. Then, end products can be assembled almost under conditions
of mass production. Furthermore, the assembly process is becoming automated
by flexible manufacturing systems allowing for a wider range of products to be
manufactured using the same assembly line. In effect, this development has led
to a competitive edge of relatively large integrated firms.
Another trend in the electronics industry is that software and system design
increasingly become the crucial bottleneck skills, because of the advancing in-
corporation of microprocessors, which serve to enhance the information pro-
cessing capacity of final products. This increase in product complexity has led
to a relatively high share of research and development expenditures in the cost
structures of the electronics industry. The competition arising under these in-
dustry parameters has produced a considerable shortening of the product life-
cycle of technology-based microelectronics products.
Taken together, process and product innovations made possible by the avail-
ability of microprocessors have given rise to significant potential economies of
scale. In turn, these economies of scale have altered the comparative advantage
of nations and firms. The share of European firms has steadily declined in
favour of suppliers from Japan and the Asian NIEs. EC 1993 is expected to
change this trend, at least partly. This may come true especially in sub-
branches of this industry where EC 1993 will facilitate the creation of harmo-
nized technical standards, thereby reducing the costs of interfacing and the
problems of non-interoperability [Wong Poh Kam, 1991, p. 156]. For example,
in the case of telecommunications, EC 1993 makes possible the creation of EC-
wide information technology, infrastructures for telephones, data transmitting,
broadcasting, and other value-added services.
The trade policy effects of EC 1993 are relatively marginal in this industry.
This does of course not preclude that the EC will continue to apply retrospec-
tive Community surveillance and anti-dumping actions against foreign compa-
nies in a protectionist way. For example, retrospective Community surveillance
of imports has long been maintained vis-a-vis Japan and South Korea on televi-
sions and video tape recorders, and anti-dumping measures were, at mid Sep-
tember 1992, in force against China and Hong Kong (colour televisions and
video tape recorders) and South Korea (car radios, CD-players, colour televi-




The EC has become the largest regional automobile market in the world,
accounting for about 35 per cent of total world production. The other major
producers are the United States (20 per cent) and Japan (25 per cent). Within
the EC, the automobile industry is one of the largest manufacturing industries.
It produces roughly 6 per cent of the value added in EC manufacturing (almost
2 per cent of the Community's GDP), and it employs about 7 per cent of the
manufacturing workforce. Nearly 30 per cent of production is exported, 90 per
cent of which goes to other member states. Approximately half of the total
value of car production is accounted for by Germany. The EC automobile mar-
ket is dominated by about 10 large manufacturers. By contrast, the components
industry is much more fragmented. The value of components produced in the
EC accounts for 60 per cent of the value of car production, and is highest in
Germany and in France.
Within the EC, there exist a number of NTBs that are at least not imme-
diately expected to vanish as a result of EC 1993. Technical requirements that
must be fulfilled in order to get a registration permit for a specific type of car
have not been fully harmonized. That is, up to now every car model needs a
special licensing for use on public roads, and therefore, automobile producers
have to seek type-approval in each member state. Differing VAT rates are re-
garded as a major obstacle to intra-EC trade for consumers in Denmark,
France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Probably the instrument that mostly
contributes to a segmentation of markets is the so-called "selective distribution
system", agreed upon by all manufacturers in the Community and authorized
by the Commission in 1985 for a period of ten years. This system represents a
network of exclusive dealing contracts.
Since end-1992, protectionist measures against imports from third countries
are directed against Japan (see Section E.III) and, to some extent, against South
Korea. Imports from DCs are granted tariff preferences under the GSP if they
meet the rules of origin requirements and can therefore enter the EC duty free.
Meeting the rules of origin is crucial, and, at least in the South Korean case,
European suppliers contest that these requirements are met.
EC 1993 is expected to speed up the present process of restructuring and
technical change in the EC, both in the production of automobiles' and in the
production of parts. Significant economies of scale are hoped to be achieved by
the widespread introduction of so-called "platforms", which combine certain
features of a production line and a flexible workshop. In effect, this reorgani-
zation of production permits both mass production and the production of
7
8 This section draws on Emerson et al. [1988, pp. 71-74] and Hild [1991].101
differentiated products. Computer aided design (CAD) and computer integrated
manufacturing (CIM), robotics, just-in-time organization and global or single
sourcing are the main headings in this context.
Especially in the automobile industry, EC 1993 could be seen as a catalyst
for this restructuring process. Assuming that total production remains un-
changed, it has been estimated that savings in terms of total unit costs for the
EC as a whole would amount to 5 per cent, only because of the changes in the
production technology [Emerson et al., 1988, p. 73]. The exploitation of econo-
mies of scale will have dynamic effects: EC-competitiveness is enhanced, and
more cars will be sold as lower production costs will ultimately show up in
lower consumer prices for cars. In turn, the increase in production may give
rise to further economies of scale, and, therefore, to a further stimulus to de-
mand. The intensified competition may give rise to mergers and production
agreements within the EC, and possibly even outside the EC. Of course, this
does not mean that economies of scale will only benefit EC-originating firms.
Subsidiaries of Japanese companies, especially in the UK, have proven to be
even more competitive than EC-originating firms, at least in some market
segments.
The overall direct effect of EC 1993 on DCs in this industry will be negligi-
ble, because to date, only single DCs (notably South Korea) are exporting cars
to the EC in small amounts. Hence, no substantial trade diversion effects
should emerge. Potential trade creation could result if suppliers from DCs could
successfully compete on EC markets. This may be the case in the production
and sale of compact small-size vehicles, in which advanced DCs such as the
Asian NIEs and Brazil and Mexico possess a comparative advantage.
4. Iron and Steel
Special characteristics of the European steel industry are the organization in
large production units and the declining competitiveness vis-a-vis suppliers
from third countries. This may partly explain why this industry is one of the
highly protected industries in the EC: intra-EC steel production benefits from
aid provided by national governments, authorized by the Commission. Whereas
the system of managed production quotas was abolished in July 1988, at pre-
sent the Commission monitors trends in current imports to identify any "ad-
verse" effects on the EC steel industry. A range of primary and semi-manu-
factured products from non-EFTA sources is subject to prior surveillance. In
August 1992 the EC imposed unilateral quotas on certain imports from the
former CSFR. Various national import restrictions were replaced by Commu-
nity quotas. According to the Commission, in late 1992 no steel imports were102
subject to VERs [GATT, 1993, p. 121]. A new sectoral support regime, intro-
duced in 1991, continues the granting of aid to the steel industry in the period
1992-1996 to four broad subject areas: research and development, environ-
mental protection, partial or total cessation of production, and investments in
certain EC regions. All other forms of aid were prohibited [GATT, 1993, Vol.
A, p. 181]. The future of this industry actually depends on the emerging Com-
munity market regime, rather than on the completion of EC 1993 per se.
At present, the steel market has become increasingly oversupplied because
of the world-wide recession and the simultaneous intensification of competi-
tion, especially from Central and Eastern European sources seeking new mar-
kets. Conceptionally, the deep structural crisis in the steel industry since 1980
can be best understood in terms of industrial organization and possible pricing
strategies in this sector [Weiss et al., 1988, p. 127]. Technology in most steel-
making operations has become relatively ubiquitous, and the economic success
of so-called mini-mills suggests that optimal plant size has tended to fall.
Hence, technology for steel making seems to be fairly easy to obtain, and possi-
bilities for low-scale entry seem to exist [Brown, McKern, 1987, p. 57]. If there
are sunk costs associated with entering steel making, they are likely to be rela-
tively low. If this description of the steel industry holds, excess profits can not
emerge as long as there are no protectionist barriers to entry. Theoretically
speaking, if fixed costs in the steel industry are low enough, the contestability
[Baumol et al., 1982] of the steel market would converge to perfect competi-
tion; and if fixed costs are high enough, one firm would serve the whole
market, but this monopolist could earn no rent because the threat of entry
would force him to charge no more than average costs for his product. Put dif-
ferently, with the higher competitiveness of NIEs and other DCs in the produc-
tion of steel due to lower wage costs and easy access to the production tech-
nologies [UNCTAD, 1990, p. 4], the state support for the steel industry in the
EC has resulted in a great deal of excess capacity.
In the words of the EC, the strategy of state support to the steel industry is an
"orderly" run-down of obsolete and non profitable production capacity, which
is accompanied by a modernization policy and a policy for monitoring the in-
stallation of new capacity. Table 28 shows the development of production ca-
pacities for the most important steel suppliers in the EC. Notably German pro-
ducers lost market shares from 1980 to 1988, not as a result of a relative loss of
competitiveness, but as a result of interventions of the Commission under the
system of managed production quotas. The capacity problem has not yet been
resolved. In the Commissions' opinion, there are still some 30 million tonnes
(roughly 15 per cent) of spare capacity [Emerson et al., 1988, p. 82] with possi-
ble employment effects in the order of 50,000 [GATT, 1993, Vol. A, p. 179].103




























































Source: Klodt, Stehn etal. [1992, p. 120].
Since EC 1993 is generally expected to reduce or even eliminate production
inefficiencies by achieving full market integration, it becomes clear why model
simulations, intended to capture these effects, generally predict large produc-
tion increases in iron and steel as a consequence of EC 1993 (see Section
G.III). The motivation for this line of reasoning seems to come from estimates
that show somewhat lower internal steel prices in the Community than in the
other two large iron and steel using regions of the world economy, namely Ja-
pan and the United States [Emerson et al., 1988, p. 82].
7
9 This reasoning may
be flawed, however, because of the subsidization of the European steel indus-
try.
Furthermore, competitive suppliers of iron and steel have emerged in DCs.
The world-wide shifts in comparative advantage towards DCs can be seen from
the increase in their share of world steel exports from 3.4 per cent in 1975 to
11.2 per cent in 1987 [UNCTAD, 1990, p. 3]. The main DC exporters are Bra-
zil and South Korea, both identified to be low labour cost producers [Fischer,
Nunnenkamp et al., 1988, p. 192]. These highly competitive producers will be
denied access to the EC even after 1992, as was mentioned above. EC 1993
will not bring an abolition of state aid to the steel industry and, therefore, will
not eliminate existing inefficiencies. The predicted production increase is not
plausible as long as excess capacities continue to exist, which can be consid-
ered obsolete when measured at world market prices.
79 In 1988, all three suppliers together accounted for about 45 per cent of world steel
production [UNCTAD, 1990, Table 2].104
5. Agriculture and Food
In the Community, agricultural production is mainly determined by the CAP.
As a consequence of EC 1993, a general dismantling of intra-EC border con-
trols will ultimately eliminate the system of border taxes and subsidies called
monetary compensatory amounts (MCA), which traditionally guaranteed the
existence of different national levels of price support. In December 1987, the
highest support price levels for the average of all agricultural products pre-
vailed in Germany and the Netherlands (7 per cent above the Community's
average), and the lowest price levels prevailed in the United Kingdom and in
Greece (12 and 38 per cent below the average) [Matthews, McAleese, 1990, p.
175]. Many EC markets for temperate-zone agricultural products are virtually
impossible for third countries to penetrate.
The total effects of these policy interventions, i.e. the total economic costs
of the CAP have been estimated in terms of producer subsidy equivalents (PSE)
and consumer subsidy equivalents (CSE) [Emerson et al., 1988, p. 81]. PSE is
defined as the payment that would be necessary to compensate farmers for the
loss of income resulting from the removal of support policies; CSE measures
consumption foregone as a result of artificially high prices for agricultural
products. In the EC, there are large transfers from consumers and taxpayers to
producers in the range of 3 per cent of GDP. The loss of economic welfare is
about 1 per cent of GDP, which reflects that not all the transfers by consumers
and taxpayers end up as additional income for producers. Put differently,
average net percentage PSEs for the sector as a whole of close to 50 per cent in
1990 and 1991 indicate that about one-half of EC farm revenue results from
policy interventions, either by border restrictions or by financial assistance
[GATT, 1993, Vol. A, p. 110]. Subsidy equivalents and welfare losses will not
be reduced to zero because of EC 1993. It would be politically unreasonable to
assume that public price or income support will be eliminated completely. This
is not intended by the Internal Market programme. Therefore, DC exports of
agricultural products will hardly be facilitated in the future.
The principle barriers to trade within the EC in the food-processing industry
included restrictions on the use of specific ingredients, regulations with respect
to the content and description of products (e.g., purity law on pasta in Italy),
packaging and labelling requirements (e.g., recyclable containers), specific
taxation (e.g. on beer in the United Kingdom) and specific bureaucratic import
restrictions. The net direct benefit from the elimination of such non-tariff
barriers has been estimated at 2-3 per cent of this industry's total value added
[Emerson et al., 1988, p. 67]. Direct benefits are very heavily concentrated on
ten products, the most important ones being beer, pasta, and vegetable fats.
Intra-EC trade is predicted to grow; for example, imports are estimated to in-105
crease by about 3-5 per cent of consumption in the case of pasta in Italy and in
the case of beer in Germany. Indirect effects stem from the increase in compe-
tition, which will lead to a reorganization of production. In contrast to US com-
panies, European food companies generally operate on a much more limited
scale, mainly because they are largely oriented towards their national markets.
Hence, the removal of non-tariff barriers should initiate an adjustment process
that will lead to an increase in specialization of the large European food com-
panies, and to a wider spread of their activities in Europe.
The abolition of intra-EC border controls for agricultural products was com-
bined with a harmonization of tight veterinary and phytosanitary rules. Controls
of all products shall be limited to the place of departure, whereas the verifica-
tion of certificates will be made at the place of destination. The DCs worry that
their exports to the Community will be adversely affected by the introduction
of such harmonized technical standards as part of EC 1993. Those standards
most likely to cause problems concern DCs' exports of plants, fish and meat
[Davenport, 1991, pp. 57-61].
In the case of plant health, each shipment cleared at the EC border will be
issued with a "plant passport", which will guarantee free circulation throughout
the Community. There also exists the possibility of negotiating pre-export in-
spection. Such tightening of product standards is most likely to affect exporters
of tropical timber, planting material and cut flowers. With respect to animal
health and hygiene, which refers to (potential) EC-imports of fresh meat, the
extra-EC slaughterhouses and processing plants must be licensed by EC
inspectors.
Probably those EC 1993 standards with the greatest effects on DCs concern
fish and related products. Under the new regime, the Commission will formu-
late specific conditions for the import of such products. These conditions may
include a list of plants and factory vessels that are authorized to export to EC
markets. From the point of view of DCs, these conditions seem to be very de-
manding and, obviously, exhibit some discretionary leeway with respect to
non-authorization. An additional effect comes from the fact that in the context
of NAFTA, the United States administration could possibly copy these tighter
standards. The list of countries that are likely to suffer from more demanding
import standards for fishery products includes Mediterranean, African and
Southeast Asian suppliers.
The EC market for fish is a special case also because contrary to the situ-
ation for many farm products, the EC is a net importer of fish. In principle,
tariffs are the sole means of external protection. For the next four years, how-
ever, imports of certain canned sardine and tuna varieties have been made sub-
ject to Community quotas. Faced with a sharp increase of cheap imports in
early 1993, the EC made the release for free circulation of various fish catego-106
ries subject to the importers' compliance with the reference prices. In case sig-
nificant quantities enter the EC market at prices below these reference prices,
the EC may revoke autonomous tariff suspensions, make importation subject to
compliance with the reference price, or introduce counteracting charges (if
compatible with existing GATT bindings) [GATT, 1993, Vol. A, p. 140].
EC 1993 is expected to have a substantial effect on a number of tropical
products exported by DCs. Bananas
8
0 are the most prominent case. EC 1993
has an effect on the structure of the Community's banana imports, simply be-
cause the import policies operating before 1 January 1993 could no longer be
maintained. World exports of bananas are dominated by Latin American sup-
pliers, roughly accounting for 70 per cent of world exports; exports from ACP
countries and from EC overseas territories account for about 15 per cent. Under
the old regime, less than half of the EC's consumption originated from ACP
countries and the Community itself, the other half being so-called dollar-
bananas originated almost entirely from Central and South America. These EC
imports of dollar-bananas are subject to specific intra-EC arrangements, de-
signed to protect former colonies of EC member countries. Guaranteed markets
for bananas from the English speaking Caribbean and from Surinam existed in
the United Kingdom; the same held for imports from French overseas depart-
ments, Cameroon and Cote d'lvoire in France, and for imports from Somalia in
Italy. Greece, Spain and Portugal restricted (or prohibited) imports of bananas
other than from Crete, the Canaries and Madeira.
For a number of ACP countries and overseas territories of the Community,
bananas represent a significant share of total merchandise exports. The privi-
leged position of these ACP and EC suppliers depended on the exclusion of
intra-EC banana trade. Insulated intra-EC banana markets were made possible
by the frequent recourse to Article 115 EEC Treaty. Hence, any opening of the
intra-EC market for bananas could be expected to worsen the position of ACP
and EC suppliers. This explains why the Community has implemented an EC-
wide tariff and a quota for dollar-banana imports
8
1 (effective since 1 July
1993), since a free German banana market as before would have meant a free
EC-wide banana market as a consequence of EC 1993. It has been estimated
8
0 See, e.g. Borell and Yang [1992], Cable [1990], Davenport [1991, pp. 46-55], and
Matthews [1992].
°1 For a Community-wide quota of 2 million tonnes the duty was set at 100 ECU per
tonne (20 per cent). Imports exceeding the quota are subject to a (prohibitive) duty
of 850 ECU/tonne (approximately 170 per cent). In 1992, EC imports from Latin
America exceeded the quota agreed upon by about 300,000 tonnes [Financial
Times, 18 December 1992; Handelsblatt, 18 and 19 December 1992]. It remains to
be seen, however, whether this decision will be challenged within the GATT.107
that even if the overall quota for dollar-bananas were set at the average level of
imports over some base period, the ACP and EC banana suppliers would not be
able to preserve their earlier privileged positions [Davenport, 1991, p. 52].
More dramatically, model simulations predict that banana exports from fa-
voured exporters will decline by 50 per cent under free trade, and even under
the protection of a tariff of 20 per cent on dollar-banana imports, their exports
will decline by almost 30 per cent [Borell, Yang, 1992, p. 283]. Without sub-
stantial increases in their productivity, which is hardly to be expected in the
short run, and in the absence of additional restrictions, ACP banana producers
will lose as a consequence of EC 1993, and dollar-banana producers will gain.
These results will, of course, not be realized if the implemented binding dollar-
banana quota will not be challenged by the GATT.
A similar situation emerges in the case of sugar. Here, potential difficulties
for DCs do not directly arise from EC 1993, but should be taken into account
especially by producers in the Caribbean who enjoy a quota at a fixed EC
supported price under the EC-ACP Sugar Protocol, notably Barbados, Belize,
Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts, Surinam and Trinidad [Stevens, 1991, p. 277]. Part
of the problem originates from the dependence of the Sugar Protocol on the
maintenance of a genuine demand for cane sugar in the Community. To date,
this demand is primarily originating from Britain, where most ACP sugar is
refined. With EC 1993, and especially with the completion of the Channel
Tunnel, it will be much cheaper to move beet sugar from continental Europe to
the United Kingdom. As a consequence, the cane sugar exporters would have to
accept a cut in price, or the cane refiners would have to go out of business.
While it is generally expected that low-cost ACP sugar exporters could live
with a (moderate) price cut, the high-cost Caribbean producers probably could
not. Hence, the reason for the sugar problem is not only to be found in EC
policies, but rather in the lack of competitiveness of the Caribbean exporters.
Other tropical products for which EC 1993 was expected to have an effect
on DCs' exports are coffee, cocoa, tobacco and tea. The concern for these com-
modities came from the anticipated EC harmonization of indirect taxation, i.e.
the harmonization of excise taxes. In some member states these taxes are sub-
stantial, reaching almost 50 per cent on coffee and tea in Germany, and 15 per
cent in Denmark, while there are zero rates in the United Kingdom, France and
the Netherlands [Cable, 1990, p. 264]. Up to now, these products have been ex-
cluded from tax harmonization in the single market context [GATT, 1993, Vol.
A, p. 133]. Tax evasion through purchase in other member states can no longer
be limited by border controls, however.
Tobacco might provide a case for an overall negative effect of EC 1993.
Since there seems to exist a majority preference in the Community for "level-
ling-up" some health standards, the Commission decided to gradually harmo-108
nize the excise duties upwards, obviously not only because of health but also
because of revenue concerns. This strategy will have severe consequences for
tobacco exporters. If excise tax rates were to be harmonized on the average of
the four highest rates (Germany, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom), the EC
average rate would more than double, resulting in an expected reduction of EC
imports from DCs of about 4 per cent [Davenport, 1991, p. 63]. Taking into
account the partial compensation by an increase of DC tobacco exports to the
rest of the world due to declining world market prices, it has been estimated
that Brazil, Zimbabwe, India and Malawi will have to face the overwhelming
part of the losses.
III. Quantitative Assessments of EC 1993 by Industry
Except for agricultural products, few empirical studies exist that try to estimate
detailed sectoral effects of EC 1993 on DCs. Some indirect quantitative esti-
mates, however, can be derived from a comparison of various recent modelling
exercises. These studies differ widely with respect to the underlying modelling
framework and with respect to sectoral and regional disaggregation. To fully
understand the variety of the estimated quantitative sectoral effects of EC 1993,
a distinction has to be made between the direct and the indirect effects of mar-
ket integration, and the capability of the various models to fully capture these.
The direct effects of market integration refer to cost reductions from the
removal of NTBs (see Table 8). The indirect effects of market integration refer
to price reductions through increased competition and to the increase in market
size that may allow the exploitation of economies of scale. According to Emer-
son et al. [1988], the latter effects are expected to be highest in highly concen-
trated industries, where scope for monopoly pricing, price discrimination and
X-inefficiencies seem to have existed in the pre EC 1993 period. Section G.II
suggests that this reasoning could possibly apply for industries such as electri-
cal machinery and automobiles. Productivity gains resulting from market inte-
gration seem to be less important for textiles and clothing, as well as for iron
and steel.
The classification of industries into perfectly and imperfectly competitive
sectors is crucial for the modelling exercises. For imperfectly competitive
sectors significant indirect effects are possible because market integration may
allow to exploit economies of scale even if the direct effects on a particular
industry are small. Hence, the key questions are whether there are economies of
scale in particular industries, and whether a high degree of concentration actu-109
ally is an indication of an inefficient production structure. Depending on the
competitive environment, the strategic responses will differ between industries
and will be based on what firms identify as the key determinants of competitive
advantage. As is almost self-evident, the indirect effects are very difficult to
evaluate. Empirical results on the sectoral effects of EC 1993 will vary accord-
ing to the classification of industries, and the approaches used to capture these
effects. These problems are revealed when it comes to a quantification of sec-
toral trade diversion and trade creation effects of EC 1993.
Table 29 presents partial equilibrium estimates of selected sectoral trade
diversion and trade creation effects for manufactured products. They were de-
rived on the assumptions of a five per cent increase of EC GDP (over five
years), relatively low uniform sectoral import elasticities (2 per cent), and
sector specific reductions in transaction costs [Mobius, 1991, p. 14], i.e. as-
sumptions that are consistent with the Emerson Report (see Section D.II.2). The
results point to a positive EC 1993 effect for DC exports of textiles and cloth-
ing (4 per cent) and to a large negative effect for DC exports of iron and steel
(-24 per cent). For electrical machinery and for automobiles, the estimated net
effects are relatively small. For the DCs as a whole, there is a small positive EC
1993 effect (1 per cent). Not surprisingly, these findings are reflecting the
assumptions made. DCs gain in labour-intensive industries, and the overall
effects remain limited because the applied import elasticities are low. If higher
import elasticities were applied, the gains for DCs would be larger because of a
higher trade creation effect (see Section F.I).
The results for selected DCs mainly reflect their pattern of specialization
with respect to EC trade. For example, the effects for Pakistan result from the
expansionary effects in textiles and clothing; and the somewhat smaller posi-
tive effects for the Asian NIEs mainly reflect trade diversion effects in electri-
cal machinery. For the ACP countries, the overall effect of EC 1993 on manu-
factured exports is negative (-3 per cent) because of expected productivity
gains in European manufacturing industries and the spezialization of ACP pro-
ducers on income inelastic segments of the market.
The first study that, at least partly, took up the issue of explicitly modelling
imperfect competition was made by Smith and Venables [1988]. In this study
and in the following ones discussed below, no reference to the effects of EC
1993 on DCs was made. These studies can be used, however, to indirectly
assess the sectoral implications for DCs and, by doing this, to put the previous
results somehow into perspective.
The general idea of the Smith-Venables exercise is that EC 1993 can be
modelled as a reduction in the costs of intra-EC trade, either by an equipropor-
tionate reduction in intra-EC trading costs across all industries (reductions-in-110
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Source: Mobius [1991, Table 5].
trade-barriers scenario), or by additionally requiring that price differences be-
tween markets only reflect transportation costs (integrated-markets scenario).
The simulation results show that internal trade liberalization induces a decrease
in extra-EC imports and a small rise in EC exports mainly for two reasons.
First, the direct effect of the policy is to reduce the prices of intra-EC imports,
thus switching expenditures away from extra-EC imports. Second, the ex-
panded EC output reduces the firms' marginal costs, thus reducing EC producer
prices both inside and outside the EC and encouraging exports. Full market
integration will cause a reduction in the firms' domestic market prices and in
the degree of market concentration. Essentially, this means that firms lose the
ability to price high in their relatively captive domestic markets.
The sectoral classification used in the Smith-Venables model appears to be
somewhat arbitrary. Differential degrees of market imperfections are assumedIll
for ten 3-digit product categories ranging from cement via motor vehicles to
footwear, while all other industries are rated as perfectly competitive. With
respect to the industries considered in this section, the model results predict
that intra-EC production increases for automobiles and electrical machinery
(Table 30). Relatively high output increases suggest a substantial degree of po-
tential trade diversion in these two industries, which would be detrimental for
DCs, particularly in Asia (see Table 26). Such effects have, however, not been
computed by Smith and Venables.
Recently, disaggregated CGE analyses have been performed to assess ex-
plicitly whether income growth (trade creation) is the dominant effect of EC
1993, or whether growth does not offset the diversion of manufactured exports
implied by the combination of all stages of market integration. The CGE mod-
elling framework accounts for the fact that factor and material inputs are not
available to all industries at fixed prices, which is the implicit assumption of
the two previous partial equilibrium analyses. Hence, the tendency in partial
equilibrium analyses is to predict an output expansion in almost all sectors as a
result of EC 1993, which is likely to be mitigated by increases in factor prices
[Winters, 1992]. With a fixed endowment of factors, one industry's expansion
in terms of inputs will be another's contraction. This means that EC 1993 is
likely to have more complex effects on international trade flows than partial
equilibrium analysis would suggest. If EC 1993 favours one set of industries —
say, those with imperfect competition and economies of scale — it will stimu-
late EC net exports in those industries and curtail them in others, and this in
turn will affect patterns of specialization elsewhere in the world. The two stud-
ies considered in detail below can be used to answer how sectoral EC imports
and exports will change as a consequence of EC 1993 and which region of the
world will be affected by the change in the composition of trade.
Evidence for the predicted effect of EC 1993 on output growth and imports
of specific industries comes from a CGE model that was used to simulate alter-
native changes in intra-EC trade barriers [Gasiorek et al., 1992]. The model
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consists of five factors of production, namely physical capital and four types of
labour differentiated by skill-intensities, and 14 imperfectly competitive sec-
tors. These sectors include virtually all important manufacturing industries as
well as financial services. The remainder of the stylized EC-economy is mod-
elled as a large perfectly competitive sector, which accounts for roughly 2/3 of
the economy (see Table 11). With respect to the industries considered in this
section, agriculture is the only one belonging to the perfectly competitive sec-
tor of the model. The simulation results show that EC output rises substantially
in all industries assumed to be imperfectly competitive and slightly falls in the
perfectly competitive sector (Table 31), and EC imports from the rest of the
world decline.
The distribution of output changes across industries depends on a number of
assumptions that are difficult to disentangle quantitatively for outside model
users, including: the degree of economies of scale in the industry, the degree of
concentration in the industry, the elasticity of demand for the individual prod-
uct varieties, and cost changes due to general equilibrium changes in input
prices. Qualitatively, the simulation results simply reflect that the higher the
share of trade in production, the greater will be the benefits from the reduction
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in trade costs; the greater the economies of scale in the industry, the larger will
be the cost reductions from increasing output; the more concentrated the indus-
try, the greater will be the gains arising from trade liberalization; and the more
elastic demand for specific products, the larger will be the change in output for
a given change in costs.
Taken together, the largest output effects are expected to arise in the most
heavily concentrated industries, in which the pro-competitive effect of intra-EC
liberalization is assumed to be largest. The overall expansion of the imperfectly
competitive sector partly occurs because of the release of real resources as
trade costs are reduced and as firms exploit the advantages of economies of
scale, but also because of the contraction of the perfectly competitive sector.
The effects of EC 1993 on extra EC-trade are predicted to be most pro-
nounced in industries where EC output grows the most.
8
2 Under the market
integration scenario, EC exports are generally expected to rise, and EC imports
are expected to decline (by 15-40 per cent). Especially the estimated decline in
extra-EC imports in textiles and clothing, electrical machinery, and food prod-
ucts points to less optimistic expectations for DCs than predicted by the partial
equilibrium studies. It should be borne in mind, however, that CGE-model
simulation results are highly sensitive with respect to parameters and disaggre-
gation, even if the same broad theoretical, model structure is calibrated to an
identical set of data. This can be seen by comparing the first columns of Table
31 and Table 32, which both predict sectoral output effects of EC 1993.
The Haaland and Norman [1992] results presented in Table 32 are based on
a stylized EC economy consisting of twelve traded goods and one non-traded
good, with an outside world including EFTA, the United States and Japan. The
authors stress that they have used the same data and have assumed essentially
the same production technologies for the same set of industries as in the study
by Gasiorek et al. Nonetheless, their predictions with respect to sectoral EC
output changes are much smaller than those of the previous model (see Table
31). On the basis of published information, these differences cannot be ex-
plained. The moderate output expansion presented in Table 32 is more in line
with a priori expectations. The small average reduction in trading costs of 2.5
per cent suggests only limited production responses. Furthermore, it is in line
with the loss of comparative advantage for EC industries such as textiles and
clothing, iron and steel, and food processing that these industries will hardly
gain from market integration.
For the plausibility of the estimated production increase in iron and steel, see
Section G.II.4. Note that if this industry were to be modelled as perfectly compe-
titive (as suggested by, e.g. Haaland and Norman [1987, p. 219]) due to contes-
tability properties, the simulation exercise would predict a production decline, as it
does for the competitive sector.114
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Table 32 shows that the effects of EC integration on Japan and the United
States are very small. This would confirm the view that the Internal Market will
not create a "Fortress Europe". The effects on production and real income in
the EFTA countries are quite significant, however, because of their dependence
on EC trade (see Section E.I). This underlines the earlier contention that freer
trade within Europe is highly important to European countries, but no serious
threat to overseas production, including the production of DCs.
When the effects of a full European integration (EES) are simulated, it is
estimated that the production of skill-intensive (engineering) products will rise
substantially in both the EC and EFTA, to some extent at the expense of pro-
duction in the United States and Japan. Within Europe, production of labour-
intensive products will shift from EFTA to the EC. All these changes reflect
two distinct forces. First, the reallocation of resources from initially highly
competitive industries to industries assumed to be imperfectly competitive.
Since the imperfectly competitive industries are highly concentrated, market
integration is expected to have a higher positive effect here. Second, with im-
perfectly competitive markets, comparative advantage will be less than fully
exploited. This may be changed by more competition; according to the Simula-115
tion results, particularly strong effects again may show up in engineering prod-
ucts.
The overall conclusion from the above review of partial and general equilib-
rium analyses is that their contribution to explaining the sectoral effects of EC
1993 on DCs remains fairly limited. This is not only the case because the CGE
models do not explicitly account for DCs, but more so because the approaches
used are questionable for various reasons. First, the direct effects of EC 1993,
i.e. the reduction of intra-EC trading costs, must differ among sectors because
of large differences in the regulatory framework (see Section G.II). The uni-
form 2.5 per cent reduction applied in the CGE models is an inadequate tool to
capture these differences. Mobius [1991] used sectorally differentiated direct
effects, but some of these appear to be completely unrealistic. A case in point is
the iron and steel industry, for which a free trade scenario seems to have been
used to impute the reduction of trading costs. Market segmentation in this
industry, however, will not be eliminated after 1992. Therefore, the gains for
EC producers and the trade diversion effects for DCs were overestimated.
Second, the importance of classifying industries into perfectly and imper-
fectly competitive sectors has repeatedly been stressed. The CGE models
attribute economies of scale to virtually all manufacturing industries. Yet, the
success of DCs in penetrating EC markets of a wide range of standardized and
semi-skilled products suggests that industries such as textiles and clothing,
footwear, iron and steel, electrical and electronic consumer goods, and auto-
mobile parts are operating under conditions of fierce competition and should
rather be classified as perfectly competitive. If this had been done, the mod-
elled structural change enhanced by EC 1993 would have resulted in a resource
reallocation from these industries towards skill-intensive sectors. In such a sce-
nario, there is much to gain for DCs from EC integration.
Third, almost all simulations largely neglect services although there is wide
agreement that the most important EC 1993 effects will accrue to this sector.
The dismantling of the substantial regulations in the service sector is expected
to generate considerable productivity gains and output effects. This implies that
resources will be shifted from manufacturing to services, and manufacturing
output will decline on average in relative terms. Expansion of services will,
therefore, strengthen the argument that manufactured exports of DCs will bene-
fit from EC 1993.
These considerations lead to the final assessment that DCs will be able to
continue to penetrate EC markets with products in which they traditionally
have enjoyed comparative advantages. The expected income effect of EC 1993
may even help to accelerate their export growth. More advanced DCs such as
Asian NIEs may, however, find it a bit more difficult to successfully compete
in EC markets for skill-intensive products such as automobiles or sophisticated116
office equipment. In these markets, EC suppliers stand to gain from market
integration and may realize economies of scale.117
H. Conclusions
European economic integration is a continuous process, which is likely to
extend well into the next millennium. The establishment of the Internal Market
in 1993 marks an important stage of integration since the removal of border
controls, harmonized technical standards, the liberalization of trade in services
and the free movement of factors of production are expected to offer opportuni-
ties to increase production, to exploit economies of scale and to improve the
allocation of resources. The resulting productivity gains would strengthen the
internal and external competitiveness of EC firms. Suppliers from non-member
countries may be negatively affected because of the fiercer competition and the
higher attractiveness of locations in Europe for internationally mobile capital,
but they may also benefit from income-induced demand growth. It is important
to note that economic integration so far was not accompanied by a deteriorating
access to European markets for third country suppliers, i.e. fears of an emerg-
ing Fortress Europe have not materialized.
In addition to the deepening of integration, the economic landscape of
Europe is changed by the widening of integration. The EFTA countries will be
joining the EC in the EES. The EES is in essence a free trade agreement that
also provides for the free movement of factors of production. Since differential
treatment of third country imports requires rules of origin and border controls,
EFTA suppliers do not enjoy the same advantages as their competitors within
the EC, and hence many EFTA countries have applied for full EC membership.
Further applicants are the formerly socialist Central European countries, with
which the EC has negotiated a time schedule for bilateral free trade in the
framework of the Europe Agreements. Somewhat less far-reaching agreements
were also offered to the East European countries, including the former USSR.
These new arrangements imply an erosion of trade preferences granted to DCs
and could result in trade and investment diversion away from DCs since
Central and Eastern European countries possess a factor endowment similar to
many DCs. However, supply constraints will prevent Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries from exploiting their advantages on EC markets in the short and
medium term.
As concerns non-European countries, the EC is maintaining its complex
hierarchy of preferential trading arrangements with important protectionist
remnants in sensitive sectors such as agriculture, iron and steel, textiles and
clothing, and cars. By contrast, there are hardly any restrictions on non-sensi-
tive manufactured imports from these countries. National quotas and VERs118
have been replaced by EC-wide regulations, but the trade policy stance of the
EC towards non-European countries has otherwise remained unchanged.
The effects of European integration on the welfare of third countries depend
on income growth generated by integration, the respective magnitudes of trade
diversion and trade creation, and regional diversion of investment funds. The
size of these effects is predominantly determined by the reduction of trans-
action costs within the EC resulting from integration and market structures.
Lower transaction costs will translate into higher output and productivity
growth in imperfectly competitive markets, i.e. when industries can reap
economies of scale. Resources will be shifted to these industries at the expense
of all other sectors of the economy operating in perfectly competitive markets
with constant returns to scale. As a result, external trade diversion could be
substantial in sectors with highly segmented internal markets prior to 1993 (e.g.
services) and substantial economies of scale. External trade creation could stem
from additional income growth inducing higher import demand in perfectly
competitive sectors. These basic relationships have to be born in mind when
evaluating the estimates on the effects of the Internal Market programme.
All quantitative assessments of third country effects take — one way or
another — recourse to the original Commission estimates of the costs of non-
Europe [Emerson et al., 1988]. These were derived from sectoral partial equili-
brium models. Assuming a uniform reduction of transaction costs across all
sectors by 2.5 per cent and different degrees of economies of scale, the consen-
sus figure suggests that static welfare gains add up to about 5 per cent of GDP
over a five year period. This estimate disregards any general equilibrium reper-
cussions in the form of declining output in perfectly competitive sectors. Yet it
also ignores potential dynamic gains from integration through the liberalization
of trade in services, free factor movement and the specialization effects of
fiercer competition. It seems safe to conclude that the Commission has pre-
sented an upper bound estimate of static welfare gains. While dynamic gains
are hardly quantifiable, a slight but permanent increase of the growth rate of
GDP may dominate the static gains in the long run.
The sectoral production and trade effects on which the income estimates are
based can be summarized as follows. Some CGE simulations predict large sec-
toral production and trade effects associated with imperfect competition. Re-
sources will be shifted into rapid-growth industries, typically R&D-intensive
and skill-intensive engineering sectors. While the degree of trade diversion may
be substantial for specific sectors, it will be offset at least partially once the
import-stimulating income effects of completing the Internal Market are taken
into account. The specification of the CGE models must be subjected to impor-
tant qualifications, however. The classification of industries into perfectly and
imperfectly competitive sectors is based on arbitrary indicators such as concen-119
tration ratios. Moreover, the assumption of a uniform reduction of transaction
costs by 2.5 per cent is highly unrealistic. Both qualifications are particularly
relevant for services, which are generally treated as perfectly competitive in the
CGE models. For these reasons, production effects in manufacturing are most
likely to be overestimated, while they are definitely underrated in services.
However, the general trend of the model predictions appears to be valid: trade
diversion will occur in sectors that can realize economies of scale.
In contrast to the considerable work done on production and trade effects of
the Internal Market programme, its effect on capital flows has been largely
ignored so far. As a host of FDI, the EC lost importance until the mid-1980s.
Recendy, though, total FDI inflows increased more than fourfold between 1986
and 1990, and the EC's share in worldwide FDI flows nearly doubled within
four years. A close examination of detailed data suggests that the Internal
Market programme has indeed enhanced the attractiveness of the EC for exter-
nal investors, albeit by much less than the cumulated flows seem to suggest.
The increase of the EC's share partly mirrors the decline of FDI flows to debt-
ridden DCs, an event completely unrelated to European integration. Further-
more, higher EC shares reflect a decline of FDI in other industrialized coun-
tries, notably the US. There are no indications of investment diversion at the
expense of those DCs without major debt problems.
The degree of structural adjustment in the EC determines the effects of the
Internal Market programme on third countries. The magnitude of the effects de-
pends on the degree of association with the EC, the extent of mutual trade rela-
tions, and the structure of production in member and non-member countries. By
these criteria, EFTA countries will be most affected by the integration process.
They have close trade ties with the EC, a comparable production structure and
preferential market access under the EES. General equilibrium simulations sug-
gest a shift from physical capital-intensive to more skill-intensive EFTA indus-
tries, while more labour-intensive industries would relocate to the southern
periphery of the EC. As a result, EFTA countries can enjoy substantial income
gains in an EES setting. Because of the remaining trade barriers, these gains
would be even larger in the case of full membership.
By contrast, all estimates indicate only marginal overall effects of European
integration for the US and Japan. The diversified structure of production and
trade in these countries and the limited net trade effects of the Internal Market
programme on non-European competitors will prevent a general decline of out-
put in the manufacturing sector and associated income losses. In some oligo-
polistic markets, however, US and Japanese firms are likely to be affected in a
more significant way. Cases in point are relatively skill-intensive industries
such as office machines in the US and the car industry in Japan, which suffers
from the mutually agreed ceiling of the share of Japanese exports in EC car120
markets. Other areas of concern are the US access to EC telecommunication
markets and the reciprocity requirements in banking, which are hard to meet
for Japanese banks.
Central and Eastern Europe is a latecomer in economic relations with the EC
because of its isolation from its natural trading partner Western Europe for
more than 40 years. In the long run, the region has much to gain from product
innovations, process innovations and locational innovations encouraged by the
EC Single Market. Because of the profound differences in resource endow-
ment, the Heckscher-Ohlin type of. inter-industry specialization will prevail in
trade between the two regions. The effects arising from such specialization
patterns are assessed to be clearly positive for Central and Eastern Europe pro-
vided that the transformation process does not fail. Quantitative assessments of
income and trade gains resulting from the Europe Agreements and other trade
preferences for Eastern Europe are not yet available because of the early stage
of the transformation process.
DCs have been particularly worried by the Internal Market programme since
the EC absorbed more than one third of their total exports in 1991. A number
of partial and general equilibrium estimates show that net trade effects (the
residual of trade diversion and income induced trade creation) crucially depend
on the assumptions about EC substitutes and market structures. Most models
assume lacking EC substitutes for primary commodities and the existence of
unexploited economies of scale virtually in all manufacturing industries. The
logical consequences are net gains for commodity exporters such as the ACP
and Latin American countries and heavy losses for suppliers of manufactured
exports such as the Asian NIEs. For all DCs taken together gains are estimated
amounting to 1.5 per cent of total trade.
The result for the Asian NIEs does not appear to be plausible since it is de-
rived from trade diversion primarily caused by economies of scale in labour-
intensive and physical capital-intensive industries in which DCs have already
proven to be competitive on EC markets. Analyses of individual manufacturing
industries suggest that there are reasons to expect that DCs can continue to ex-
ploit their comparative advantages in textiles and clothing, footwear, iron and
steel, electrical and electronic consumer goods, and automobile parts since the
respective markets must be classified as perfectly competitive. In this scenario,
income-induced demand effects can be expected to overcompensate trade di-
version not only for commodity producers but also for suppliers of semi-skilled
and standardized manufactures such as the Asian DCs. The net welfare effect
of EC 1993 will, therefore, be either positive or at worst zero for most DCs.
Major exceptions are agricultural economies, the exports of which are heavily
concentrated on specific products, such as bananas, that enjoyed privileged
market access prior to 1993. Another caveat is that more advanced DCs such as121
the Asian NIEs may find it a bit more difficult to compete successfully in EC
markets for skill-intensive products such as automobiles or sophisticated office
equipment. In these markets, EC suppliers stand to gain from market integra-
tion and may realize economies of scale.122
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